People v. Pinyan
| Decision Date | 01 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. C--620,C--620 |
| Citation | 190 Colo. 304,546 P.2d 488 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Lloyd Dalton PINYAN, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Robert R. Gallagher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Jerry B. Tompkins, Deputy Dist. Atty., Littleton, for petitioner.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colo. State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Bruce G. Smith, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the district court which affirmed an order of dismissal of a criminal complaint by the county court on the ground that section 18--1--408(2), C.R.S.1973, 1 barred the filing of municipal and state charges for criminal acts arising out of the same occurrence. We reverse.
The undisputed facts show that on December 2, 1973, the respondent was stopped by an Englewood, Colorado, police officer for making an illegal left-hand turn. This conduct violated a traffic ordinance, and respondent was issued a municipal court citation therefor. At the time the citation was issued, the officer discovered that the respondent was driving while his license was suspended or revoked. For this violation of a state statute, section 42--2--130, C.R.S.1973, 2 the police officer issued a county court summons and complaint. The respondent appeared in county court on December 26, 1973, and entered a plea of not guilty to the state charge. On January 24, 1974, respondent mailed his fine for the municipal traffic ordinance violation to the municipal court.
On June 25, 1974, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the county court complaint on the state charge. On June 26, 1974, the county judge granted the motion based on his interpretation of section 18--1--408(2), C.R.S.1973.
In the analysis of the issues raised, it will be advantageous to consider not only subsection (2), but also subsection 18--1--408(1), C.R.S.1973. The subsections read:
'(1) When any conduct of a defendant establishes the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not be convicted of more than one offense if:
'(a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (5) of this section; or
'(b) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the other; or
'(c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or
'(d) The offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or
'(e) The offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods or instances of such conduct constitute separate offenses.
'(2) If the several offenses are known to the district attorney at the time of commencing the prosecution and were committed within his judicial district, all such offenses upon which the district attorney elects to proceed must be prosecuted by separate counts in a single prosecution if they are based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode. Any offense not thus joined by separate count cannot thereafter be the basis of a subsequent prosecution.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the judge stated:
'The Court, for the edification of the district attorney's office, interprets the language 'if the several offenses are known to the district attorney,' the Court interprets that to mean 'the prosecuting arm or agency of the State.' What that section really means is 'if the several offenses are known to the State, then they must be joined."
It is clear that insofar as the statute is concerned a defendant may be prosecuted for each offense that he allegedly commits, with certain well-defined limitations. See People v. Cooke, 186 Colo. 44, 525 P.2d 426 (1974). The limitations are primarily those embodied within the constitutional concepts of double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 18, impermissible joinder and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). These concepts were thoroughly discussed in People v. Horvat, 186 Colo. 202, 527 P.2d 47 (1974), and will not be repeated here, except to the extent necessary for a discussion of the proper interpretation of section 18--1--408(2), C.R.S.1973.
Other statutory provisions which bear upon the problem here are found in the Uniform Traffic Code, sections 42--4--101 Et seq., C.R.S.1973. This article specifically authorized local authorities...
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Jeffrey v. District Court In and For Eighth Judicial Dist., 80SA476
...See People v. Hines, 194 Colo. 284, 572 P.2d 467 (1977); People v. Talarico, 192 Colo. 445, 560 P.2d 90 (1977); People v. Pinyan, 190 Colo. 304, 546 P.2d 488 (1976).8 The only language difference between section 18-1-408(2) and Crim.P. 8(a) is that the former employs the terminology of "dis......
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People v. McCormick, 92SC334
...v. People, 735 P.2d 176, 181 (Colo.1987); People v. Talarico, 192 Colo. 445, 446, 560 P.2d 90, 91 (1977). See Pinyan v. People, 190 Colo. 304, 307, 546 P.2d 488, 491 (1976). A review of the decisions articulating this principle illustrates its applicability to the unusual circumstances of t......
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...joinder bar to municipal ordinance violations. 5 Second, we look to prior case law construing section 18-1-408(2). In People v. Pinyan, 190 Colo. 304, 546 P.2d 488 (1976), this court dealt with the applicability of the compulsory joinder bar to successive prosecutions in municipal and state......