People v. Price

• Decision Date: 18 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 100635.,No. 100470.,100470.,100635.
• Citation: 850 N.E.2d 199,221 Ill.2d 182
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Charles PRICE, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Anthony Rose, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

850 N.E.2d 199

221 Ill.2d 182

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Charles PRICE, Appellee.

The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Anthony Rose, Appellee.

No. 100470.

No. 100635.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 18, 2006.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, James Glasgow, State's Attorney, Joliet (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer, Terry A. Mertel, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Thomas A. Karalis, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellees.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Charles Price and Anthony Rose were each charged with two counts of felony theft arising out of a single incident. They were tried together before a jury and convicted on both counts. Price was sentenced to five-year concurrent sentences on both counts, and Rose was sentenced to two-year concurrent sentences on both counts. Each defendant appealed separately. In a published opinion, the appellate court reversed Price's convictions and remanded for a new trial. 356 Ill.App.3d 223, 292 Ill.Dec. 153, 825 N.E.2d 741. Rose's convictions were reversed and remanded in a summary order. No. 3-03-0497 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The State filed petitions for leave to appeal in both cases. We allowed the petitions and consolidated the cases on appeal to this court.

The two theft counts in the indictment were predicated on different sections of the theft statute (720 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2002)) and alleged the commission of the same offense in two different ways. The appellate court determined that the guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent and remanded for a new trial. This case presents the question of whether the verdicts were legally inconsistent and, if inconsistent, whether we must remand for a new trial. We now reverse the judgments of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Price and Rose were both charged by indictment with one count of burglary and two counts of felony theft in the circuit court of Will County. The burglary count alleged that defendants entered the Schenk, Duff & McNamara law firm with the intent to commit a theft. The first theft count alleged that both defendants "exerted unauthorized control over * * * office-related property, having a total value exceeding $300 * * *, intending to deprive [the law firm] permanently of the use or benefit of said property." The second theft count alleged that both defendants "obtained control over * * * office-related property having a total value exceeding $300 * * * under circumstances that would reasonably induce them to believe that the property was stolen, intending to deprive [the law firm] of the use or benefit of the property."

At defendants' jury trial, a Joliet police officer testified she observed the defendants walking away from Joliet Housing Authority property at approximately 12:15 a.m. About an hour later, Rose returned to the property. The officer asked where he was going, and Rose explained that he needed to help his friend carry food because his friend's car had broken down. Rose then retrieved a shopping cart from the side of a building. The cart appeared to belong to the liquor store located there. He then headed eastbound across a bridge.

About 10 minutes later, the officer observed defendants returning together westbound over the bridge. Price was pushing a shopping cart filled with a laptop computer, radio, two briefcases, a humidor, and a combination TV/VCR. At the entrance to the housing authority property, the officer asked Rose where he had obtained the items in the shopping cart. He replied that he found them by the garbage at St. Vincent's Church. According to the officer, St. Vincent's Church is actually the DePaul Resale Shop, a thrift resale store. After obtaining Rose's permission, the officer examined the items and discovered a business card from the Schenk law firm inside a black briefcase.

The officer testified that the Schenk law firm is approximately four to six blocks from the place where she encountered defendants and that it would take approximately four to six minutes to walk that distance. According to the officer, no retail establishments were open on a Sunday between midnight and 1:30 a.m.

Another officer testified Rose stated he encountered an unknown female behind St. Vincent's who gave him the items in the cart. Rose told the officer he had previously taken items with permission from behind St. Vincent's. The officers dispatched a police car to the thrift store, but no items were found outside the building.

An employee of the St. Vincent DePaul Resale Shop testified that unwanted items were never placed in back of the store for people to take after hours. Since October 2002, discarded items have been placed in the garbage inside a closed garage and collected by the garbage service. She testified that she did not give the recovered items to defendants and had never before seen those items. Evidence was introduced establishing that the items in the shopping cart belonged to various individuals in the Schenk law firm and had been removed without authority from anyone in that firm.

