People v. Porterfield

• Decision Date: 07 April 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 95227
• Citation: 420 N.W.2d 853,166 Mich.App. 562
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Wayne PORTERFIELD, Defendant-Appellant. 166 Mich.App. 562, 420 N.W.2d 853
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 853

420 N.W.2d 853

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Wayne PORTERFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 95227.

166 Mich.App. 562, 420 N.W.2d 853

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 3, 1987.

Decided Feb. 17, 1988.

Released for Publication April 7, 1988.

[166 MICHAPP 563] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief, [166 MICHAPP 564] Appellate Div., and Paul J. Fischer, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Cooper, Shifman, Gabe, Quinn & Seymour by Philip H. Seymour, Royal Oak, for defendant-appellant.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and J.H. GILLIS and TAHVONEN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of child torture, M.C.L. Sec. 750.136a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.331(1). Defendant was sentenced to from three to ten years' imprisonment. We affirm.

Defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question following a bench trial, this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 268-270, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985). Defendant first contends that, to be convicted of child torture, the prosecution must prove not only that he intentionally inflicted extreme, intense, or severe pain upon the victim but also that he did so for various purposes, such as sadistic pleasure, coercion, or punishment. In People v. Biegajski, 122 Mich App 215, 223, 332 N.W.2d 413 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 1080 (1983), a panel of this Court reasoned that the difference between child cruelty and child torture is that the former applies where the abuse is inflicted with a punishment motive, while the latter applies where abuse is inflicted for sadistic purposes or for a purpose other than punishment. The Biegajski panel adopted the dictionary definition of torture even [166 MICHAPP 565] though it noted that Black's Law Dictionary defined torture as "the infliction of violent bodily pain upon a person." Biegajski, supra, p. 223, 332 N.W.2d 413. In People v. Webb, 128 Mich.App. 721, 727, n 3, 341 N.W.2d 191 (1983), lv. den. 418 Mich 966 (1984), and People v. Shelton, 138 Mich.App. 510, 514-515, 360 N.W.2d 234 (1984), other panels of this Court rejected the reasoning of the Biegajski panel and held that the degree of severity of the injury inflicted rather than that the defendant's motive in perpetrating the offense distinguished child torture from child cruelty. Hence, before a defendant may be convicted of child torture, it need only be shown that he intentionally inflicted extreme, intense or severe pain or injury upon the victim. Id. We agree with the Webb and Shelton panels. Because defendant concedes and the trial court found that his conduct satisfies the Webb-Shelton standard, no error occurred when defendant was convicted of child torture. Petrella, supra.

Defendant further contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he fractured his six-week-old son's ribs and leg. After reviewing the trial transcript, we can only conclude that, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant was the person responsible for both of those acts. Moreover, defendant's single act of fracturing the child's skull also constitutes child torture. We reject defendant's argument that multiple acts are required. Biegajski, supra, 122 Mich.App. at p. 223, 332 N.W.2d 413.

Defendant next claims that the magistrate abused his discretion in binding him over on a child torture charge. An examining magistrate's function is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause for charging the defendant with its commission. People[166 MICHAPP 566] v. Makela, 147 Mich.App. 674, 679, 383 N.W.2d 270 (1985). In doing so, the magistrate may pass upon the credibility of the witnesses; however, where the evidence conflicts or raises reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt, the magistrate should bind the defendant over because such issues are to be decided by the trier of fact. Id. A magistrate's decision to bind a defendant over will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

Defendant again claims the prosecutor failed to prove that he acted for various purposes, such as sadistic pleasure or coercion. As noted above, defendant's motive is not an element of the crime. Shelton, supra; Webb, supra.

Likewise, defendant again claims that there was no probable cause to believe that he was the person guilty of the crime charged insofar as it related to the child's ribs and leg. Having reviewed the preliminary examination testimony, we hold that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in binding defendant over. Makela, supra. Again, we note that proof of the child's fractured skull was sufficient in and of itself to support binding defendant over even though defendant claimed the injury was accidental. Id.

Defendant next claims a protective services worker's testimony concerning a statement defendant made in the course of a child-neglect proceeding was inadmissible because he was not informed of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86...