People v. Mollette

• Decision Date: 22 March 1976
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Curtis MOLLETTE and Leroy Nicky Barnes, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 817

383 N.Y.S.2d 817

87 Misc.2d 236

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Curtis MOLLETTE and Leroy Nicky Barnes, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Trial Term, Bronx County, Part XXI.

March 22, 1976.

Asst. Dist. Atty. Helen Johnson, New York City, for the people.

David Breitbart, New York City, for defendant Leroy Barnes.

Robert Koppelman, New York City, for defendant Curtis Mollette.

IVAN WARNER, Justice:

This Court is called upon to determine the constitutionality of Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.30, subdivision 3, paragraph a.

Both defendants here have been indicted for the commission of the crimes of murder and possession of a weapon, dangerous instrument and appliance as a misdemeanor.

The relevant provisions of section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law read as follows:

Subdivision 1:

'Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where the people are not ready for trial within:

(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony.'

Subdivision 3, paragraph a:

'Subdivisions one and two do not apply to a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of an offense defined in sections 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.27 of the penal law.'

The above-cited sections relate to criminally negligent homicide, manslaughter in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, murder in the second degree and murder in the first degree respectively.

Subdivision 1, paragraph e, of section 170.30 of the CPL refers to a motion to dismiss an information for denial of a speedy trial; subdivision 1, paragraph g of section 210.20 of the CPL concerns a motion to dismiss an indictment for the same reason.

While crimes charged as violative of Article 125 of the Penal Law are excluded from the six months ready rule, CPL Section 30.30, they fall within the mandate of CPL section 30.20, subdivision 1, which provides that after a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial. However, no specific time limit is enumerated in that section.

It is the defendants' contention that section 30.30, subdivision 3(a) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it denies them equal protection of law.

The defendants argue that since a 'fundamental' right is involved, that is, a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, this Court must scrutinize the statute strictly to determine if a compelling state interest exists which justifies the distinction between homicide related crimes and other felonies for purposes of providing a defendant a speedy trial within six months.

In support of their contentions that CPL 30.30, paragraph 3(a), in excluding certain crimes in violation of Article 125 of the Penal Law from the six month time limitation, is irrationally and unconstitutionally applied, the defendants advance the position that when the New York State Legislature enacted the 'Rockefeller Drug Laws', Penal Law section 220.00 and others, it made a legislative finding that drug crimes were the 'most serious crimes in this State'. This, according to the defendants, is evidenced by the sentences attending violations of the drug laws and the restrictions placed on plea bargaining on drug 'A' felonies (CPL 220.10, subdivision 6(a)), as compared to the absence thereof under any of the crimes within Article 125 of the Penal Law, including 'A' felonies.

Thus, according to the defendants, there is no rational basis for treating them differently as regards to their eligibility to benefit from the six month period of limitation provided by CPL 30.30 from those persons who, in their opinion, are charged with 'equally, or more serious crimes.' See defendants' memorandum, page four.

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States accords every person accused of the commission of a crime the 'fundamental' right to a speedy trial. This right is made applicable to state proceedings by way of the Fourteenth Amendment (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1, 1967; People v. Minicone, 28 N.Y.2d 279, 321 N.Y.S.2d 570, 270 N.E.2d 300, 1971).

The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the 'fundamental' character of an accused's right to a speedy trial, has nevertheless refrained from fixing specific time periods for the commencement of a trial, beyond which would assume the posture of a violation of such 'fundamental' right.

The Court has indicated that 'the right to a speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied' (Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 1972).

Instead, the various states have been vested with the responsibility of establishing, on an individual state basis, the guidelines of insuring a speedy trial consistent with constitutional standards (Barker v. Wingo, supra, page 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101).

This Court, while acknowledging that the right to a speedy trial is a 'fundamental' right inasmuch as it is guaranteed by the Constitution, also recognizes that there is no fundamental right to a speedy trial within a constitutionally defined period of time.

This Court hastens to add that although the defendants' contentions are framed in terms of an allegation of a denial of their fundamental right to a speedy trial, the issue specifically before this Court is whether one charged with some form of homicide delineated in CPL 30.30, subd. 3(a) has a 'fundamental' right to be tried within six months after the commencement of a criminal action, and whether the statutory exclusion of such offenses from the six month time period is an abridgement of these defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and a denial of equal protection of the laws.

This Court finds that CPL 30.30 subd. 3(a) is constitutional and does not deny to these defendants equal protection of the laws. As urged by the People, there is no fundamental right to a speedy trial within six months. Criminal Procedure Law section 30.30, subdivision 3(a) in no way violates these defendants' rights to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or by section 30.20 of the CPL.

The New York State Legislature, acting within its authority enacted CPL 30.30 which set out specific time periods within which the People must be ready for trial after the commencement of a criminal action. Inherent within its authority, the Legislature likewise designated certain crimes to be exempt from the time requirements.

No matter how innovative or salutary this statute might be, it cannot be elevated to the status of a 'fundamental' right. Thus, since this Court has determined that there is no 'fundamental' right to a speedy trial within six months, and since the defendants themselves concede that we are not here dealing with a 'suspect' classification such as race, religion or national origin, this legislative enactment must be judged by the test of whether a rational basis exists for the classification made. (See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491).

The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a Federal constitutional violation (Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446; cf. People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 268, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97, 102, 290 N.E.2d 139, 142).

The Legislature has wide power to prescribe the nature and definition of crimes and the procedure to be followed in the prosecution and punishment of defendants (Matter of Rudd v. Hazard, 266 N.Y. 302, 306, 194 N.E. 764, 765; People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions of Monroe County, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386; Matter of Dodd v. Martin, 248 N.Y. 394, 398 to 399, 162 N.E. 293, 294 to 295; People v. Gowasky, 244 N.Y. 451, 155 N.E. 737). Under familiar principles, a strong presumption must be entertained that the Legislature has determined that facts exist indicating the need for the enactment of the statute and that it has responded to that need by providing the procedure laid down in the statute (Matter of Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357, 352 N.Y.S.2d 924, 308 N.E.2d 442; East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 293 N.Y. 622, 628, 59 N.E.2d 625, 626, affirmed 326 U.S. 230, 66 S.Ct. 69, 90 L.Ed. 34).

Differences in treatment of criminal offenders have been considered not to affect an interest of fundamental concern (see Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618; McGinis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282; United States ex rel. McGill v. Schubin, 475 F.2d 1257).

The classification found in CPL 30.30, subdivision 3(a) cannot be said to be directed against any individual or category of persons, but rather, it represents a policy choice made by that branch of government vested with the power to make such choice (Marshall v. U.S., supra).

Legislative solutions must be respected if the 'distinctions drawn have some basis in practical experience', (South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331, 86 S.Ct. 803, 820, 15 L.Ed.2d 769, 1966), or if some legitimate state interest is advanced (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 486, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491).

All legislative enactments are "supported by a presumption of validity so strong as to demand of those who attack them a demonstration of invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v. Estrada, 80 Misc.2d 608 at 610, 364 N.Y.S.2d 332 at 335, citing Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878, 209 N.E.2d 539, 540; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369; Matter of Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 206, 207...