People v. Pendleton, Court of Appeals No. 13CA1617
| Decision Date | 22 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 13CA1617 |
| Citation | 2015 COA 154,374 P.3d 509 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Erin A. PENDLETON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Rebecca L. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Antony Noble, Ruchi Kapoor, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM
¶ 1 Defendant, Erin A. Pendleton, appeals the postconviction court's order denying her motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c). We affirm.
¶ 2 In June of 2004, defendant gave birth in a public restroom and discarded her newborn son in the trash, where he was later found dead.
¶ 3 Defendant was charged with first degree murder1 and child abuse resulting in death.2 With the help of her attorneys, she negotiated a plea agreement with the prosecution. In exchange for her plea to the child abuse charge, the prosecution dismissed the murder charge and agreed to a sentencing range of between sixteen and forty years in prison (eight years less than the maximum authorized by statute). The trial court accepted the agreement and sentenced defendant to a term of forty years in prison.
¶ 4 Almost three years later, defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), in which she sought to withdraw her plea for a variety of reasons. After a ten-day hearing, the postconviction court denied her request.
¶ 5 On appeal, defendant claims the postconviction court erred when it denied her motion for postconviction relief. Specifically, she argues the court erred when it (1) retrospectively determined she was competent when she entered her guilty plea; (2) concluded she entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and (3) rejected her claim that the attorney who represented her was ineffective. We address these arguments in turn.
¶ 6 Every person convicted of a crime is entitled to apply for postconviction relief on grounds that the conviction was obtained, or the sentence was imposed, in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or Colorado. Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I). A judgment of conviction is presumed valid. People v. Simpson, 69 P.3d 79, 80 (Colo.2003). It is therefore a defendant's burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her conviction was invalid. Id.
¶ 7 Where, as here, the postconviction court denies a motion for postconviction relief after conducting a hearing, we review its legal conclusions de novo, but defer to its findings of fact if the record supports them. People v. Corson, 2013 COA 4, ¶ 14, 338 P.3d 333 (cert. granted Nov. 12, 2013); see People v. McKimmy, 2014 CO 76, ¶ 19, 338 P.3d 333. We also defer to the court's determinations regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who testify at the hearing. People v. Curren, 228 P.3d 253, 258 (Colo.App.2009).
¶ 8 Defendant first claims the postconviction court erred when it retrospectively determined that she was competent at the time she entered her guilty plea. We disagree.
¶ 9 Initially, we address how the postconviction court was presented with and considered the issue of competency. The postconviction court dealt with the issue of defendant's competency in connection with its consideration of her claims that she did not make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea because she was incompetent, and her counsel was ineffective because he failed to pursue a competency determination.3 To resolve these claims, the postconviction court was required to consider defendant's competency or, at minimum, determine the probable result of a competency hearing. We therefore agree with the postconviction court that the nature of defendant's claims required it to determine whether she was competent at the time of her plea. See generally People v. Karpierz, 165 P.3d 753 (Colo.App.2006) ().
¶ 10 Competency is a question of fact. People in Interest of W.P., 2013 CO 11, ¶ 10, 295 P.3d 514. We therefore review the postconviction court's competency determination for abuse of discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, People v. Hoskins, 2014 CO 70, ¶ 17, 333 P.3d 828 ; when it misapplies the law, People v. Henson, 2013 COA 36, ¶ 9, 307 P.3d 1135 ; or when there is no evidence in the record to support it, People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380, 383 (Colo.2005).
¶ 11 Although retrospective competency determinations are not favored, they are permitted whenever the record, together with any additional evidence available, allows the court to make an accurate assessment of the defendant's competency. See People v. Corichi, 18 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo.App.2000). In deciding whether a meaningful retrospective competency determination is possible, the “court should consider: (1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) [the] defendant's statements in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and witnesses who interacted with the defendant” around the time of her plea. Id.
¶ 12 The record here supports the postconviction court's findings that it had sufficient information to make a retrospective competency determination and that defendant was, in fact, competent when she entered her guilty plea.
¶ 13 Significant medical evidence, including the results of three contemporaneous competency evaluations, was available to the postconviction court. The first, prepared by Dr. Diamond, concluded she was legally competent; the second, prepared by Dr. Gray and Dr. Shultz, agreed; the third, prepared by Dr. Fukutaki, concluded that defendant's seizure disorder would render her incompetent unless it was controlled. The court considered the results of all three evaluations, as well as testimony by two of the psychologists who prepared them. It found the evaluations concluding defendant was competent more persuasive than the one that did not. Because the postconviction court is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, we defer to its finding. Karpierz, 165 P.3d at 755.
¶ 14 The postconviction court reviewed transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings, which contained defendant's statements to the trial court. Defendant's responses to the trial court's questions at the plea hearing also suggest that she understood the nature of the proceedings and the terms of the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, defendant expressed genuine remorse for her actions and articulately described her mental health problems, drug addiction, and other stressors that contributed to them. Defendant's statements indicate that she not only understood the proceedings but was fully capable of participating in her defense. See People v. Wingfield, 2014 COA 173, ¶ 32 (). The record shows that the trial court found defendant to be competent before her sentence was announced.
¶ 15 The attorney who represented defendant when she entered the plea testified at the postconviction hearing. He explained that while he was initially concerned about defendant's competency, they had several conversations around the time of her plea that convinced him she was competent. The postconviction court found his testimony credible. Although defendant claims the court placed too much weight on plea counsel's testimony, an attorney's “first-hand evaluation of a defendant's ability to consult on his case and to understand the charges and proceedings against him may be as valuable as an expert psychiatric opinion on his competency.” Blehm v. People, 817 P.2d 988, 994 (Colo.1991). For this reason, courts “must rely to a great extent on defense counsel's evaluation of the defendant's competency.” Id.
¶ 16 In addition, based on the record, Dr. Fukutaki's concerns, which we accept as well-founded, did not necessarily indicate that defendant was incompetent at the time of the plea. Indeed, the trial court's written findings from the plea hearing state that “[d]efendant is competent at this time.”4
¶ 17 Because the postconviction court had sufficient contemporaneous information to evaluate defendant's competency at the time of her plea, the fact that it did so five years later does not invalidate its findings. See Corichi, 18 P.3d at 811 (); see also Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 675 (10th Cir.2006) (); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir.1999) ().
¶ 18 In sum, the nature of defendant's postconviction claims made it necessary for the postconviction court to evaluate defendant's competency at the time of her plea, the court had enough information to make a retrospective competency determination, and the record supports its finding that defendant was competent.
¶ 19 The People claim defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. However, defendant argued in her initial postconviction motion that “[a]s Ms. Pendleton was [i]ncompetent,...
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