People v. Meals

• Decision Date: 02 July 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 25915
• Citation: 122 Cal.Rptr. 585,49 Cal.App.3d 702
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Lester MEALS, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 585

122 Cal.Rptr. 585

49 Cal.App.3d 702

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Lester MEALS, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 25915.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

July 2, 1975.

Burton Marks, Beverly Hills, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., James H. Kline and Donald F. Roeschke, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BEACH, Associate Justice.

Robert Meals, Jr. appeals from the judgment of conviction (order of probation) and from various orders of the trial court that are not appealable except from the judgment. The conviction was based on a guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain; a certificate of probable cause (Pen.Code, § 1237.5) is in the record. ¹

In an indictment filed November 20, 1973, appellant and several codefendants were charged with conspiracy to commit grand theft. A second indictment, filed April 11, 1974, charged appellant and codefendants with conspiracy to commit grand theft and to receive stolen property. The proceedings culminating in the plea bargain are based on the second indictment. A motion under Penal Code setion 995 to dismiss the indictment was denied. ² A demurrer to the indictment was also overruled.

A plea bargain was entered into whereby defendants would plead guilty to conspiracy to receive stolen property; the matter would be made a misdemeanor by sentence without any representation or promise as to what the sentence would be; and all Defendants would be entitled to a certificate of probable cause to appeal those issues contained in the motions to dismiss, in the demurrer and in the petitions for writ of prohibition. A motion to set aside the plea (filed 'in order to have a record') was denied. Appellant was sentenced; execution of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL:

1. The indictment should have been set aside because the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to warrant conviction of the alleged offense of conspiracy. In addition, much of the evidence before the grand jury was inadmissible because defendant's extrajudicial statements cannot be used to establish the conspiracy; and without the proof of conspiracy, hearsay statements of co-conspirators cannot be used.

2. The indictment was defective because it was found in violation of Penal Code section 939.6(a) in that it was predicated on off the record statements by the district attorney rather than on any competent evidence of conspiracy.

DISCUSSION:

Sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable in this appeal.

Appellant wants this court to review the evidence presented to the grand jury to determine if it was sufficient to 'warrant a conviction by a trial jury.' Initially, we note that that is not the test by which to review sufficiency of evidence leading to an indictment. "Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (Citation.) An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming the Possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.' (People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal.2d 503, 532, 30 Cal.Rptr. 538, 553, 381 P.2d 394, 409.)

More important here is the fact that sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal from a guilty plea. (People v. Stanworth, 11 Cal.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058.)

A)plea of guilty is an admission of every element of the offense, so that no other proof is necessary. (See People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574--575, 58 Cal.Rptr. 313, 426 P.2d 881; People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 636, 651, 343 P.2d 577.) A judgment entered upon such a plea is not reviewable on the merits. Even though the judgment is appealable (under section 1237.5), 'irregularities not going to the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings will not be reviewed.' (People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 281--282, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 651, 431 P.2d 228, 235; Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal.2d 864, 870, 388 P.2d 182.)

'. . .196

The claimed insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury is not an issue which goes to the jurisdiction or the legality of the trial court proceedings in any fundamental sense. Penal Code section 995 gives the defendant the opportunity to challenge the regularity of the grand jury proceedings or the preliminary examination as well as the existence of probable cause, by motion prior to entering his plea. . . . Insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury or at the preliminary examination is 'jurisdictional' in the special procedural sense that the ruling of the trial court (on the motion under Penal Code section 995) may be reviewed By writ of prohibition under Penal Code section 999a. (See Guerin v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 80, 83, 75 Cal.Rptr. 92.) But the defect is not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, because . . . it is subject to waiver.' (Emphasis added.) (People v. Warburton, 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 821--822, 86 Cal.Rptr. 894, 897. See also People v. Martin, 9 Cal.3d 687, 693, 108 Cal.Rptr. 809, 511 P.2d 1161; People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058.) At bench appellant did not seek a writ of prohibition under Penal Code section 999a after denial of his motion under Penal Code section 995. He therefore waived his right to a review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury.

Although sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury is not reviewable on appeal from an ordinary plea of guilty, it might be contended that a plea bargain specifically providing that defendant shall be entitled to such a review might preserve the issue. This contention is answered in People v. Castro, 42 Cal.App.3d 960, 117 Cal.Rptr. 295. '(W)hile a plea bargain has been permitted to accomplish that result where the pretrial ruling specifically reserved for appeal was collateral to and not inconsistent with the guilty plea (see People v. Glover, 40 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010--1011, 115 Cal.Rptr. 714, where appellate review of the denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was permitted), it has not been permitted to do so where, as here, the result would be wholly illogical and totally inconsistent (see People v. Brown . . . 18 Cal.App.3d 1052, 1054--1055, 96 Cal.Rptr. 476).' (People v. Castro, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 964, 117 Cal.Rptr. at p. 297.) As in Castro and People v. Brown, 18 Cal.App.3d 1052, 96 Cal.Rptr. 476, the result in the instant case would be totally inconsistent with the admission of guilt. The issue of sufficiency of the evidence is therefore not reviewable. (People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d 588, 605, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058.)

The plea bargain was improper.

As in People v. Brown, supra, 18 Cal.App.3d 1052, 96 Cal.Rptr. 476 appellant's consideration for his plea of guilty was not fully explained to him in the plea bargain. He properly waived his rights to jury trial, to trial by court, to cross-examine witnesses, to confrontation, and against self-incrimination. He also admitted there was a factual basis to the plea. It was explained that defendants would plead to conspiracy to receive stolen property; the matter would be made a misdemeanor by sentence; and 'all defendants will be entitled to a certificate of probable cause to appeal those issues which have been raised or reasonably found in the motions to dismiss in the demurrer and which are set forth in the petitions for writs of prohibition ³ . . .' However, appellant gave up his right to appeal from a judgment after trial, which would have permitted review of the issues he now raises. He did this in exchange for, among other things, the promise of a certificate of probable cause. 'The certificate is a procedural requirement to perfect an appeal from a judgment based upon a plea of guilty; it does not provide grounds for an appeal or determine the issues which are reviewable. (See People v. Ribero, 4 Cal.3d 55, 63, 92 Cal.Rptr. 692, 480 P.2d 308.)' (People v. Castro, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 965, 117 Cal.Rptr. at p. 298.) This limited right to appeal was not explained to appellant; therefore, under People v. Brown, supra, 18 Cal.App.3d at p. 1055, 96 Cal.Rptr. 476, he was not properly advised of the consequences of his plea.

We are mindful of the legality of plea bargains. (People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.) There are, however, limits to the plea bargain procedure. The plea bargain cannot be used to change or to ignore statutory requirements which the trial court has no power to change or to ignore. We, therefore, emphasize that it is inappropriate for the trial court to accept a plea based on a plea bargain which contains a promise that defendant will be entitled to or shall receive a certificate of probable cause (presumably made in order that defendant may pursue an appeal under section 1237.5). The case at bench illustrates that such a promise may well be illusory and hence worthless (People v....