People v. Miller

• Decision Date: 21 November 2016
• Docket Number: B267728
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. QUENTIN AVERY MILLER, Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. QUENTIN AVERY MILLER, Defendant and Appellant.

B267728

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

November 21, 2016

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA428962)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Dennis J. Landin, Judge. Affirmed.

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, William N. Frank, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * * California's anti-pimping statute makes it a crime, among other things, for a person to knowingly derive his "support or maintenance" from a prostitute's earnings. (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a).)¹ The substantive due process component of the due process clause severely limits a state's power to interfere with certain fundamental liberty interests, including the right to make the "most basic decisions about family." (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. 833, 849 (Casey).) If a pimp and his prostitute have had a prior intimate relationship and continue to live together and share living expenses, does the anti-pimping statute unconstitutionally interfere with the pimp's fundamental right to choose his "family"? The statute is not facially invalid (People v. Grant (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 107, 111-117 (Grant)), but is it invalid as applied to such a pimp? We conclude the answer is no.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Quentin Avery Miller (defendant) met Tiffani M. (Tiffani) back in 2011, when Tiffani was just 16 years old. They dated and lived together for two or three years. After they broke up, Tiffani and the son she had with another man twice moved in with defendant: She lived with defendant and other roommates for seven months in 2013, and with defendant and others for a few months in early 2014.

During these times Tiffani lived with defendant, he told her he needed money and encouraged her to be a prostitute for him. He instructed her on what to charge for various sex acts and what sorts of men to "date"; he bought her pepper spray to protect herself; he drove her to the locales where men trolled for prostitutes; and he bailed her out of jail when she was eventually arrested for prostitution in 2014. Indeed, Tiffani even got defendant's "pimp name"—"Savage"—tattooed on her body. Tiffani always contributed all or some of her earnings to pay the expenses of the household she shared with defendant and the others.

The People charged defendant with several crimes, including pimping Tiffani for three months in early 2014 (§ 266h, subd. (a)). The People further alleged that he did so at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). A jury convicted defendant of the pimping count, but found the gang allegation not true. Defendant was acquitted of every other charged crime.²

The trial court imposed a prison sentence of three years.

Defendant filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, defendant argues that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for pimping, and (2) the pimping statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Because our resolution of the first issue may obviate the need to reach the second, constitutional issue (e.g., People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 401-402, fn. 2 [courts should avoid reaching constitutional questions unless necessary]), we turn first to the sufficiency question.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

California's anti-pimping statute prohibits (1) "liv[ing]" on a prostitute's earnings, (2) "deriv[ing] support or maintenance" from a prostitute's earnings, and (3) "solicit[ing] or receiv[ing] compensation for soliciting" a prostitute. (§ 266h, subd. (a); People v. McNulty (1988) 202Cal.App.3d 624, 630.) To convict a defendant under the second prong at issue here, the People must prove that (1) the defendant "derive[d] [his] support or maintenance in whole or in part" from a prostitute's "earnings or proceeds," (2) the defendant knew the person was a prostitute, and (3) the defendant knew the earnings or proceeds used for his support or maintenance came from prostitution. (§ 266h, subd. (a); People v. Tipton (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 213, 217-218 (Tipton); People v. Simpson (1926) 79 Cal.App. 555, 559.)

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction, we ask only whether there was enough credible evidence of solid value for a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.) We do so while viewing the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict, which includes drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in favor of that verdict. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 89.)

The evidence in this case amply supports defendant's conviction for pimping. Tiffani testified that, in early 2014, defendant charged her $250 per month for household expenses, that he knew she was working as a prostitute, and that he knew that the money she paid him came from her income as a prostitute. Indeed, defendant himself admitted to all of these facts when he took the stand at trial.

Defendant levels three specific challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.

First, he asserts that he cannot be guilty of pimping because, at most, he lived off of her prostitution income but was not involved in her prostitution business. This argument confuses the crime of pimping by deriving support with the crime of pandering. Pandering involves the active procurement, encouragement or inducement of a person to engage in prostitution with the intent "to persuade or otherwise influence the target 'to become a prostitute.'" (§ 266i, subd. (a); People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980.) Pimping by deriving support is a general intent crime and does not require any active involvement in the prostitution. (People v. Gibson (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 386.) Defendant goes on to suggest that the reduced intent requirement for pimping by deriving support renders it an impermissible strict liability crime(In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 879 [noting general prohibition set forth in section 20 against crimes having no mens rea requirement but carrying substantial penalties]), but his argument ignores that this type of pimping has two knowledge requirements that preclude its classification as a strict liability crime (People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331-332). Moreover, even if a defendant's active involvement were an element of pimping by deriving support, defendant was involved in Tiffani's prostitution because he told her how much to charge and drove her to find "dates." Defendant protests that he denied any involvement when he testified, but Tiffani testified to the contrary and, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must resolve this conflict in the evidence—like all others—in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict. (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1086.)

Second, defendant argues that in 2014 he had a job at AutoZone and lived in government subsidized housing, and therefore did not need Tiffani's monthly contribution to make ends meet. However, such necessity is not a requirement, and its absence is consequently not a defense. The statute itself only requires that the pimp "derive[] [his] support or maintenance in whole or in part." (§ 266h, subd. (a), italics added.) That the pimp has income from other sources is of no concern. (People v. Coronado (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 762, 766 ["if such earnings are received knowingly and applied to the support of the accused person, under the circumstances mentioned in the statute, he would be guilty of pimping regardless of his wealth, possessions or legitimate income from other sources"]; People v. Courtney (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 731, 739-740 [gainful employment is not a defense to pimping].) The anti-pimping statute was meant to reach "'opulent violators'" as well as "'impecunious ones.'" (People v. Kennedy (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 814, 817.)

Third, defendant contends that he used Tiffani's money to pay household expenses. This fact does not exonerate him; to the contrary, it is an element of the offense necessary to convict him.

II. Substantive Due Process Challenge

The federal Constitution provides that "[n]o State" shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." (U.S. Const., art. XIV, § 1; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) ["[a] person may not bedeprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"].) Due process not only guarantees that certain, minimum procedural safeguards will be followed before a person is deprived of life, liberty or property (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334-335), but also has a substantive component that places certain deprivations beyond the power of the State to effect—regardless of the procedural safeguards that are provided—absent a sufficiently compelling justification (Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 301-302).

In examining whether a particular statute violates this substantive due process guarantee, we must ask four questions. First, what right or interest is the challenger asserting? (In re Lira (2014) 58 Cal.4th 573, 585 ["[s]ubstantive due process analysis begins with a '"careful description"' of the asserted fundamental liberty...