People v. McChriston

• Decision Date: 24 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 115310.,115310.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Billy McCHRISTON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2014 IL 115310

4 N.E.3d 29

378 Ill.Dec. 430

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Billy McCHRISTON, Appellant.

No. 115310.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 24, 2014.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Karen Munoz, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Julia R. Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Stephen M. Soltanzadeh, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

VIncent Boggan, of Concerned Inmates of Dixon Correctional Center, of Dixon, amicus curiae.

OPINION

Chief Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 2004, defendant, Billy McChriston, was convicted by jury of the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony that carried a mandatory Class X sentence. The trial judge sentenced defendant to 25 years' imprisonment. The trial order did not indicate that defendant would also be required to serve a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) pursuant to section 5–8–1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d) (West 2004)), nor did the trial judge mention MSR at the sentencing hearing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentencing on direct appeal. No. 4–04–0770 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 2 Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 2008)), raising issues not related to the MSR term. The circuit court dismissed the postconviction petition and the appellate court affirmed ( People v. McChriston, No. 4–07–0720, 386 Ill.App.3d 1133, 361 Ill.Dec. 264, 970 N.E.2d 630 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)).

¶ 3 Then in 2011, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2010)), arguing that the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) impermissibly added a three-year MSR term to his 25–year sentence. The circuit court of Champaign County dismissed defendant's petition for failure to state a cause of action. 735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2010).

¶ 4 The appellate court affirmed, rejecting defendant's arguments that the imposition of the MSR term violated defendant's constitutional rights to due process and the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The appellate court found that the MSR term attached by operation of law and therefore was not unconstitutionally imposed by the DOC.2012 IL App (4th) 110319–U, 2012 WL 7017233. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 5 ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Defendant argues that only the trial court, not the DOC, is empowered to impose a term of MSR, and therefore the addition of the MSR term to defendant's sentence violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution and his federal constitutional right to due process. Looking to the plain language of the statute, the State asks this court to affirm the appellate court's conclusion that the sentence imposed by the circuit court included the MSR term “as though written therein” and, therefore, MSR attached as part of the sentence regardless of whether the trial judge wrote MSR into the sentencing order. We review a dismissal of a section 2–1401 petition for failure to state a claim for relief de novo. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill.2d 1, 16, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007).

¶ 7 A. Separation of Powers

¶ 8 Under the Illinois Constitution, “[t]he legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No Branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. Further, “the power to impose sentence is exclusively a function of the judiciary.” People v. Phillips, 66 Ill.2d 412, 415, 6 Ill.Dec. 215, 362 N.E.2d 1037 (1977). Defendant maintains that because the trial court did not reference the mandatory MSR term at the sentencing hearing or in the written sentencing order, the DOC lacks the authority to impose the MSR term upon defendant after he serves his full 25–year sentence.

¶ 9 At the time defendant was sentenced, the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) provided that, subject to earlier termination, the MSR term for a Class X felony was three years. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d)(1) (West 2004). Further, the Code stated that “[e]xcept where a term of natural life is imposed, every sentence shall include as though written therein a term in addition to the term of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d) (West 2004).

¶ 10 The parties do not dispute as to whether MSR was mandatory in defendant's case. At the time defendant was sentenced, section 5–8–1(d)(1) required defendant's sentence to include a three-year MSR term. The central issue in this case is whether defendant's constitutional rights were violated by the imposition of MSR where the trial court did not reference the MSR term at the sentencing hearing or include MSR in the sentencing order.

¶ 11 Defendant maintains that the DOC lacked authority to increase his sentence beyond that imposed by the trial court, as “under our form of government an administrative board has no power to change a judicial judgment.” People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 609, 44 N.E.2d 569 (1942). In support of his position that the MSR term was added by the DOC, defendant looks to People v. Kerns, 2012 IL App (3d) 100375, ¶ 18, 359 Ill.Dec. 193, 966 N.E.2d 514, where the Third District considered similar facts and stated that “the DOC imposed a term of MSR under section 5–8–1(d)(4).”

¶ 12 In response, the State argues that under the plain language of section 5–8–1(d), the MSR term was included in defendant's sentence “as though written therein,” even though the MSR term was not written explicitly into the sentence. Therefore, according to the State, the imposition of MSR did not increase the trial court's sentencing order, as the MSR term was automatically included in the sentence from the beginning.

¶ 13 This court has previously held that it is within the General Assembly's authority to enact legislation that includes a mandatory parole term in a sentence by operation of law. People ex rel. Scott v. Israel, 66 Ill.2d 190, 5 Ill.Dec. 580, 361 N.E.2d 1108 (1977). In Scott, two defendants challenged the constitutionality of section 5–8–1(e), which like section 5–8–1(d)(1) stated that every sentence “shall include as though written therein” an MSR term. The defendants each served the sentences imposed by the court, but each violated his parole term after being released from prison. This court upheld the mandatory MSR terms, finding that the DOC had the power to enforce them.

¶ 14 Furthermore, in People v. Williams, 66 Ill.2d 179, 186, 5 Ill.Dec. 582, 361 N.E.2d 1110 (1977), this court stated that “the legislature has the power to prohibit particular acts as crimes, fix the punishment for the commission of such crimes and determine the manner of executing such punishment.” The court further found that mandating parole periods falls within this power. Defendant, however, argues that the statute does not authorize the DOC to increase defendant's sentence, as “[a] person on parole remains subject to the sentence of commitment to the [DOC] for the period of time specified by the court.” Id. at 187, 5 Ill.Dec. 582, 361 N.E.2d 1110.

¶ 15 We look first to the plain language of section 5–8–1(d). “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. [Citation.] The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] When the statute contains undefined terms, it is entirely appropriate to employ a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms. [Citation.] Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. [Citation.]” People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30, 40, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545 (2009).

¶ 16 Defendant's position relies on the premise that the MSR term was not included as part of his original sentence because it was not written in the sentence. If under the plain language of the statute, however, the MSR term was included automatically into the sentence, even if not specifically written, then the DOC did not add onto defendant's sentence by imposing the MSR term, and defendant's separation of powers argument must fail.

¶ 17 The version of the statute applicable at the time of defendant's sentencing stated that “every sentence shall include as though written therein a term in addition to the term of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d) (West 2004). Specifically, we are concerned with the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “every sentence shall include as though written therein.” Black's Law Dictionary defines “therein” to mean “[i]nside or within that thing; inside or within those things.” Black's Law Dictionary 1616 (9th ed. 2009). Consequently, the plain language of section 5–8–1(d) provides that the sentence shall include a period of MSR as if it were written within the sentence. Applying this plain meaning to the present case, the sentencing order issued by the trial court included a term of MSR even if the court did not mention the MSR term at the sentencing hearing or in the sentencing order.

¶ 18 As further evidence of this conclusion, we look to the legislative history of section 5–8–1(d)(1). In 2011, section 5–8–1(d)(1) was amended and now reads, “the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be written as part of the sentencing order.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d) (West 2012).

“A subsequent amendment to a statute may be an appropriate source for...