People v. Poole
| Docket Number | 352569 |
| Decision Date | 18 January 2024 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN ANTONIO POOLE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 02-000893-02-FC
Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RIORDAN, JJ.
This case comes before us on remand from our Supreme Court, which directed this Court to "determine whether defendant is entitled to relief based on [the Supreme Court's] People v Parks, [510 Mich. 225; 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022)], that mandatory life-without-parole sentences imposed on 18-year-old defendants are categorically disproportionate and thus unconstitutional under Const 1963 art 1, § 16." People v Poole, 510 Mich 851, 851-852; 977 N.W.2d 530 (2022). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate defendant's first-degree murder sentence and remand for resentencing.
In mid-December 2001, defendant was recruited by his uncle and codefendant, Harold Varner, to murder the victim for $300. Specifically, Varner was having difficulty entering into a real estate transaction with Delora Lester because she needed additional financing from Varner to purchase a residential home from him. The victim, Henry Covington, was Lester's fiance. Varner interfered with Lester's attempt to take possession of the home, and Lester and the victim were forced to leave the home after someone threw a firebomb through the kitchen window.
At 5:00 a.m. on December 12, 2001, Varner contacted Amanda Coddington, his property manager and the mother of his child and asked her to meet him at a gas station. After their meeting, Varner directed Coddington to an area to meet defendant. Defendant entered Varner's car first and then got into Coddington's car. Coddington was instructed to follow Varner's car to an area near where the victim and Lester were staying. Once there, defendant left Coddington's car, proceeded into an alley, and headed toward the victim's home. As Coddington waited, she heard four gunshots. Defendant returned to the car after 15 minutes, holding a .357-caliber gun that he placed inside a shopping bag on the car's floor. Coddington asked defendant what happened, but he instructed her to drive away. Later, defendant told Coddington that he shot "someone," but did not identify the victim by name. Varner explained that he had the victim killed because it would make Lester easier to handle. After the murder, defendant repeatedly asked Varner for more money. Coddington later discarded the gun in a dumpster.
At the time of the murder, defendant was 18 years old, but would turn 19 years old within a month's time. Following a jury trial, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, 24 to 90 months' imprisonment for felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and two years' imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. When imposing defendant's sentence on August 13, 2002, the trial court said:
Thereafter, defendant filed two successive motions under MCR 6.502(G) that the trial court denied. The trial court refused to accept defendant's third successive motion, and this Court dismissed defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal. People v Poole, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 1, 2020 (Docket No. 352569). Our Supreme Court determined that defendant demonstrated a retroactive change in the law, entitling him to file his third motion for relief from judgment. People v Poole, 510 Mich. 851; 977 N.W.2d 530 (2023). Our Supreme Court vacated our order dismissing defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal under MCR 6.502(G) and remanded the matter to this Court, directing that the merits of defendant's motion for relief from judgment be addressed in light of People v Parks, 510 Mich. 225; 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022).[3] Poole, 510 Mich. at 851-852.
In Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the punishment of life without parole for juveniles constituted cruel and unusual punishment, stating:
The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more appropriate. Such a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile's "lessened culpability" and greater "capacity for change," Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74; 130 S.Ct. 2011; 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and runs afoul of our cases' requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties. We therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments."
After the Miller decision, the question arose whether its holding applied retroactively to juvenile offenders who had final convictions and sentences at the time Miller was decided. The opportunity to address this issue arose in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 193-194; 136 S.Ct. 718; 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In Montgomery, the petitioner was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana. The petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but his conviction was reversed when it was determined that public prejudice deprived him of a fair trial. On retrial, the petitioner was again found guilty but "without capital punishment." Under Louisiana law, the petitioner was automatically sentenced to life without parole upon the jury's verdict and was not given the opportunity to present mitigation evidence to justify a less severe sentence. At the time of his filing seeking relief, the petitioner was 69 years old and had spent nearly his entire life in prison. Id. at 194.
The Montgomery Court noted that, in Miller, it was determined that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders that committed homicide violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 195. The failure to consider youth and its accompanying circumstances to the harshest prison sentence of life without parole posed a risk of disproportionate punishment. And, therefore, sentencing courts were now required to consider the juvenile's diminished capacity and heightened ability to change before sentencing him to life or to die in prison. Despite the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Montgomery Court noted that a trial court was not foreclosed from sentencing a juvenile defendant to life without parole. But, "a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect 'irreparable corruption.'" Id. at 195 quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479480.
Following the decision in Miller, the petitioner sought collateral review of his sentence, and the Louisiana state courts concluded that Miller did "not have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review." Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 196-197. The Montgomery Court granted certiorari to address whether the Miller Court adopted a new substantive rule that applied retroactively on collateral review for defendants sentenced as juveniles to die in prison. Id. at 197. The Montgomery Court addressed retroactivity, stating:
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288; 109 S.Ct. 1060; 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), set forth a framework for retroactivity in cases on federal collateral review. Under Teague, a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure does not apply, as a general matter, to convictions that were final when the new rule was announced. Teague recognized, however, two categories of rules that are not subject to its general retroactivity bar. First, courts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive rules include "rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct," as well as "rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Penry v Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330; 109 S.Ct. 2934; 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989); see also Teague, supra, at 307; 109 S.Ct. 1060. Although Teague describes new substantive rules as an exception to the bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, this Court has recognized that substantive rules "are more accurately characterized as . . . not subject to the bar." Schriro v Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, n 4; 124 S.Ct. 2519; 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). Second, courts...
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