People v. Motley

• Decision Date: 31 March 1987
• Citation: 507 N.E.2d 308,514 N.Y.S.2d 715,69 N.Y.2d 870
• Parties: , 507 N.E.2d 308 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James MOTLEY, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Warren WILDER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 715

514 N.Y.S.2d 715

69 N.Y.2d 870, 507 N.E.2d 308

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James MOTLEY, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Warren WILDER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 31, 1987.

Scott J. Learned, Elmira, for appellants.

James T. Hayden, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

In each case, the order of the Appellate Division, 119 A.D.2d 57, 505 N.Y.S.2d 251 and 122 A.D.2d 489, 505 N.Y.S.2d 389, should be affirmed.

Each defendant pleaded guilty to attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree in the full satisfaction of an indictment charging promoting prison contraband in the first degree and received a negotiated sentence.

"A guilty plea represents a compromise or bargain struck after negotiation between the defendant and the People. It is meant to mark the end of a criminal case, not a 'gateway' to further litigation" (People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 219, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955, 486 N.E.2d 813, cert. denied 475 U.S. 1150, 106 S.Ct. 1804, 90 L.Ed.2d 349). Thus, a plea of guilty generally precludes appellate review of nonjurisdictional defec in the proceedings (People v. Fernandez, 67 N.Y.2d 686, 688, 499 N.Y.S.2d 919, 490 N.E.2d 838; People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 220, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955, 486 N.E.2d 813, supra). Though a challenge to a jurisdictional defect in an indictment may be made notwithstanding a guilty plea, not every alleged defect is jurisdictional. As noted in People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 600, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 384 N.E.2d 656: "In essence, an indictment is jurisdictionally defective only if it does not effectively charge the defendant with the commission of a particular crime."

The statute defining the offense charged in each case is Penal Law § 205.25(2), which provides: "A person is guilty of promoting prison contraband in the first degree when * * * 2. Being a person confined in a detention facility, he knowingly and unlawfully makes, obtains or possesses any dangerous contraband." The indictment in each case cites the statute by section number and alleges acts which, if proven, would have established the statutory elements of the crime.

In People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584, 586, 439 N.Y.S.2d 321, 421 N.E.2d 813, we held that "[t]he incorporation [in an indictment] by specific reference to the statute [defining the crime charged] operates without more to constitute allegations of all the elements of the crime required by explicit provision of the statute itself or by judicial gloss overlaid thereon" (see also, People v. Wright, 67 N.Y.2d 749, 500 N.Y.S.2d 98, 490 N.E.2d 1224, revg. on dissent at 112 A.D.2d 38, 39, 490 N.Y.S.2d 943). Although the statute defining the crime charged in this case does not define dangerous contraband, it is not judicial gloss, but another statute, Penal Law § 205.00(4) that does, indicating that it is "contraband which is capable of such use as may endanger the safety or security of a detention facility or any person therein." As in Cohen (supra),...