People v. Murray

• Citation: 386 N.Y.S.2d 691,40 N.Y.2d 327
• Parties: , 353 N.E.2d 605 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Melvin MURRAY, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 13 July 1976
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 691

386 N.Y.S.2d 691

40 N.Y.2d 327, 353 N.E.2d 605

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Melvin MURRAY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 13, 1976.

Joel Martin Aurnou and James J. Duggan, White Plains, for appellant.

Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty. (Janet Cunard, White Plains, of counsel), for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for the crimes of common-law murder, felony murder, two counts of attempted robbery, attempted grand larceny and possession of a weapon as a felony. He had admitted and confessed to a police officer that during the course of attempting to rob a man sleeping in an automobile, a struggle ensued, and he stabbed and killed a man.

The critical issue presented is whether, in a felony murder prosecution based upon a full confession of guilt, the confession corroboration statute (CPL 60.50) requires the roboration statute (CPL 60.50) requires the People to prove the commission of the predicate felony by evidence independent of that contained in the confession. Determination of this issue turns on the meaning ascribed to the rule set forth in CPL 60.50, which provides that:

'A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confessi or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.' While the wording of CPL 60.50 differs slightly from that of its 1881 predecessor (Code Crim.Pro., § 395), the Legislature manifested no intention of changing the meaning or requirements of the confession corroboration rule when it enacted the CPL in 1971 (see Denzer, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL 60.50, p. 331). ¹

Following a pretrial confession suppression hearing, defendant's statement, made to Mount Vernon Police Detective Frank Tetro, was held to have been voluntarily made and admissible in evidence. At trial, Detective Tetro testified that after administering the standard preinterrogation admonitions (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), defendant described what had occurred at 6:00 a.m. on August 5, 1972 on West Third Street in Mount Vernon. According to this evidence, defendant stated that as he walked along that street, he saw a man slumped over the steering wheel of a car, apparently sleeping, and decided that 'he would take him (the victim) off'. After unsuccessfully attempting to enter the car, defendant opened the driver-side door, awakened the victim and said, 'Man, do you know you can be taken off here? You can be mugged'. Whereupon the victim answered, 'Don't worry. I can take care of myself', and offered the defendant some french fries. Detective Tetro further testified that 'it was then that (defendant) stated that he said to the victim, 'I'm going to take you off. Give me all your money.' With this, the victim turned in the seat of the car. As he was getting out, he kicked (defendant), knocking him to the ground. The victim got out of the car. He was standing against the door. (Defendant) said he got up off the ground, punched the victim. The victim in turn punched him and knocked him back to the ground again and he said at this time he had an open knife in his pocket, took it out of his pocket, got up off the ground and plunged the knife into the victim. He said he stood there and he seen blood coming out of the victim's shirt. He said at this time he panicked, and he ran around the car and went into the hallway of 57 West Third, out to the backyard, where he stated he dropped the knife, and continued out, jumped the fence and went out onto Eighth Avenue.' Medical testimony showed that the fatal knife wound entered the victim's heart from a left to right angle of 15 degrees and was from three and a half to four and a half inches deep. There was evidence, via the autopsy, that the victim's brain showed a .20% Blood alcoholic content at death, and that he had french fries and nonred meat in his stomach. Other evidence established the presence of french fries spread in and about the vehicle.

Defendant took the stand in his own defense and denied the statements attributed to him by Officer Tetro. He claimed that the victim was an illicit drug supplier known as 'Tee' to whom he, an addict and small-time pusher, owed money. He asserted that, in the course of a disagreement and resultant struggle over the quality of drugs supplied to him and the amount of money he owed therefor, he stabbed 'Tee' in self-defense and then fled from the scene.

After the prosecution had rested, the Trial Judge granted a defense motion to dismiss the attempted robbery and larceny counts on the ground that the prosecution had not corroborat the confession as to commission of those crimes. The jury was charged as to the remaining three counts and also as to manslaughter, first degree, as a lesser-included offense of the common-law murder count. The jury found defendant guilty of felony murder, manslaughter, first degree, and felonious possession of a weapon. These convictions were affirmed by an unanimous Appellate Division.

