People v. Mathews
| Decision Date | 12 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | SC: 158102,COA: 339079 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Laricca Seminta MATHEWS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
On October 3, 2019, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to deny leave in this case because I believe that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the warnings provided to defendant were insufficient under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny. I would reverse.
Defendant Laricca Mathews was charged with open murder, MCL 750.316, and related firearms charges arising out of the shooting death of her boyfriend, Gabriel Dumas. Defendant called 911 and told the dispatcher that she had shot Dumas. After the police arrived at the scene, she was taken into custody and transported to the Wixom Police Department. Defendant was interviewed twice while at the police station. Both interviews were videotaped, as required by MCL 763.8(2). During the first interview, Detective Brian Stowinsky provided defendant with an advice-of-rights form, which stated:
Detective Stowinsky orally reviewed the advice-of-rights form with defendant, and the following exchange took place:
Defendant signed the form, and Detective Stowinsky proceeded to interview her. During the interview, defendant claimed that she and Dumas had been fighting and that she had shot Dumas in self-defense after Dumas attacked her.
Later that day, Sergeant Michael DesRosiers conducted a second interview with defendant. Before the interview, the following exchange took place:
During the second interview, defendant claimed that she shot the victim when they were "face to face." When Sergeant DesRosiers told defendant that Dumas had been shot in the back of the head, defendant speculated that the bullet may have ricocheted off the wall. She also suggested the shooting may have been an accident.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements that she made to police arguing, in pertinent part, that the police failed to advise her that she had the right to have an attorney present both before and during questioning.1 The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that the police had failed to inform defendant that she had the right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The Court of Appeals initially denied the prosecution’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal, but on remand from this Court, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that suppressed defendant’s statements. After recognizing the conflicting authority on the issue, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, holding that "a general warning regarding a ‘right to a lawyer’ does not comply with the dictates of Miranda ." People v. Mathews , 324 Mich. App. 416, 429, 922 N.W.2d 371 (2018). Because there was no binding caselaw addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals undertook a lengthy and thorough review of its own cases, along with cases from the federal circuits and our sister state courts. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals majority decided to follow its own prior decisions, see, e.g., People v. Whisenant , 11 Mich. App. 432, 434, 161 N.W.2d 425 (1968),2 and those of the federal circuit courts, holding that a defendant must be specifically advised of the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Noti , 731 F.2d 610, 615 (C.A. 9, 1984). The Court of Appeals described the decisions of other federal circuits holding that general warnings were sufficient as "disingenuous in light of Miranda ’s mandate for clear and unambiguous warnings[.]" Mathews , 324 Mich. App. at 438, 922 N.W.2d 371.
Miranda has been called a "pathmarking decision." Florida v. Powell , 559 U.S. 50, 53, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010). It ruled that "an individual must be ‘clearly informed,’ prior to custodial questioning, that he has, among other rights, ‘the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.’ " Id ., quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It is beyond dispute, however, that Miranda was not intended, and has not been interpreted, as establishing a precise incantation that must be given prior to a custodial interrogation. Miranda itself said that either the warnings it laid down or "a fully effective equivalent" were required. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see also Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) ().
The Supreme Court’s post- Miranda pronouncements on the topic similarly make clear that the "Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed." Powell , 559 U.S. at 60, 130 S.Ct. 1195 ; see also California v. Prysock , 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) ( ). The question is whether the warning that was given reasonably conveyed the rights specified in Miranda , and in making this determination the warning need not be interpreted as though it were a legal document. Duckworth v. Eagan , 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989).
With regard to the specific warning at issue here—the notice of the right to an attorney—the Supreme Court has not established that the warning must expressly notify the suspect of the right to consult an attorney before questioning or have one present during it. Some comments in Miranda suggest such a requirement. See Miranda , 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (). But other statements mentioned the right to an attorney’s "presence" without specifying when and where the "presence" would occur.3 And when the Court gave an example of satisfactory warning language that complied with the standards it had set forth, it chose (and even lauded as "exemplary") the standard warning that was given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Miranda , 384 U.S. at 483, 86 S.Ct. 1602. This is important because the FBI’s practice was to give only the general warning "that the person has ... a right to counsel," which included no information regarding when the right applied. Id. at 484, 86 S.Ct. 1602.4
As courts have recognized, Miranda ’s various statements thus create some ambiguity.5 And, while it appears the discussion of the FBI warnings was not necessary to decide the case,6 the bottom line is that the Court specifically approved a warning that lacked any explicit reference to the time when the right to counsel attached, i.e., that it attached before or during the interrogation. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained it well:
To be sure, Miranda clarified that "presence" includes the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning. But Miranda did not require a warning exactly to that effect. Case in point: Miranda acknowledged that the warnings employed by the FBI at the time of its decision were "consistent with the procedure which we delineate today." And those warnings, while advising of the right to counsel, conspicuously did not state expressly that counsel may be present during interrogation. [ United States v. Clayton , 937 F.3d 630, 639 (C.A. 6, 2019) (citation omitted).]
See also United States v. Lamia , 429 F.2d 373, 376-377 (C.A. 2, 1970) (); cf. People of Territory of Guam v. Snaer , 758 F.2d 1341, 1342 (C.A. 9, 1985) (...
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...of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information.’ " People v Mathews , 505 Mich. 1114, 1121 n 9, 943 N.W.2d 636 (2020) ( Viviano , J., dissenting), quoting Grice, Logic and Conversation , in 3 Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts (New York: Academi......