People v. Peters
| Decision Date | 31 July 1978 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 20257 |
| Citation | 581 P.2d 651,147 Cal.Rptr. 646,21 Cal.3d 749 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 581 P.2d 651 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerold Joseph PETERS, Defendant and Respondent. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Dist. Atty., Harry B. Sondheim and Richard W. Gerry, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.
Michael Rotsten, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
The People appeal from the trial court's dismissal of an indictment dated May 5, 1976, charging that defendant committed a felony. Defendant argues that the dismissal was justified because, at a first preliminary examination on October 14, and a second on December 16, 1975, the magistrates had dismissed prosecutions of him for the same offense. Penal Code section 1387 states that ". . . dismissal of an action pursuant to this chapter is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a felony and the action has been previously dismissed pursuant to this chapter. . . . ."
In that statute, "this chapter" means chapter 8 of title 10 of part 2 of the Penal Code (). In chapter 8 the only words that could have authorized the magistrates' dismissals in this case ("pursuant to this chapter") are these in section 1385: "The court may . . . in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." The issue here is whether, within the meaning of those 13 words, each magistrate was a "court" when, during the preliminary examinations on October 14 and December 16, 1975, the decision was made to dismiss the action against defendant.
There are no constitutional issues. The issues of policy are of course for the Legislature, which only two years ago extended the bar of section 1387 to felonies as well as misdemeanors. 1 Our sole concern now is the exact meaning of "court". If in section 1385 it denotes a tribunal that may conduct a trial, contrasted with a tribunal that merely decides whether defendant should be held for trial, then the indictment here should not have been dismissed because the authority conferred by section 1385 extends only to a court. We seek, therefore, guides regarding the Legislature's intent when it used the word "court".
People and press do refer to "the magistrate's court". They even say, "In court this morning the magistrate decided to hold the suspect for trial." Such loose usage does not, though, force us to a conclusion that the legislators who voted for section 1385 and its predecessor statutes believed that "court" should include magistrates as well as trial judges.
The predecessor statutes date from 1850. There were revisions in 1851, 1872, and 1951. 2 The 1951 revision has special significance because it reflects legislative consideration of the comprehensive "Recommendations for Proposed Changes in Criminal Procedure in Inferior and Superior Courts of the State of California" that were submitted by Judge Hartley Shaw, Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court's Appellate Department. (See Final Rep. of the Special Crime Study Com. on Crim. Law and Proc., Supra, pp. 39-85.) In his report Judge Shaw's use of "court" and "magistrate" were as follows (Id. p. 43, italics added):
To be stressed are (1) those last six words in paragraph 1; (2) their impact on the distinctions between "court" and "magistrate" that inhere in paragraph 4. It seems indisputable the Judge Shaw's analyses of existing statutes and his proposed revisions led him to conclude first, that "courts" are tribunals that have trial jurisdiction; second, that a magistrate is not an inferior court, a superior court, or a competent court. Instead, from 1850 onwards the Legislature had treated a magistrate as an official who merely decides whether a suspect should be held for trial. She or he is not a "court" because at the preliminary hearing stage there is no "trial jurisdiction". Arguments here have not persuaded us that Judge Shaw's analyses were incorrect then or are outdated now.
We conclude, therefore, that Penal Code section 1385 authorizes dismissals by trial courts, not magistrates. The contrary conclusion in Horner v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 638, 134 Cal.Rptr. 607 is disapproved.
The order of dismissal is reversed.
The facts of this case constitute a vivid example of prosecutorial harassment and forum-shopping. 1 On October 14, 1975, defendant appeared at a preliminary examination before a municipal court magistrate on charges of possession of marijuana and possession of a controlled substance for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11357, 11378, subd. (a).) On the People's refusal to disclose the identity of an informant deemed to be an essential witness, the magistrate dismissed the case in furtherance of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. 2
The People then refiled the same charges against defendant. When the second preliminary examination was set before the magistrate who had previously dismissed the action, the People threatened a third filing if the case was again dismissed. Capitulating to that threat, defendant stipulated to the examination being set before a different magistrate. 3 When the People continued to withhold the informant's identity, the second magistrate dismissed the action on December 16, 1975, again pursuant to section 1385. 4
Not satisfied with the considered decisions of two municipal court judges sitting as magistrates, 5 on May 5, 1976, the People turned to yet another forum and presented the case to the grand jury for an indictment. Predictably, without revelation of the informant, the People obtained an indictment on the same day. The superior court thereafter granted defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 1387, and the People appeal from that order.
The majority opinion identifies the construction of the word "court" in the context of section 1385 as the issue requiring resolution, and then proceeds to assign an overly formalistic meaning to the term contrary to common usage, legislative intent, and previous judicial interpretation. The majority rely solely on certain legislative recommendations formulated in 1949 by Judge Hartley Shaw to conclude that "court" means only tribunals with trial jurisdiction, thereby excluding magistrates from the power to dismiss pursuant to section 1385.
The conclusion gleaned from the Shaw commentary is questionable on several grounds. First, Shaw provides no express definition of "court," an omission which renders his report of circumstantial relevance at best. Second, the majority offer no explanation why the meaning of "court" should be controlled by an assumed interrelationship between the definitions of "inferior court" and "accusatory pleading." Third, the power of the magistrate is by definition inseparable from the court of which he is a member. That is, only the Tribunal need have trial jurisdiction; it is not rational to focus on the person of the magistrate, because no judge possesses trial jurisdiction apart from his relationship with the court on which he sits. Here the magistrate was a judge of the municipal court, and hence comes within Shaw's definition of "inferior court" because the municipal court is obviously a body with trial jurisdiction. Finally, even if the Shaw construction were to support the majority's conclusion as a matter of logic, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to adopt this hypertechnical interpretation of the word "court." Quite to the contrary, related statutes as well as judicial construction reflect general acceptance of a common meaning of "court" to include magistrates.
To begin with, the statutory history of section 1385 the sole basis of the majority opinion presents an equivocal picture at best. The predecessor statute to section 1385, section 629 of chapter 119, Statutes of 1850, authorized dismissal in the interest of justice "after indictment." Because chapter 119 provided for indictment only after preliminary hearing, section 629 would appear to have precluded dismissal by a magistrate. However, the limitation implicit in section 629 was subsequently modified by changes in 1851 (Stats. 1851, ch. 29, § 597, p. 279) which permitted dismissal of an "action or indictment," and it was eliminated altogether by the 1951 amendment to section 1385 deleting any reference to indictment. This sequence of amendments implies an intent to extend section 1385 dismissal power to all stages of a proceeding,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Slaughter
...(Jones, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 664-665, 94 Cal.Rptr. 289, 483 P.2d 1241.) In 1978, this court decided People v. Peters, (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749, 147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651. Peters held that a magistrate could not employ section 1385 to dismiss a felony charge. 8 The underlying premise of ......
-
California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist.
...6, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41 (Bird, C. J.; Willson letter to Governor); People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749, 762, 147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651 (dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.; Sen. Song letter to Governor). Against that array of recent opinions 2 and against Friends of Mammoth and Peral......
-
Landrum v. Superior Court
...to reconcile the statutory scheme for disposition of felony complaints with this court's decision in People v. Peters, supra, 21 Cal.3d 749, 147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651. In that case, this court held that a magistrate was not authorized to dismiss a felony complaint pursuant to section ......
-
People v. Tanner
...25, 1978, respectively, passed the Assembly and Senate after this court's 4-to-3 decision on July 31, 1978 in People v. Peters, 21 Cal.3d 749, 147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651. (At the end of September, interestingly, it was vetoed by the Governor.)* "(J)udgment is synonymous with the imposi......