People v. Mendoza, E048399 (Cal. App. 3/8/2010)

Decision Date08 March 2010
Docket NumberE048399.
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN MENDOZA, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Superior Court of Riverside County, No. RIF116877, James T. Warren, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Pamela Ratner Sobeck and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Not to be Published in Official Reports

OPINION

RICHLI, J.

Defendant and appellant Juan Mendoza appeals following the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This is his second appeal. Defendant pled guilty to committing an attempted battery by gassing on a police officer (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 4501.1, subd. (a))1 (count 1) and two counts of committing a battery on a noninmate (§ 4501.5) (counts 2 and 3). Defendant also admitted that he had sustained three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 27 years to life in state prison. (People v. Mendoza (Dec. 12, 2008, E045428) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions; however, we ordered the abstract of judgment amended to reflect imposition of a one-year term for each of the two prior prison term enhancements, instead of the two 2-year terms indicated in the abstract of judgment. (Ibid.)

On remand, the trial court vacated the two 2-year terms, imposed a term of one year for each of the prior prison term enhancements, and resentenced defendant to 27 years to life in state prison. Defendant thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which was heard and denied. The trial court then vacated defendant's sentence on the two prior prison term enhancements, reimposed them, and then stayed them, for a total term of 25 years to life in state prison.2

In this second appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

II

DISCUSSION3

On January 28, 2008, defendant initialed and signed a felony plea form, pleading to the sheet with "no deals" promised. Defendant was informed that the maximum possible custody commitment would be 25 years to life. Defendant's initials acknowledged that he was advised of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his plea. Defendant also indicated that he had adequate time to discuss with his attorney his constitutional rights, the consequences of his plea, and any defenses he had against the charge. At the guilty plea hearing, the court inquired whether defendant understood the plea, signed the plea form, reviewed the plea form with his attorney, understood his constitutional rights, and understood that he was voluntarily giving up those rights. Defendant answered in the affirmative. Therefore, the court found that defendant willingly, voluntarily, and knowingly entered his guilty plea.

In regard to the possible sentence defendant could receive, the court, in great lengths, explained to defendant the following: ". . . I would have the ability on the three counts I could sentence those all consecutively so it would be a 75 year to life potential term. I will indicate to you that I would not sentence you—at the very worst case scenario—to no more than 25 to life. I'm not saying I would do . . . that, but that would be the worst case scenario if it all went badly for you. What's going to happen now at this point is that the matter will be referred to the Probation Department. We'll get what information they have. We'll set this for a sentencing proceeding, and I'll hear from your attorney regarding a motion to strike those prior strikes if he wishes to file that. There can be any kind of argument regarding the disposition in this case. So the worst case scenario would be 75 to life.

"I could also go all the way to the other end of the extreme and strike all the strikes and grant you probation and give you some time in the county jail. And there's lots of options in between, and all of that is on the table. I am not making any disposition. I could tell you right now I don't have a clue as to what I'm going to do at the end of this case, but I will assure you I'll give you fair consideration. I'll take into account your entering a plea of guilty rather than going to trial. That would be a factor in your favor, and I will certainly consider that. But I'm making no promises or representations as to how this will come out. We'll take it from there. Essentially, you are in the same position as if you went to trial and were convicted of everything except that you wouldn't have the benefit of a guilty plea instead of a jury verdict. So you have improved your situation in that regard but, again, I would emphasize no promise or deals." The court then asked defendant whether "we understand each other?" Defendant replied in the affirmative.

On March 20, 2009, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming his trial counsel advised him his sentence would be four years rather than the 25-year-to-life sentence ultimately imposed. In support, defendant merely declared that he was "entitled to withdraw the plea because the court intends to impose the following sentence, which differs significantly from that to which I agreed." The People filed an opposition on March 26, 2009.

The hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was heard on April 29, 2009. The trial court indicated that it had read and considered defendant's motion, the opposition, and the transcript of the proceedings on January 28, 2008, when defendant entered his plea. Following argument from defense counsel, the trial court denied the motion.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his trial counsel informed him that he would face a maximum sentence of four years in state prison if he pled guilty and not the 25 years to life he actually received. In the alternative, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of the possible and likely consequences in pleading guilty. We disagree.

Under section 1018, the trial court may, on a showing of good cause, allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty. The defendant has the burden of establishing good cause by clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585.) "`Good cause'" means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or another factor that overcomes the exercise of free will. (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917.) The trial court then considers all factors necessary to obtain a just result, including the rights of the defendant. (People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 798.) The trial court must examine whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the elements of the offense, the pleas, and the defenses at the time of his plea. (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103.)

"A decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "`rests in the sound discretion of the trial court"' and is final unless the defendant can show a clear abuse of that discretion." (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) The trial court has broad discretion when considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and the facts found by the trial court must be adopted by the reviewing court if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Suon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) Therefore, the trial court's denial must be "arbitrary or capricious or `"`exceed[] the bounds of reason . . .'"'" to be disturbed on appeal. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)

In this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that defendant's trial counsel led him to believe that his plea would result in a four-year sentence and not the 25 years to life actually imposed. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The plea form indicated the maximum possible custody commitment would be 25 years to life. Defendant's initials on the plea form acknowledged that he was advised of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his plea. Defendant also indicated that he had adequate time to discuss with his attorney his constitutional rights, the consequences of his plea, and any defenses he had against the charge. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court repeatedly explained the plea to defendant and the possible sentence defendant could receive. The trial court informed defendant that there were "no . . . deals," that nothing had been promised to him, and that he could receive a sentence between probation and 25 years to life. Defendant answered in the affirmative to the court's inquiry of whether defendant understood the plea, signed the plea form, reviewed the plea form with his attorney, understood his constitutional rights, and understood that he was voluntarily giving up those rights. Defendant also indicated that he understood the possible sentence he could receive. Therefore, the court found that defendant willingly, voluntarily, and knowingly entered his guilty plea.

There patently was no abuse of discretion here. The trial court evidently did not believe defendant's claim that his trial counsel led him to believe he would receive a four-year sentence if he pled guilty, and the record provides no basis whatsoever for differing with this evaluation of credibility. Determinations of credibility and the truth or falsity of the facts on which the determinations depend...

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