People v. Quagliata
| Decision Date | 29 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-05153,2007-05153 |
| Citation | 861 N.Y.S.2d 792,2008 NY Slip Op 6465,53 A.D.3d 670 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. JENNIFER QUAGLIATA, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and her statements to law enforcement officials are denied, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
On June 4, 2006, at approximately 2:00 A.M., the Nassau County Police Department received a 911 call reporting that a red Scion motor vehicle containing two Hispanic males and a firearm was located at 1723 Broadway in Hewlett. Within minutes, Police Officer John Patterson responded to the call and drove up to the red Scion at the reported location, parking his patrol car nose-to-nose with the Scion. Officer Patterson exited his patrol car, with his gun unholstered and pointed down, and approached the vehicle. Two females were seated in the Scion, the 20-year-old defendant driver and her passenger. The defendant exited the vehicle after Officer Patterson asked her to do so, whereupon he reholstered his gun. When asked what she was doing at the location, the defendant responded that she was "waiting around for a friend."
Moments later, three police officers and a police sergeant arrived on the scene, parking behind the Scion. Upon the police sergeant's request, the defendant, who was standing in the street, moved to a safer location towards the sidewalk. In response to inquiries about a gun in the car, the defendant denied knowledge of any gun in the car. The sergeant then asked the defendant "if we could search the vehicle" to which she responded "yes." According to the sergeant, the defendant was "pretty calm" and spoke in a normal, "matter of fact" conversational tone.
At that point, the sergeant went to retrieve the car keys from the ignition, but the defendant volunteered that the sergeant did not need the keys to open the trunk, whereupon she pressed a button located on the trunk, which opened it. The sergeant observed a backpack in the trunk and asked the defendant if it was her bag. The defendant stated the bag was not hers. After the defendant denied ownership of the bag, the sergeant looked in it and saw a quantity of drugs, a scale, and a grinder. The defendant and her passenger were immediately placed under arrest. A subsequent search of the vehicle's glove compartment uncovered a loaded firearm. After waiving her Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), the defendant made statements to the police.
Prior to trial, the defendant made an omnibus motion, inter alia, to suppress all of the physical evidence and her statements to law enforcement officials as the fruits of an illegal search of the vehicle. Upon the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the County Court found that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search of her vehicle, and thus suppressed the physical evidence and the defendant's oral and written statements. We reverse.
It is well settled that the People have the heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of a defendant's consent to a search (see People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122, 128 [1976]; People v Whitehurst, 25 NY2d 389, 391 [1969]), which is a question of fact that must be determined from the totality of the circumstances (see Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 248 [1973]; People v DePace, 127 AD2d 847, 849 [1987]; People v Abrams, 95 AD2d 155, 157 [1983]). In order to sustain this burden, the prosecution must "demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied" by the actions of the law enforcement authorities (Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US at 248).
Once illegal drugs or other contraband are found pursuant to that search, and (People v Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 678 [1989]; see People v Belton, 55 NY2d 49, 53-55 [1982]; People v Martin, 50 AD3d 1169 [2008]; People v Garcia, 30 AD3d 833, 834-835 [2006]).
Here, contrary to the County Court's conclusion, the defendant voluntarily consented...
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