People v. Ryals

• Decision Date: 09 August 1979
• Citation: 100 Misc.2d 551,420 N.Y.S.2d 257
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Benjamin RYALS.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 257

420 N.Y.S.2d 257

100 Misc.2d 551

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Benjamin RYALS.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings County, Part 4.

Aug. 9, 1979.

George J. Robertazzi, Brooklyn, for defendant

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (Suzan T. Picariello and Lois M. Raff, Brooklyn, of counsel), for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM

GERALD J. BELDOCK, Justice.

Defendant moves to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20(1)(h) alleging: that Penal Law 10.00 subd. 18 and Penal Law 30.00 specifically excludes the infancy defense from being utilized when there is a charge of attempted murder, thus denying him equal protection of the law; that CPL 180.75 fails to provide for specific procedures and standards, thus denying him due process of the law, and that CPL 720.10 denies persons under the age of 16 eligibility to youthful offender treatment on the basis of age alone, thus, denying him equal protection of the law.

Defendant, aged 14, was indicted and charged as a Juvenile Offender for having committed the crimes of attempted murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree and burglary in the second degree (two counts). These charges arose from an incident that occurred on December 13, 1978, wherein it is alleged defendant was aided by others in attempting to cause the death of a person by throwing him off the roof of a multiple story dwelling. It is also alleged that defendant took certain items of property from the complainant without the permission of complainant.

There is no fundamental right to be treated as a juvenile. The common law treated infants in the same manner as adults (People v. Cook, 37 N.Y.2d 591, 595, 376 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112, 338 N.E.2d 619, 621; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1437, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 540; 43 C.J.S. Infants § 196, pp. 514, 515). The present laws that provide for juvenile treatment "represented a shift in public attitudes, and was not the result of any declaration of unconstitutionality" (People v. Williams, 97 Misc.2d 24, 34, 410 N.Y.S.2d 978, 985).

Where a statute is attacked as violation of equal protection of the law the courts have applied either the strict scrutiny of the rational basis test. These tests were set forth in San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d 16. "This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. * * * If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

The courts have determined that statutes directed at a specific race, national origin, religion, sex or a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution are suspect and in such cases, have applied the strict scrutiny test (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1771, 36 L.Ed.2d 583). A reading of the Juvenile Offender Law, Ch. 481 Laws of 1978 indicates that these statutes were not directed at any class of individuals on account of race, national origin, religion, or sex. This court will thus apply the rational basis test.

The gravity of a crime with which a person is charged has been held to be a rational basis for distinguishing treatment (People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1, 350 N.E.2d 377; People v. Mollette, 87 Misc.2d 236, 242, 383 N.Y.S.2d 817, 822). In Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618, the Supreme Court held that a statute which denies persons with two prior convictions, access, as of a right, to the same rehabilitative program as persons with less than two prior convictions was not a violation of the equal protection clause. There was no fundamental right to participate in the rehabilitative program and there was a rational basis for Congress to make the classification.

In the present case, as in Mollette, supra, the Legislature has classified the treatment of the defendants based upon the seriousness of the crime (Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454, 393 N.E.2d 450 (1979). A reading of PL 10.00 subd. 18 and PL 30.00 indicates that the Legislature intended that those young persons who commit serious violations of the penal law to be treated differently than those young persons who commit non-serious violations. This is a rational basis for the distinction in treatment. Therefore, the juvenile offender statutes do not violate defendant's rights to equal protection of the law.

Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of CPL 180.75 in that "the procedure for the determination of the issue of removal or retention of jurisdiction, and the proceedings conducted thereunder, are violative of procedural due process and equal protection under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution" (defendant's affirmation).

CPL 180.75 subd. 4 states in part:

"(a) the court, on the motion of any party or on its own motion may, and shall, at the request of the district attorney, order removal of an action, (not applicable), to the Family Court pursuant to the provisions of article seven hundred twenty-five of this chapter, if it . . . determine(s) that to do so would be in the interest of justice . . . "

Defendant claims that this section is violative of his due process rights in that it fails to provide adequate notice to the parent and child of the charges, fails to provide the opportunity to retain counsel, and fails to give defendant the right to call witnesses on his behalf.

An examination of the minutes of the hearing held in the Criminal Court, Part AP1, before Judge Moskowitz on January 2, 1979 reveals that defendant had notice of the charges against him and was represented by counsel at the hearing who cross-examined witnesses and called witnesses to testify on defendant's behalf. Further, defendant's mother was present in court and the presiding judge gave defendant the opportunity to present any evidence that he desired relevant to the issues of the hearing.

Defendant has been afforded all of the rights that he claims CPL 180.75 does not provide. He thus lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of CPL 180.75 on those grounds. As the court stated in Abrams v. NYC Transit Authority, 48 A.D.2d 69, 70, 368 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166, affd. 39 N.Y.2d 990, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235, 355 N.E.2d 289, "It is settled law that a petitioner making a general attack on legislative or administrative action must demonstrate special damages distinct from that suffered by the public at large (citations omitted). Thus, in determining whether there is 'standing to sue', it must be shown that petitioners' personal or property rights will be directly and specifically affected."

Defendant further claims that CPL 180.75 fails to provide specific standards and criteria to control the court in its decision to transfer or retain jurisdiction. This claim has no merit.

The primary purpose of CPL 180.75 is not to consider the issue of removal but to determine whether there is reasonable cause to hold defendant in custody pending action by a grand jury (Vega v. Bell, supra, see, also, CPL 180.10).

In Vega v. Bell, supra, defendant, age 15, was indicted for sodomy in the first degree and sought a writ of prohibition which was granted by the Appellate Division (Vega v. Bell, 67 A.D.2d 420, 415 N.Y.S.2d 424) and later dismissed by the Court of Appeals. The writ was sought on the ground that the grand jury lacked the power to indict defendant because he was not afforded a removal hearing in the Criminal Court as provided for in CPL 180.75.

The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's interpretation of CPL 180.75 and dismissed the writ. In reaching the conclusion that the failure to provide petitioner with a removal hearing at the local Criminal Court did not deprive the Grand Jury of its power to indict, the court stated, Inter alia, that it was the Legislature's intent, in enacting the Juvenile Offender Law, to have most of the serious felonies committed by persons between the ages of 13 and 15 tried in the Superior Court. It is the exceptional case rather than the typical case that was intended to be transferred to the Family Court.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 discussed in the Vega case is distinguishable and not applicable here because the statutory plan involved in the Kent case differs from the statutory plan employed in the Vega case. The statutory plan underlying the Kent case establishes that juveniles who are initially subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court must be afforded a hearing before the case may be transferred to the adult criminal justice system. Under the statutory plan of the New...