People v. Nguyen

• Decision Date: 29 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. H028798.,H028798.
• Citation: 152 Cal.App.4th 1205,62 Cal.Rptr.3d 255
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Vince Vinthuong NGUYEN, Defendant and Appellant.

62 Cal.Rptr.3d 255

152 Cal.App.4th 1205

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Vince Vinthuong NGUYEN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H028798.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.

June 29, 2007.

Mary J. Greenwood, Public Defender, Seth Flagsberg, Deputy Public Defender, Dallas Sacher, Santa Clara, As Amicus Curiae under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant.

McADAMS, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether "the role of the jury [is] diminished and eroded in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution" by the use of juvenile adjudications to increase the maximum punishment for an offense, in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (Apprendi) and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (Blakely). In concluding that it is, we respectfully disagree with our colleagues on this court and others, and join the small but growing number of courts across the county that have likewise concluded that Apprendi and its progeny compel us to recognize that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an integral part of the process that is due before a prior conviction may be used to increase the maximum sentence for a criminal offense.

In our prior opinion, we also held that because defendant's juvenile adjudication is based on his admission of guilt in juvenile court, rather than on a contested hearing, he was not entitled to relief, and we affirmed the judgment. We granted defendant's rehearing petition to reconsider that holding. Upon reconsideration, we now conclude that the core principles driving our rejection of the cases that treat juvenile adjudications the same as prior adult convictions also compel us to apply those principles across the board to all juvenile adjudications. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

In December 2004 a complaint was filed charging 21-year-old defendant Nguyen with four felony counts: possession of a firearm by a felon; possession of ammunition by a felon, possession of a billy, and possession of methamphetamine. (Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12316, subd. (b), 12020, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The complaint also alleged two misdemeanor counts, being under the influence of a controlled substance and possession of a device for the same. (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11550, 11364.) Finally, the complaint alleged, under the Three Strikes law, that defendant had suffered a juvenile adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon with infliction of great bodily injury. (Pen.Code §§ 667, subs, (b)-(i), 1170.12, 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded no contest to one felony (Pen.Code 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and one misdemeanor (Pen. Code § 12020, subd. (a)(1)) and the remaining counts were dismissed.

Following a court trial, the allegation pertaining to defendant's prior juvenile adjudication was found true on the basis of documentary evidence submitted to the court.¹ Over defendant's objection that use of a prior juvenile adjudication to increase his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, defendant was sentenced to 32 months in prison, double the mitigated term, pursuant to the two strike provisions of the Three Strikes law.

The Juvenile Adjudication

In December 1999 an original petition (No. 117308) filed pursuant to Welfare and Institution Code section 602, accused defendant, then 16 years old, of aggravated assault with a knife and a crowbar and inflicting great bodily injury on the victim. (Pen.Code §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7.) The petition further alleged that defendant was not "a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, and the People [would] move the court to so order." However, defendant was not transferred to adult criminal court. Instead, in January 2000, defendant admitted only to a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) in juvenile court. Although alternative placements were sought for him, none were found, and his disposition consisted entirely of juvenile hall detention.

DISCUSSION

The Historical Background

At English common law prior to 1854, juveniles charged with crimes were either tried as adults with the right to jury trial, or were not tried at all. With Parliament's enactment of the Youthful Offenders Act in that year, juveniles lost their jury trial rights in cases of minor crimes such as petty theft, but retained the right in felonies. (In re Javier A. (1984) 159 Cal App.3d 913, 940, fn. 18, 206 Cal.Rptr. 386; see also Comment, California's Three Strikes Law—Should a Juvenile Adjudication Be a Ball or a Strike? (1995) 32 San Diego L.Rev. 1297, 1308-1309, citing Javier A.; Note, Juvenile Strikes: Unconstitutional Under Apprendi and Blakely and Incompatible with the Rehabilitative Ideal (2005) 15 So. Cal. L.Rev. & Women's Stud. 171, 174; Comment, Prior `Convictions' Under Apprendi: Why Juvenile Adjudications May Not Be Used to Increase An Offender's Sentence Exposure if They Have Not First Been Proven to a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt (2004) 87 Marq. L.Rev. 573, 583.)

In 1899, Illinois created the first juvenile justice system in the United States. (Juvenile Strikes, supra, 15 So. Cal. L.Rev. & Women's Stud. 171; Prior Convictions under Apprendi supra, 87 Marq. L.Rev. 573.) "This new system was premised on the idea that because of their young age, children were either less culpable for their wayward actions or not culpable at all. With the proper resources and guidance, progressives believed children were still young and impressionable enough to reform before they turned toward a life of crime. However, to accomplish this end, the state, as parens patriae, needed to commence a civil action against the juvenile's parents to gain superior custody rights. Because it was a civil proceeding, custody, not liberty, was at issue. Children could not be found guilty or innocent; they could only be found delinquent. The main function of the proceeding was not to frame the state and the child as adversaries, but `"to feel that [the child] is the object of [the state's] care and solicitude."' Finally, the purpose of sanctions would be for therapeutic and rehabilitative purposes, not for retribution or incapacitation." (Prior Convictions Under Apprendi at pp. 584-585, fns. omitted.)

Under this benevolent regime, juveniles had no need of, and no right to, notice of the charges, an attorney, the presumption of innocence, right against self-incrimination, right to present and cross-examine witness, or the right to appeal. (Note, But I Was Just a Kid! Does Using Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences Run Afoul of Apprendi v. New Jersey? (2005) 26 Cardozo L.Rev. 837, fn. 1, 843, fn. 40 (hereafter Kid).) Over the next 70 years, however, it became increasingly clear that "the absence of procedural protections exposed juveniles to an unpredictable justice system that fell short of its rehabilitative goals." (Id. at p. 837, fn. omitted.) As a result, beginning in the mid-1960's, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions² that promised juveniles virtually all of the procedural rights and protections to which they would have been entitled if they were adults—notice, counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, confrontation, the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, double jeopardy—save one: the right to a jury trial. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, the Court concluded that "despite disappointments of grave dimensions" the juvenile court system still held the promise of "accomplishing] its rehabilitative goals," and that by "imposing the jury trial" requirement in juvenile cases the Court would impede the states'"experimentation" with "new and different ways" to solve "the problems of the young." (Id. at p. 547, 91 S.Ct. 1976)

The McKeiver court identified 13 reasons for its conclusion, but three ideas were central to its holding. First and foremost was the court's concern that the injection of the jury trial into the juvenile court system would "bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system," would "put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding" and would threaten if not destroy "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates." (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 545, 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976.)

Second, the court was reluctant to tread where "28 States and the District of Columbia," as well as the Task Force Report on juvenile delinquency and youth crime, commissioned by the President, had not. (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 548, 91 S.Ct. 1976.) The lack of legislative and executive branch support for a jury trial in juvenile court, in turn, informed the third important consideration: that jury trials were neither appreciably more reliable than court trials nor "a necessary part even of every criminal process that is fair and equitable." (Id. at p. 547, 91 S.Ct. 1976, citing Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145,149-150, fn. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491.)³

The Statutory Framework

Formerly, section 502 of Welfare and Institutions Code⁴ (since repealed) provided that the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law were to "`secure for each minor ... such care and guidance, preferably in his own...