People v. Pruitt, Docket No. 7898

• Decision Date: 29 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 2,Docket No. 7898,2
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James PRUITT, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 22

179 N.W.2d 22

23 Mich.App. 510

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James PRUITT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 7898.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

April 29, 1970.

Released for Publication Aug. 28, 1970.

Hugh B. McVicker, Jr., Badgley, Domke, McVicker & Marcoux, Jackson, for appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol Gen., Bruce A. Barton, Pros. Atty., for appellee.

Before GILLIS, P.J., and DANHOF and O'HARA ^*, JJ.

O'HARA, Judge.

This is a case of statutory construction, and the application of the statute to agreed facts.

The accepted statement of fact is herewith set out.

'On April 6, 1968, the defendant and appellant was sentenced to a minimum term of two and one-half years and a maximum sentence of ten years from Wayne County on a breaking and entering charge. On July 6, 1968, while he was incarcerated in the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson on the prior sentence, appellant escaped and was apprehended the same day.' (Transcript p. 9)

'On September 13, 1968, an Order was entered granting appellant a new trial on the breaking and entering charge.' (Transcript p. 3) 'On April 28, 1969, the breaking and entering charge was dismissed in Wayne County.' (Transcript p. 16)

'On May 21, 1969, appellant entered a plea of guilty in the Circuit Court for the County of Jackson to the escape charge.' (Transcript p. 9) 'He was sentenced to a minimum term of one and one-half years and a maximum term of five years on May 29, 1969 with credit being given for 32 days, this being the time appellant spent in jail between April 28, 1969 when the breaking and entering charge was dismissed and the day of the sentencing.' (Transcript p. 16)

Throughout the entire period of time involved, the appellant was held in jail without bond.

We deem it necessary to add to the agreed statement additional dates from the record in order to apply the statute properly.

'On July 26, 1968, defendant was arraigned before an associate Municipal judge of the city of Kalamazoo on a warrant which had been authorized on July 22. On September 16, 1968, there was a preliminary examination held before the Jackson Municipal judge and defendant was bound over to the circuit court of Jackson County.'

The involved statute provides:

'Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing.' M.C.L.A. § 769.11b (Stat.Ann.1970 Cum.Supp. 28.1083(2)), added by P.A.1965, No. 73, § 1, Eff. March 31, 1966.

Stripped of all non-essentials the real question here presented is whether the above quoted statute applies to a sentence imposed for conviction of the offense of prison escape ¹ which can only be committed while the accused is already serving a presumptively valid sentence, and thus not eligible for release on bond in any amount on the latter charge, at the arraignment on the warrant or the complaint before the magistrate or upon the information in the circuit court.

We find no case heretofore decided which is precisely in point. Several are analogously applicable.

We discuss what we consider a question of first impression.

One manifest legislative intent of the credit-granting statute was to equalize as far as possible, the status of the indigent, and the less financially well circumstanced accused with the status of the accused who can afford to furnish bail. It is arguable that this intent did not extend to a case where the equalization is meaningless because a pre-imposed sentence would require continuing incarceration irrespective of the ability of the defendant to furnish bond.

Contrariwise, it may also be contended that the statute is remedial and calls for a liberal interpretation. (See People v. Chattaway (1969), 18 Mich.App. 538, 542, 171 N.W.2d 801.) The logical extension of this argument would dictate that when the legislature used the terms 'any crime' in the statute the offense of prison escape was not excepted. Consequently, the credit to be granted should begin on the first date that bond could have been set for that offense despite the fact that the accused was ineligible for release on bond in any amount.

Either construction is possible within the wording of the statute.

It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that 'absurd consequences' are to be avoided if a 'logical alternative' is available. (See In re Wright, 360 Mich. 455, 459, 104 N.W.2d 509.)

We consider that placing a premium on prison escape under the involved statute does result in 'absurd consequences.' It is apparent that to grant appellant credit from the date of his arraignment on the warrant for prison escape July 26, 1968 would be an invitation to all inmates similarly circumstanced to attempt escape; then if apprehended and arraigned simply to indicate an inability to furnish bond. Automatically credit would of necessity be extended from the date of apprehension and arraignment to the date of sentencing for prison escape.

We think the 'logical alternative' is that we compute the time from the date on which the accused could have In fact been released upon bond for the offense of prison escape.

When the defendant here was granted a new trial on the original breaking and entering charge on September 13, 1968, he stood before the law presumptively innocent of that offense. His continued incarceration from that date became attributable to the pending charge of prison escape, since before the law he was presumed...