The effect of the confession corroboration statute is to require proof of the corpus delicti (People v. Reade, 13 N.Y.2d 42, 45, 241 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831, 191 N.E.2d 891, 892), a requirement universally followed by other States (see Ann., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316). Generally, proof of the corpus delicti requires a showing: (1) that a loss has occurred (i.e., in a homicide, a deceased person) and (2) that the loss resulted from somebody's criminality (People v. Bennett, 49 N.Y. 137, 143; 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2072). ² The purpose of the first element is to establish that the loss or death actually did occur and the purpose of the second element is to insure that the loss or death did not occur as the result of an accident, suicide, disease or other natural cause; or, put another way, that the loss or death did in fact occur as the result of human agency (see Wigmore, Op. cit., pp. 401--402). The requirement has never been extended, insofar as our research reveals, to require negation of any possible claim of self-defense. Indeed, the requirement of proving the corpus delicti evolved at common law apart from any justification defense concerns (see, generally, Note, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638). It arose principally from the confluence of two factors: first, the shock which resulted from those rare but widely reported cases in which the 'victim' returned alive after his supposed murderer had been convicted (see, e.g., Trial of Stephen and Jessie Boorn, 6 Am.St.Trials 73; see, generally, State v. Howard, 102 Or. 431, 203 P. 311; cf. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192); ³ and secondly, the general distrust of extrajudicial confessions stemming from the possibilities that a confession may have been erroneously reported or construed (see State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 1379, 44 N.W.2d 24; Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 134, 16 A.2d 401), involuntarily made (see, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596--597, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819), mistak as to law or fact, ⁴ or falsely volunteered by an insane or mentally disturbed individual (see People v. Buffom, 214 N.Y. 53, 57, 108 N.E. 184, 186).

Consonant with this rationale, the Legislature codified the common-law rule (see People v. Bennett, 49 N.Y. 137, 143, Supra) and enacted what became CPL 60.50 which requires additional proof of the crime to obviate the 'danger that a crime may be confessed when no such crime in any degree has been committed by any one' (People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 314, 178 N.E. 290, 291; see People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629, 376 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440, 339 N.E.2d 139, 141). The additional proof need not be direct evidence linking the defendant to the crime (People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 59, 85 N.E. 809, 814). It suffices to show corroborating circumstanc 'which, when considered in connection with the confession are sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt' (People v. Conroy, 287 N.Y. 201, 202, 38 N.E.2d 499). Moreover, it is not necessary that the proof include 'every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt' (People v. Cuozzo, 292 N.Y. 85, 92, 54 N.E.2d 20, 24). As we wrote in People v. Jaehne, 103 N.Y. 182, 199--200, 8 N.E. 374, 381--382 And repeated in People v. Reade, 13 N.Y.2d 42, 241 N.Y.S.2d 829, 191 N.E.2d 891, Supra: 'when, in addition to the confession, there is proof of circumstances which, although they may have an innocent construction, are nevertheless calculated to suggest the commission of crime, and for the explanation of which the confession furnishes the key, the case cannot be taken from the jury'. Thus, we have said that 'presence at the scene, proof of motive, evidence of flight and other conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt may * * * be held to constitute the essential additional proof' (Reade, supra, at p. 46, 241 N.Y.S.2d at p. 831, 191 N.E.2d at p. 892). Indeed, 'the statute is satisfied by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone' (People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629, 376 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440, 339 N.E.2d 139, 141, Supra). ⁵

We hold that the proof adduced here was sufficient and adequate to satisfy the requirements of CPL 60.50. The prosecution established the corpus delicti Aliunde the confession by showing the fact of death and that the cause thereof was a knife wound, a nonnatural cause. In addition, the evidence of the depth, angle, and accuracy of the wound further corroborates the fact that the wound was not accidental. And even were all that evidence not sufficient, which it clearly is, it was also shown, apart from the confession, and as Reade (supra) states to be satisfactory 'additional proof', that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime, that he had a motive (i.e., to rob the victim to support his drug habit) and that after the stabbing, the defendant...