People v. Maldonado

• Decision Date: 29 November 1995
• Citation: 635 N.Y.S.2d 155,86 N.Y.2d 631,658 N.E.2d 1028
• Parties: , 658 N.E.2d 1028 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William MALDONADO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 155

635 N.Y.S.2d 155

86 N.Y.2d 631, 658 N.E.2d 1028

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William MALDONADO, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 29, 1995.

Diane Pazar, Philip L. Weinstein and Daniel L. Greenberg, New York City, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County, New York City (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Mark Dwyer, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

The Penal Law provides that a person is guilty of escape in the first degree when "[h]aving been arrested for * * * a class A or class B felony, he escapes from custody" (Penal Law § 205.15[2]. Lower degrees of escape are predicated on an arrest for lesser charges. In this case, defendant has been charged with escape in the first degree following his arrest for selling narcotics, a B felony (see, Penal Law § 220.39[1] ). The question submitted is whether the People presented sufficient evidence of the underlying narcotic crime to support the indictment for escape, first degree.

Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, holding that the People failed to establish a prima facie case of criminal sale of narcotics to support a charge of escape in the first degree. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, concluding that the People need establish only that there was probable cause for the underlying narcotics arrest and that this burden had been satisfied. We now affirm.

I

The charges arise from events during a buy and bust operation. An undercover police officer, after negotiating a purchase of drugs, advised his backup team that there had been a "positive buy" and gave a description of the seller. Based on this radio transmission, Officer Gary Combs arrested defendant for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, a class B felony (see, Penal Law § 220.39[1] ). The police rear-cuffed the defendant and placed him in the back of a police van. While being transported to the station, defendant managed to open the rear door of the van and disappeared into a nearby apartment complex. He remained at large for five days until he was again arrested.

In the interim, a laboratory analysis of the substance sold by defendant tested negative for narcotics and accordingly, the People presented only the escape charge to the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury indicted defendant for escape in the first degree (Penal Law § 205.15[2].

II

Section 205.15(2) of the Penal Law provides that escape in the first degree is committed when a person escapes from custody after "[h]aving been arrested for, or charged with" an A or B felony (Penal Law § 205.15[2]. A person is in custody when he is restrained by a public officer following an authorized arrest (Penal Law § 205.00[2]. The only element in question in this appeal, and the focus of our inquiry, is the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the existence of the underlying crime, i.e., whether the People established that the police made an authorized arrest for a B felony. If the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for an A or B felony, defendant's subsequent escape from custody constituted first degree escape.

Defendant maintains that the People have a greater burden, that they must prove the A or B felony. He points out that the sole difference among the three degrees of escape is the basis for the arrest: a defendant who escapes from general custody is guilty of third degree escape, a class A misdemeanor (Penal Law § 205.05); a defendant who escapes from custody after being arrested for a class C, D or E felony is guilty of second degree escape (Penal Law § 205.10[2]; and a defendant who escapes from custody after being arrested for a class A or B felony is guilty of first degree escape (Penal Law § 205.15[2]. Thus, he urges a showing of the defendant's actual culpability for the underlying crime is necessary to justify the imposition of enhanced punishment for the escape crime. In his view a simple showing of probable cause satisfies the requirement that the custody was lawful, and may demonstrate that the defendant committed escape, third degree, but it does not supply the evidence required to establish the aggravating element, an A or B felony arrest, necessary to subject defendant to enhanced punishment for the escape.

We hold the People need not prove to the Grand Jury's satisfaction that the underlying crime was actually committed or even establish, prima facie, that a narcotic was sold (see, People ex rel. Dixon v. Snyder, 259 App.Div. 760, 18 N.Y.S.2d 171). The statute is satisfied if the People establish that the police had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the arrest that an A or B felony has been committed. The ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant (cf., People v. Eiffel, 81 N.Y.2d 480, 600 N.Y.S.2d 437, 616 N.E.2d 1099; People v. Williams, 25 N.Y.2d 86, 302 N.Y.S.2d 780, 250 N.E.2d 201).

Defendant's argument assumes that the enhancement of the crime of escape is based upon the arrestee's blameworthiness. The conduct involved in escaping, however, is equally culpable regardless of the severity of the underlying charge. The crime increases in degree, not because of the arrestee's blameworthiness, but because of the impact an escaped prisoner charged with an underlying crime of greater severity has on society. A similar degree structure, supported by similar policy concerns, is found in the bail jumping statutes (Penal Law § 215.55 et seq.).

Nor do we find persuasive defendant's reliance on cases such as People v. Warren, 103 A.D.2d 760, 477 N.Y.S.2d 234 and People v. Jeffries, 129 A.D.2d 962, 514 N.Y.S.2d 277. The Courts in those cases construed the statute as we do to require probable cause for the arrest for the underlying felony. The arrests in both those cases were for grand larceny, a crime which is defined in terms of the value of the property. Inasmuch as value is an element of the crime of grand larceny, the Courts held the People had failed to establish probable cause for the arrests for grand larceny because they had failed to establish the value element. There is no similar requirement that the police know the kind or amount of the narcotics involved before making an arrest for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (see, People v. Williams, 205 A.D.2d 567, 613 N.Y.S.2d 211; People v. Hernandez, 189 A.D.2d 634, 592 N.Y.S.2d 331; People v Acevedo, 179 A.D.2d 465, 467, 577 N.Y.S.2d 864).

III

The inquiry, then, is whether Officer Combs possessed probable cause to arrest defendant for selling narcotics.

A police officer may arrest for an offense without a warrant if he has reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed that offense in his presence (CPL 140.10[1][b]. Reasonable cause means probable cause (see, People v. Johnson, 66...