People v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 30 June 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 53446
• Citation: 107 Mich.App. 440,309 N.W.2d 634
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond John PERKINS, Defendant-Appellee. 107 Mich.App. 440, 309 N.W.2d 634
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 634

309 N.W.2d 634

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond John PERKINS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 53446.

107 Mich.App. 440, 309 N.W.2d 634

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 30, 1981.

Released for Publication Sept. 1, 1981.

[107 MICHAPP 441] Richard H. Browne, Pontiac, for plaintiff-appellant.

James M. Biernat, Mount Clemens, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and CAVANAGH and FREEMAN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The people appeal as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant youthful trainee status under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, M.C.L. § 762.11 et seq.; M.S.A. § 28.853(11) et seq.

Defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter stemming from a car accident which [107 MICHAPP 442] occurred on September 9, 1979. Following a preliminary examination, he was bound over for trial on a charge of felonious driving, M.C.L. § 752.191; M.S.A. § 28.661. Defendant subsequently petitioned the court to be assigned the status of youthful trainee under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act. At the hearing on this petition, the court noted that defendant did not meet the age requirements set forth in the act because he was 21 years old on the date of the offense. However, the judge ruled that the age requirements in the statute were invalid, stating:

"(T)he Court does feel that it has the power in reviewing that statute to determine on its own, the validity of those age requirements, and in doing so, determined that that Statute, as it applies in that regard is considered to be unconstitutional as not affording equal protection to all citizens and arbitrarally placing an age limit upon the qualifications for consideration.

"The fact that a person is older and still has a good record should go more to his credit than the fact that he is younger." (Emphasis added.)

Defendant was then granted youthful trainee status.

The people appeal, claiming that the trial court erred in granting the petition.

The relevant statutory provision reads as follows:

"When a youth is alleged to have committed a criminal offense, other than murder in the first degree or a major controlled substance offense, between the youth's seventeenth and twentieth birthdays, the court of record having jurisdiction of the criminal offense may with the consent of both the affected youth and the youth's legal guardian or guardian ad litem elect to consider [107 MICHAPP 443] and assign that youth to the status of youthful trainee." M.C.L. § 762.11; M.S.A. § 28.853(11). (Emphasis added.)

It is undisputed that defendant was not within the specified age period on the date of the offense and we therefore address the issue of whether the trial court erred in striking down the age restrictions as violative of equal protection.

Equal protection analysis requires an initial determination of the proper test to be applied. If the statute affects a fundamental interest or makes an inherently suspect classification, a strict scrutiny test is appropriate and the statute will not be upheld unless the classification is justified by a compelling state interest. Absent a fundamental interest or suspect classification, the alternative test places the burden on the party challenging the statute to show that the classification is arbitrary and not reasonably or rationally related to the object of the legislation. McAvoy v. H. B. Sherman Co., 401 Mich. 419, 452-454, 258 N.W.2d 414 (1977), People v. Schmidt, 86 Mich.App. 574, 578, 272 N.W.2d 732 (1978).

We find that the strict scrutiny test is not proper in the instant case. Age is not a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 488 F.Supp. 433 (W.D.La.1980). Furthermore, differences in treatment of criminal offenders do not generally affect fundamental interests. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974). Defendant's claim that his fundamental right to liberty would be impaired by the denial of youthful trainee status is meritless because the denial of liberty would occur only after he was found guilty in a judicial proceeding at which he would be [107 MICHAPP 444] provided the full panoply of rights and protections guaranteed under the Federal and state constitutions. After such a determination of guilt, the state may circumscribe defendant's liberty. People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 662, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).

Since the statute does not interfere with a fundamental right or involve a suspect classification, we examine the age requirements under the rational basis test to determine whether the classification is arbitrary and not reasonably related to the object of the legislation. The Holmes Youthful Trainee Act constitutes remedial legislation designed to alleviate problems with young offenders by permitting the use of rehabilitation procedures prior to conviction, on the petition of the defendant. People v. Bandy, 35 Mich.App. 53, 192 N.W.2d 115 (1971). The age classification indicates a legislative belief that...