People v. Montford

• Decision Date: 19 November 1987
• Citation: 134 A.D.2d 207,521 N.Y.S.2d 7
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Thomas MONTFORD, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 7

521 N.Y.S.2d 7

134 A.D.2d 207

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Thomas MONTFORD, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

Nov. 19, 1987.

A. Rettew, A.M. Donnelly, New York City, for appellant.

C.P. Cassidy, New York City, for defendant-respondent.

Before KUPFERMAN, J.P., and SANDLER, CARRO, MILONAS and SMITH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Howard Bell, J.), entered June 24, 1986, which denied the People's application to have defendant-respondent adjudicated a second violent felony offender and which sentenced defendant-respondent, after a jury finding of guilt of robbery in the second degree, as a first felony offender to a term of imprisonment of from two to six years, is unanimously reversed, on the law, defendant-respondent's sentence vacated and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County, to have defendant-respondent resentenced as a second violent felony offender.

On May 27, 1986, defendant was found guilty, following a jury trial, of robbery in the second degree. Prior to sentence being imposed, the People filed a predicate violent felony statement, alleging that on November 10, 1981, defendant had been convicted, after a plea of guilty, of robbery in the second degree, a violent felony. Defendant moved to controvert the predicate felony statement, challenging the constitutionality of the plea of guilty on the ground that it was improperly accepted without defendant's admission of such facts as would constitute the crime of robbery in the second degree. We agree with the People's position that the sentencing court erred in denying the application for second violent felony status and in determining that defendant had satisfied his burden of proving that he did not knowingly and intelligently enter a plea to robbery in the second degree.

When the People move to have a defendant adjudicated a second violent felony offender, they have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt and by competent evidence that defendant has been convicted of a predicate violent felony, as that term is defined in P.L. § 70.04, subd. (1), par. (b). [CPL § 400.15, subd. (7), par. (a) ]. Once the conviction is established, it is then the defendant's burden to allege and prove facts to support the claim that the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. [CPL § 400.15, subd. (7), par. (b); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 15, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170]. Under the particular facts of this case, where defendant's claim of unconstitutionality rests solely on the failure of the court which accepted the plea to inquire as to the element of force in setting forth the underlying facts to the robbery, we hold that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that the plea was thereby rendered unconstitutional.

In so holding, however, we hasten to reaffirm certain general principles concerning pleas of guilty. A plea of guilty satisfies due process constitutional requirements when it is entered voluntarily and intelligently, and such must be affirmatively disclosed in the record. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n. 4, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 n. 4, 25 L.Ed.2d 747; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. A plea will be held to be constitutionally flawed, either because defendant does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving, or, as is the claim here, "because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257 n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 108; see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436, 103 S.Ct. 843, 851-52, 74 L.Ed.2d 646; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859.

Similarly, while the Court of Appeals, in People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 353, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687, held that no "uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants should be required," the Nixon court also declared that it would not be "tolerable for the State to punish its members over protestations of innocence if there be doubt as to their guilt, or if they be unaware of their rights, or if they have not had opportunity to make a voluntary and rational decision with proper advice in pleading guilty." Id. at 354, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687. The court went on to suggest a number of factors which, besides the defendant's own admissions on the record, a court could consider to assist it in determining...