People v. Moran

• Citation: 376 P.3d 617,205 Cal.Rptr.3d 491,1 Cal.5th 398
• Decision Date: 04 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. S215914.,S215914.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jeffrey Michael MORAN, Defendant and Appellant.

1 Cal.5th 398

376 P.3d 617

205 Cal.Rptr.3d 491

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Jeffrey Michael MORAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S215914.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 4, 2016.

Joshua H. Schraer, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Alisha M. Carlile and

Leif M. Dautch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

We granted review in this case to consider the Court of Appeal's ruling that a probation condition prohibiting defendant Moran from entering the premises or adjacent parking lot of any Home Depot store in California violates his constitutional right to travel. Because we find no such constitutional violation, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. Facts

Defendant Moran entered a Home Depot store in San Jose, placed items valued at $128 in his backpack, and left the store without paying. Confronted by store security, he admitted the theft and explained that he had hoped to resell the stolen items. He later pleaded no contest to second degree burglary and having served a prior prison term for vehicle theft (Pen.Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd. (b) ),¹ in exchange for an indicated sentence of probation on conditions including a year in jail and, at issue here, the condition that he not “go on the premises, parking lot adjacent or any store of Home Depot in the State of California.” He did not object to these conditions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that “[a]lthough ... there is an obvious nexus between appellant's crime and the probation condition as it relates to the specific Home Depot store from which he took the merchandise, ... the condition should contain an exception that would allow [him] to be on Home Depot property on legitimate business....” According to the appellate court, because the condition lacked this exception, it was unconstitutionally overbroad. That court also suggested the condition violated defendant's constitutional right to travel, noting that the “right to travel ‘is simply elementary in a free society. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.’ ” The Court of Appeal struck the challenged probation condition and, as so modified, affirmed the judgment. We granted the People's petition for review.

II. Discussion

The People argue the state may place a criminal offender on probation, subject to a condition that he or she stay away from the property of the victim, without contravening the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel. Consistent with established law,² we first address whether the probation condition was permissible under state law before turning to resolve any potential federal constitutional issue posed in the case.

A. Statutory Basis for the Condition

Following a defendant's conviction of a crime, the sentencing court may choose among a variety of dispositional options. One option is to release the offender on probation. “Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation.” ( People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67 (Carbajal ).) A grant of probation is “qualitatively different from such traditional forms of punishment as fines or imprisonment. Probation is neither ‘punishment’ (see § 15 ) nor a criminal ‘judgment’ (see § 1445 ). Instead, courts deem probation an act of clemency in lieu of punishment [citation], and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in nature [citation].” (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 946 P.2d 828.) Accordingly, we have explained that a grant of probation is an act of grace or clemency, and an offender has no right or privilege to be granted such release. (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 32, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 685, 235 P.3d 11.) Stated differently, “[p]robation is not a right, but a privilege.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.)

Although the Legislature has directed in some circumstances that probation be unavailable³ or limited,⁴ in most circumstances the trial court has broad discretion to choose probation when sentencing a criminal offender. A reviewing court will defer to such choice absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. (People v. Franco (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 342, 348, 226 Cal.Rptr. 280 ; People v. Goodson (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 290, 295, 145 Cal.Rptr. 489.)

When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and ... for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) Accordingly, we have recognized a sentencing court has “broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1120, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.) But such discretion is not unlimited: “[A] condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute,” and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be “ ‘reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ ” (Id. at p. 1121, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.) “If the defendant finds the conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise face, he may refuse probation” (People v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 32, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 685, 235 P.3d 11 ) and simply “choose to serve the sentence” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1 (Olguin )).⁵

On appeal, “[w]e review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1.) That is, a reviewing court will disturb the trial court's decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.)

As noted, ante, the types of conditions a court may impose on a probationer are not unlimited. We first recognized the limits on probation conditions in the seminal case of People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (Lent ).⁶ “Generally, ‘[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 379–380, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1, quoting Lent, supra, at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.)

Applying this test, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under state law when it imposed the Home Depot “stay away” condition on defendant's probation. Indeed, the condition fails Lent's first factor for invalidity: Because defendant stole from a Home Depot store, the condition that he stay away from all such stores is reasonably related to his crime. He was not, after all, prohibited from entering all retail establishments nor even all home improvement, hardware, or big box stores. The condition simply prevented him from entering the stores (and adjacent parking lots) of the company he victimized. As the test is one of reasonableness and deference to the trial court's exercise of discretion, we find sufficient grounds to uphold the trial court's choice in this regard.

Were more support needed for our conclusion, we observe that the condition also fails Lent's third factor for invalidity, because prohibiting defendant from entering Home Depot stores is reasonably directed at curbing his future criminality by preventing him from returning to the scene of his past transgression and thus helping him avoid any temptation of repeating his socially undesirable behavior. (See § 1203.1, subd. (j) [probation conditions should be aimed at “the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer”] Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545.) Sentencing courts often condition a grant of probation on the offender's agreement to avoid future contact with his or her victim. (See, e.g., People v. Armas (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176, fn. 2, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 [defendant ordered to stay away from his victim]; People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1104, fn. 2, 267 Cal.Rptr. 494 [defendant ordered to stay 100 yards from victim's residence].) Indeed, such so-called stay-away orders are common in domestic violence cases. (See § 1203.097, subd. (a)(2) [authorizing protective orders that may include stay away conditions].)

Defendant asserts Home Depot has 232 stores in California (including 14 such stores within 20 miles of his home ZIP code) and argues that when considered with those stores' respective parking lots, the stay-away probation condition sweeps much too broadly.⁷ But that defendant's crime was confined to a single Home Depot store in San Jose and not the entire chain of stores does not fatally undermine the trial court's exercise of discretion in imposing a more wide-ranging...