People v. Morrison, 96CA1565.
Decision Date | 18 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 96CA1565.,96CA1565. |
Citation | 985 P.2d 1 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cory MORRISON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, David R. Little, Special Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Desmond, Deputy State Public Defender, Alan Kratz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge CRISWELL.
Defendant, Cory Morrison, appeals a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of eight counts of sexual assault on a child. We affirm.
All eight counts were based on a series of assaults upon two young boys that had occurred during a two-year period when defendant was employed as a live-in, part-time, babysitter for one of the victims. Defendant also occasionally babysat the other victim during this period.
At trial, both victims, who were then nine years old, testified. Several other witnesses, including relatives and police officers, were also allowed to testify as to the hearsay statements of both victims, pursuant to § 13-25-129, C.R.S.1998. In addition, an expert witness testified with respect to the dynamics of sexual abuse. Focal issues at trial included the credibility of both victims and one of the victim's untruthfulness in other instances.
Defendant initially contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a challenge for cause of a prospective juror who had allegedly expressed her inability to be fair and impartial. We conclude that, whether there was an abuse of discretion or not, defendant suffered no prejudice.
During voir dire, the trial court questioned the juror and satisfied itself that, with an instruction about the presumption of innocence, the juror would be able to determine the case on the evidence submitted. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's challenge. Thereafter, defendant chose not to excuse the juror by the exercise of a peremptory challenge, and she remained on the jury during the trial. Defendant used all of his peremptory challenges to excuse other prospective jurors.
To demonstrate that a defendant is prejudiced by a trial court's improper denial of a challenge to a prospective juror for cause, a defendant must exhaust all of his peremptory challenges. People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo.1996).
713 P.2d 356 (Colo.1986) that there is no "principle of law which requires the defendant to exhaust his remaining challenge on the juror who was not removed for cause," does not persuade us otherwise. Russo was decided before either Rodriguez, Prator, or Macrander was announced. As the supreme court noted in a footnote to its Russo opinion, there is an "obvious tension" between the quoted statement and earlier supreme court precedent. See People v. Russo, supra, 713 P.2d at 363, fn. 7.
Here, because defendant chose not to excuse the juror in question by use of a peremptory challenge, the court's denial of his challenge for cause did not have the effect of reducing the number of peremptory challenges that he could exercise. Hence, he has failed to demonstrate how the court's denial of his challenge worked any prejudice upon him.
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the prosecution's expert to give an opinion with respect to the credibility of the victims. We disagree.
As part of the prosecution's case, a licensed marriage and family therapist with a Ph.D. in clinical psychology testified as an expert in the area of sexual abuse treatment and the dynamics of sexual abuse. During the expert's first day of testimony, she testified, in general terms, about many aspects of sexual abuse including: (1) the grooming of victims by sexual offenders; (2) the common patterns of disclosure of sexual abuse by children, including delayed reporting; and (3) the differences between male and female victims, including the use of empowerment techniques by males. Defendant does not object to this portion of the expert's testimony.
The next morning, the prosecutor continued her direct examination of the expert with respect to empowerment statements that boys commonly make. The following exchange then took place between the prosecutor and the witness:
The hypothetical situated stated by the prosecutor contained facts identical to those presented by the evidence here. Specifically, one victim's report described the sexual abuse in the same way as in the prosecutor's hypothetical, but that victim later admitted that he had lied about two aspects of the incidents: the urination in his mouth and the perpetrator chasing him.
The expert witness then testified, again in general terms, about: (1) reactions that child sexual abuse victims commonly experience; (2) problems children typically have in recounting specific instances of past sexual activity; (3) reasons why children lie; and (4) possible effects upon the child of videotaping interviews. Shortly thereafter, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and the witness:
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Morris v. State, PD–0796–10.
...... the Scope of the Field? Because we have already held that the behavior of people who sexually victimize children is, under Nenno 's first prong, a legitimate field of expertise, ...Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo.App.1999), aff'd, 19 P.3d 668 (Colo.2000) (licensed marriage and family ......
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Morris v. State
...December 8) (not designated for publication) (Los Angeles police detective who was an expert on child exploitation); People v. Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd, 19 P.3d 668 (Colo. 2000) (licensed marriage and family therapist with a Ph.D. in clinical psychology); Clark v. St......
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People v. Short
...by [children] who have been subjected to sexual abuse that might, under other circumstances, be considered bizarre." People v. Morrison , 985 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd , 19 P.3d 668 (Colo. 2000) ; accord People v. Fasy , 829 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo. 1992) (The doctor’s "testimony cle......
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People v. Whitman
...value outweighed any prejudice. A division of this court has found similar remarks do not amount to error. See People v. Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.App. 1999), aff'd, 19 P.3d 668 Defendant points us to no authority that persuades us that the use of examples by an expert to discuss genera......