People v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 10 November 2016
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Miles S. MITCHELL, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

144 A.D.3d 1598
41 N.Y.S.3d 805
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07543

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Miles S. MITCHELL, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Nov. 10, 2016.

41 N.Y.S.3d 807

Shirley A. Gorman, Brockport, for Defendant–Appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nancy Gilligan Of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

144 A.D.3d 1599

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of, inter alia, two counts of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1], [3] ) and one count of attempted robbery in the first degree (§§ 110.00, 160.15[4] ). Defendant is convicted of acting in concert with two others in the shooting death of the victim, a man the assailants mistakenly believed was having a relationship with the mother of defendant's children. Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of intentional murder as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, Supreme Court's Molineux determination does not constitute reversible error. The evidence that, two weeks before the crimes herein were committed, defendant struck the mother of his children and beat a man who was in a car with her was relevant with respect to his motive and intent to harm a person because of his jealousy and anger (see People v. Willsey, 148 A.D.2d 764, 765, 538 N.Y.S.2d 342, lv. denied 74 N.Y.2d 749, 545 N.Y.S.2d 124, 543 N.E.2d 767 ). We conclude that the prejudicial effect of that testimony did not outweigh its probative value, and that “ ‘any prejudice to defendant was minimized by [the court's] limiting instructions' ” (People v. Carson, 4 A.D.3d 805, 806, 771 N.Y.S.2d 775, lv. denied 2 N.Y.3d 797, 781 N.Y.S.2d 296, 814 N.E.2d 468 ). Defendant failed to object when the court permitted a witness, the intended victim, to testify that he had received a telephone call from a person he did not know and thus his contention that the court committed reversible error by admitting that testimony is not preserved for our review (see CPL 470.15[6][a] ). In any event, we conclude that any error is harmless because the evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that he would have been acquitted in the absence of that testimony (see generally People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241–242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ).

We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in denying his challenges for cause with respect to three prospective jurors. With respect to the first prospective juror, the court

144 A.D.3d 1600

complied with its obligation to elicit an unequivocal assurance from that prospective juror that he would not draw a negative inference if defendant did not testify (see People v. Williams, 128 A.D.3d 1522, 1523, 8 N.Y.S.3d 838, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1209, 16 N.Y.S.3d 531, 37 N.E.3d 1174 ; People v. Fowler–Graham, 124 A.D.3d 1403, 1403–1404, ...