Following denial of defendants' motion for directed verdict, the case was submitted to the jury. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge inquiring about the difference between the phrases "knowingly exerted unauthorized control" and "knowingly obtained control" in the jury instructions. The jury also asked whether there was "any clear distinction between the second and third charge" and whether defendants could be convicted of both. The judge responded in writing, directing the jurors to refer to the instructions submitted, and he gave no further guidance on the jurors' questions.

The jury acquitted defendants of burglary, but found them guilty of both theft counts. On the first theft count, it found both defendants guilty of theft of property exceeding $300 in value. On the second theft count, it found both defendants guilty of theft of stolen property exceeding $300 in value. Following denial of their posttrial motions, defendants were sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment. Defendants appealed separately.

In Price's appeal, the appellate court held, in a published opinion, that the guilty verdicts for counts II and III were legally inconsistent and remanded for a new trial. 356 Ill.App.3d at 225-27, 292 Ill.Dec. 153, 825 N.E.2d 741. Two justices specially concurred, agreeing that the verdicts were legally inconsistent, but arguing that because both convictions were for theft and carried the same sentence, the better course would be to vacate one of the two convictions. Nevertheless, the two concurring justices believed that remand was mandated by this court's precedent, including People v. Jones, 207 Ill.2d 122, 278 Ill.Dec. 45, 797 N.E.2d 640 (2003). 356 Ill.App.3d at 227-28, 292 Ill.Dec. 153, 825 N.E.2d 741 (Slater, P.J., specially concurring, joined by Lytton, J.).

In Rose's appeal, the appellate court filed a Rule 23 summary order (166 Ill.2d R. 23(c)) vacating the theft convictions and remanding for a new trial pursuant to the holding in Price. We consolidated the appeals for review in this court.

ANALYSIS

At the outset, we must determine whether the verdicts on count II and count III of the indictment were legally inconsistent. "Legally inconsistent verdicts occur when an essential element of each crime must, by the very nature of the verdicts, have been found to exist and to not exist even though the offenses arise out of the same set of facts." People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill.2d 326, 343, 168 Ill.Dec. 108, 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992). When offenses involve mutually inconsistent mental states, a determination that one mental state exists is legally inconsistent with a determination of the existence of the other mental state. People v. Hoffer, 106 Ill.2d 186, 195, 88 Ill.Dec. 20, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985). Whether two verdicts are legally inconsistent presents a question of law and, therefore, our review is de novo. Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill.2d 622, 642, 297 Ill.Dec. 432, 837 N.E.2d 883 (2005).

Count II of the indictment alleged a violation of section 16-1(a)(1) of the theft statute. That section provides that one commits theft who knowingly "[o]btains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner." 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1) (West 2002). Count III of the indictment alleged a violation of section 16-1(a)(4) of the theft statute. That section provides that one commits theft who "[o]btains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen." 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(4) (West 2002). We recently confirmed earlier authority holding that "`the several subsections of section 16-1 do not undertake to create a series of separate offenses, but rather to create a single offense of theft which may be performed in a number of ways.'" People v. Graves, 207 Ill.2d 478, 484, 279 Ill.Dec. 502, 800 N.E.2d 790 (2003), quoting People v. Fowler, 72 Ill.App.3d 491, 494-95, 28 Ill.Dec. 787; 390 N.E.2d 1377 (1979), citing People v. Marino, 44 Ill.2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970).

The indictment alleged each defendant violated section 16-1(a)(1) in that they "knowingly exerted unauthorized control over property of Schenk, Duffy and McNamara * * * intending to deprive Schenk, Duffy and McNamara permanently of the use or benefit of said property." The indictment alleged each defendant violated section 16-1(a)(4) in that they knowingly obtained control over the Schenk firm property "under such circumstances as would reasonably induce them to believe that the property was stolen." Thus, the charging...