People v. Ortega, 76-202
Decision Date | 16 March 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 76-202,76-202 |
Citation | 580 P.2d 813,40 Colo.App. 449 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Leo ORTEGA, Defendant-Appellant. . I |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Felipe V. Ponce, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Dorian E. Welch, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant, Thomas Leo Ortega, was convicted by a jury of felony theft and first degree criminal trespass. Finding merit in his contention that certain remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument impermissibly referred to defendant's failure to make a detailed exculpatory statement upon arrest, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
The driver of a pickup truck was injured one morning when he lost control of the vehicle. Upon returning from treatment of his injuries, he discovered certain tools and other items were missing from the truck. Observations by police led them to obtain a search warrant for a house at which defendant was present. Executing the warrant at the house, the officers saw some of the missing items described in the warrant, and arrested the defendant.
After being advised of his rights, defendant told the officers that he had helped bring the items to the house, and that they had been removed from a pickup truck. In the midst of the officers' questioning of defendant, another man whom defendant indicated had participated in the items' removal arrived at the house and was also arrested. He made a statement to the effect that he and defendant had removed the tools for safekeeping purposes only.
At trial, defendant's theory of the case was that in removing the tools he had lacked any intent to steal and that he had sought only to safeguard the items. To refute that defense, the prosecutor reviewed with the jury in closing argument the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest. He directed the jury's attention to defendant's custodial silence, reiterating that "(o)ther than (acknowledging he had brought the items to his house), the defendant said nothing," and subsequently, in his rebuttal remarks, posed the following series of rhetorical questions:
(emphasis added)
Since Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the self-incrimination guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, has barred in state criminal trials prosecutorial comment on an accused's exercise of his right of silence. Although Griffin involved remarks directed at defendant's reliance on his right of silence at trial, i. e., his election not to testify, its rationale implicitly proscribes references to the defendant's silence during custodial interrogation. People v. Atencio, Colo., 565 P.2d 921 (1977); Hines v. People, 179 Colo. 4, 497 P.2d 1258 (1972); see Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); People v. Reynolds, Colo., 575 P.2d 1286 (announced February 6, 1978). And, in Doyle v. Ohio,426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that, since "post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested," the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment similarly proscribes the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused's silence upon arrest. See People v. Reynolds,supra ; cf. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 71, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975) ( ).
In the instant case, the prosecutor's remarks to the jury were in manifest violation of the constitutional protections assured by Griffin and Doyle. Notwithstanding the presumption of defendant's innocence, his privilege against self-incrimination and the assurances given defendant in his Miranda warnings, the prosecutor's remarks expressly directed the jury to consider as evidence of defendant's culpable mental state and guilt, defendant's failure upon arrest to protest his innocence or to proffer an exculpatory explanation. The remarks were particularly egregious here, since the question of defendant's guilt or innocence hinged solely on the jury's acceptance or rejection of defendant's contention that he had not intended to deprive permanently the injured man of the tools in his truck.
The People argue, however, that because defendant made a brief statement to the arresting officers, argument to the jury expressly referring to defendant's subsequent silence was constitutionally permissible. But a defendant in custody need not refrain from saying anything to preserve his Fifth Amendment rights. Miranda, for example, recognized that such a defendant can volunteer information after receiving his constitutional warnings, without surrendering his right of silence: "The mere fact that (a defendant in custody) may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries." Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Additionally, the view urged by the People is incongruous with the requirements of due process. "Surely (defendant) was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him at trial." Doyle v. Ohio, supra, quoting United States v. Hale, supra (White, J. concurring). Thus, we conclude that defendant's initial volunteered statement did not operate to waive his right of silence at arrest and did not serve to authorize the prosecutor's manifestly improper references at trial to defendant's reliance on that right. State v. Boyd, W.Va., 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977); State v. Lyle,73 N.J. 403, 375 A.2d 629 (1977); People v. Robinson, 44 Ill.App.3d 447, 3 Ill.Dec. 43, 358 N.E.2d 43 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 244 Pa.Super. 182, 366 A.2d 1252 (1976); see People v. Reynolds, supra.
Similarly, the prosecutor's comments cannot be excused by defendant's failure expressly to advise arresting officers that his silence while in custody was in reliance on his privilege against self-incrimination as assured him by the Miranda warnings. The majority opinion in Doyle refused to require, as urged by the dissent, any showing by an accused that his "silence was induced by reliance on deceptive advice." Doyle v. Ohio, supra ...
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...comment upon the fact that shortly after his arrest the defendant had failed to make a detailed exculpatory statement. People v. Ortega, Colo.App., 580 P.2d 813 (1978). Holding that these impermissible comments on the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent violated his privilege ......