People v. Pabon
| Citation | 640 N.Y.S.2d 421,167 Misc.2d 214 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Michael PABON, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 12 April 1995 |
| Court | New York City Court |
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney of Bronx County (Joseph Sperber, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Legal Aid Society (Brooks Holland, of counsel), for defendant.
Defendant is charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) § 509(1) and VTL § 511(2)(a)(iv) aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. Defendant has filed a pre-trial motion seeking an order dismissing the information for facial insufficiency. Defendant asserts that the complaint has not adequately been converted to an information as required by CPL 170.65. Specifically, defendant argues that VTL 511(2)(a)(iv) requires proof that defendant knew or had reason to know of three or more suspensions, and that the documents offered by the People to corroborate the complaint are neither public records nor business records and are thus hearsay. The People oppose the motion.
VTL § 511(2)(a) provides:
2. Aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree. (a) A person is guilty of the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree when such person commits the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree as defined in subdivision one of this section; and
(i) has previously been convicted of an offense that consists of or includes the elements comprising the offense committed within the immediately preceding eighteen months; or
(ii) the suspension or revocation is based upon a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter or upon a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter; or
(iii) the suspension was a mandatory suspension pending prosecution of a charge of a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter ordered pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-three of this chapter or other similar statute; or
(iv) such person has in effect three or more suspensions, imposed on at least three separate dates, for failure to answer, appear or pay a fine, pursuant to subdivision three of section two hundred twenty-six or subdivision four-a of section five hundred ten of this chapter.
Under the terms of VTL § 511(2)(a)(iv), the People are obliged to plead and prove that defendant committed the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree under VTL § 511(1), and that he had three or more suspensions imposed on at least three separate dates.
VTL § 511(1)(a) provides:
1. Aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree.
(a) A person is guilty of the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree when such person operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway while knowing or having reason to know that such person's license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle in this state or privilege of obtaining a license to operate such motor vehicle issued by the commissioner is suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner.
Defendant argues that the "knowing or having reason to know" element of VTL § 511(1)(a) is to be applied to VTL § 511(2)(a)(iv). Such application would oblige the People to plead and prove that defendant knew or had reason to know that he was under three or more suspensions on at least three separate dates.
The Court does not agree with the reading of this statute proposed by defendant. Generally, statutes are to be construed in accordance with the natural and obvious meaning of the language used by the legislature. McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, section 94. The Court cannot disregard the plain meaning of the language of a statute to extend it to a purpose or policy not included in the statute. Id.
The plain and natural meaning of VTL § 511(2)(a)(iv) is that in order to establish a prima facie case of a violation of VTL § 511(2)(a)(iv), the People are required to plead and prove the following elements:
1. defendant operated a motor vehicle; and
2. defendant operated the motor vehicle on a public highway; and
3. defendant did so while knowing or having reason to know his license or privilege of operating a motor vehicle was suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner; and
4. defendant had, in effect, three or more suspensions imposed on at least three separate dates.
The clear and unambiguous language of VTL § 511 limits the "knowing or having reason to know" element to defendant's knowing or having reason to know that his license was suspended. Defendant's interpretation of the statute would extend the scienter element not only to VTL § 511(2)(a)(iv), but to VTL § 511(2)(a)(i) through (iii) as well. The legislature did not elect to do this through the expressed wording of the statute. It is not the role of the Court to arrogate this important legislative duty.
The Court therefore finds that the People are not required to plead and prove that defendant knew or had reason to know that he had, in effect, three or more suspensions imposed on at least three separate dates. That portion of defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
The Court also finds that the People have adequately corroborated the complaint, and have alleged a prima facie case for the charged offenses. The accusatory instrument is verified by Police Officer Mandera, who observed defendant sitting behind the steering wheel of a 1982 Buick as the car was moving on a public highway, 171st and Teller Avenue, Bronx County. This sworn statement satisfies the first two of the four elements listed above.
With regard to the third element, that defendant knew or had reason to know that his license had been suspended, the People submit a document entitled, "Driver License Suspension Order." This document is dated July 25, 1993, and is addressed to defendant at 2020 Grand Avenue, Bronx, New York. The suspension order indicates that defendant's license was suspended as of July 25, 1993 for operating a vehicle without insurance. This document qualifies as a public record under CPLR 4520.
CPLR 4520 provides:
Certificate...
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People v. Kleiner
...to know the number of times he had been suspended, only that he knew he was suspended at the time he was driving (People v. Pabon, 167 Misc.2d 214, 640 N.Y.S.2d 421 [Crim.Ct. Bronx Co.1995] Additionally VTL § 214 establishes that if an affidavit from an employee of the Department of Motor V......
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People v. Clinkscales, 2004 NY Slip Op 24033 (NY 2/5/2004)
...that must otherwise support a judgment of conviction in this case (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [2] [a] [iv]; see also People v. Pabon, 167 Misc 2d 214 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1995, Soto, J.]; but cf. People v. Garcia, 163 Misc 2d 862 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1995, Webber, J.]). Because, ......
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People v. Clinkscales
...that must otherwise support a judgment of conviction in this case (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [2] [a] [iv]; see also People v Pabon, 167 Misc 2d 214 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1995, Soto, J.]; but cf. People v Garcia, 163 Misc 2d 862 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1995, Webber, J.]). Because, h......
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