People v. Magana

• Decision Date: 14 March 2022
• Docket Number: B311611
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesus MAGANA, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

76 Cal.App.5th 310

291 Cal.Rptr.3d 394

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Jesus MAGANA, Defendant and Appellant.

B311611

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Filed March 14, 2022

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

FEUER, J.

In 2011 Jesus Magana was convicted of two counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14, and he was sentenced to six years in state prison. Prior to Magana's release, on November 7, 2016 the People filed a petition to commit Magana as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. ).¹ At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the superior court found there was no probable cause to support the petition. The People appealed, and we reversed, concluding the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for lack of probable cause because " ‘a reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the offender is an SVP’ " based on the experts’ opinions Magana suffered from pedophilic disorder. ( People v. Magana (Apr. 29, 2019, B288123) 2019 WL 1894773 [nonpub. opn.]).

On remand, the trial court made a finding there was probable cause to believe Magana met the criteria for commitment as an SVP. On the day set for trial, the court provided a minimal advisement to Magana of his right to a jury trial (explaining only that in a court trial the same burden of proof applies), and Magana waived his right to a jury trial. After a seven-day court trial, on March 16, 2021 the trial court found the petition to be true, declared Magana to be an SVP, and committed him to the State Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term.

On appeal, Magana urges us to read into the SVPA a requirement that the trial court provide a full jury trial advisement, as required under other civil commitment statutes. In the alternative, Magana contends the trial court violated his right to due process and equal protection by failing to provide him a sufficient advisement of his right to a jury trial as articulated by the Supreme Court in People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 396 P.3d 424 ( Sivongxxay ).

In People v. Washington (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 453, 463, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ( Washington ) we rejected the argument made by an alleged SVP that we should read into the SVPA a requirement that the trial court provide a full jury trial advisement and take a personal waiver of an alleged SVP's right to a jury trial. We also concluded there was no due process violation. ( Id . at p. 471, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 352.) However, as to the claim that the lack of a full jury trial advisement and waiver violated the defendant's right to equal protection under the federal and California Constitutions ( U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7 ), we remanded for the defendant to raise his claim in the trial court. We observed, "[W]e have difficulty seeing how the dangerousness of an SVP would justify denying an alleged SVP the procedural protections for the right to a jury trial afforded other civil committees, especially given the significant liberty interests at stake for an alleged SVP facing a potential indefinite commitment." ( Washington , at p. 474, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 352.)

As in Washington , Magana's equal protection claim likely has merit. We conclude a rational basis review standard applies to Magana's equal protection claim. Even under this deferential standard, the People have not shown a legitimate government purpose to justify differential treatment of SVP's from other civil committees with respect to advisement of an SVP's right to a jury trial and a personal waiver of that right. However, because Magana did not raise his equal protection claim in the trial court, we remand for Magana to raise his equal protection claim, and upon a showing SVP's and other civil committees are similarly situated as to their right to a jury trial, to provide an opportunity for the People to meet their burden to justify the disparate treatment of SVP's.

We conditionally affirm the order declaring Magana to be an SVP and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term. If the trial court determines there is an equal protection violation, the court shall vacate the order declaring Magana to be an SVP and set the matter for a jury trial, unless Magana provides a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial after being personally advised of that right.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 3, 2021 Magana appeared for trial by videoconference from Coalinga State Hospital, assisted by a Spanish language interpreter. After defense counsel advised the trial court that neither he nor Magana was requesting a jury trial, the court advised Magana as to his right to a jury trial:

"The court: [M]y understanding is that both sides have agreed ... to try this matter without a jury, and—so it will be a court trial for Mr. Magana's benefit.

In a court trial, the same burden of proof applies as in a jury trial. [The] court would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt [of] the allegations ... that are in the petition in order to sustain the petition.

If the People fail to meet that burden, then the petition would not be sustained, and Mr. Magana would be released. Okay?

So my understanding, Mr. Magana, is that you agree with your attorney to proceed without a jury trial and have this court hear the matter. Is that correct, Mr. Magana?

"[Magana]: Yes. That's correct.

"The court: Okay. Thank you. People join in the jury waiver?

"[Prosecutor]: Yes, your honor.

"[Defense counsel]: And I join as well, your honor.

"The court: Excellent. Thank you."

The trial commenced as a court trial on February 3, 2021. On March 16 the court found the petition to be true and declared Magana to be an SVP. The court committed Magana to the State Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term.

Magana timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The SVPA

"The SVPA authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person who has completed a prison term but is found to be a[n] [SVP]." ( State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 344, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 349 P.3d 1013.) An SVP is defined as "a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health or safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." ( § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) "The court must order a trial if there is probable cause, and it must dismiss the petition if there is not." ( State Dept. of State Hospitals, at p. 346, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 349 P.3d 1013 ; accord, People v. Superior Court (Vasquez ) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 43, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 14.)

An alleged SVP is entitled to a jury trial, but only upon a demand by the alleged SVP or the SVP's attorney. Section 6603, subdivision (a), provides, "A person subject to this article is entitled to a trial by jury ...." Subdivision (b), in turn, provides, "The attorney petitioning for commitment under this article has the right to demand that the trial be before a jury." Further, "[i]f the person subject to this article or the petitioning attorney does not demand a jury trial, the trial shall be before the court without a jury." (Id. , subd. (f).) The SVPA does not require the trial court to advise an alleged SVP of the right to a jury trial.

B. Standard of Review

"We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent, giving effect to the law's purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We construe the statute's words in context, harmonizing statutory provisions to avoid absurd results. [Citation.] If the statutory text is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, we may consider extrinsic aids such as legislative history to facilitate our interpretative analysis." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 64, 416 P.3d 53 ; accord, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268 ( Blackburn ).)

C. Right to a Jury Trial in an SVP Proceeding

Magana contends the trial court erred by failing to advise him fully of his right to a jury trial, analogizing to the requirements in the statutory schemes for extending the involuntary commitment of a mentally disordered offender (MDO) ( Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (a)(1) & (2) ) and for extending the involuntary commitment of a person initially committed after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to a criminal offense (id. , § 1026.5, subd. (b)(4) & (5)). Both the MDO and NGI statutes require the trial court to advise the committee of the right to a jury trial and for the committee to waive that right. ( People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, 354 P.3d 148 ( Tran ) ["The trial court must advise the NGI defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision."]; Blackburn , supra , 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1120-1122, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 458, 354 P.3d 268 [MDO statute requires both an advisement of a defendant's right to a jury trial and a personal waiver of that right by ...