People v. Ray, 79SA347
Decision Date | 06 April 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 79SA347,79SA347 |
Citation | 626 P.2d 167 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry D. RAY, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., O. Otto Moore, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Donna Skinner Reed, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
This is an appeal by the People from a judgment of acquittal granted by the trial court after a jury had been unable to reach a verdict on a second-degree burglary 1 charge against the defendant, Larry D. Ray. In addition to asserting error in granting the judgment of acquittal, the People challenged the trial court's ruling denying the People's offer of evidence of two allegedly similar transactions. We approve the entry of the judgment of acquittal but disapprove the exclusion of the evidence concerning similar transactions.
On October 26, 1978, during the mid-day absence of Mr. and Mrs. Frank W. Winegar from their Denver residence, someone entered their locked house and stole a number of items of silver and jewelry as well as a down comforter, a bedspread 2 and a fur stole. Much of the jewelry was antique and specially designed. No television or other electronic equipment was taken.
Mrs. Winegar discovered the loss when she returned home late that afternoon. She notified the police, who quickly arrived on the scene. Inspection of the premises by the police and Mrs. Winegar disclosed that a milk chute in the back of the house had been broken open and appeared to be the opening through which the burglar had entered the dwelling. The milk chute was approximately 20 inches wide and 14 to 16 inches high. It had two steel doors, one on the outside of the house and the other on the inside, with a space the width of the outside wall between them. Only a latch was maintained on the outer door, but the inner door had been secured by a bar lock, which had been forcibly torn loose from its fastenings.
Police officers obtained five latent fingerprints from the outside surface of the inside milk chute door, and did not attempt to search for additional prints inside the house. One of the latent fingerprints was positively identified at trial as that of the defendant. The poor quality of the other prints prevented identification. No other evidence was presented by the People linking the defendant to the crime. The defendant was not known to the victims and had no permission to enter their home.
Prior to the presentation of any evidence by the People, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of two similar transactions which he understood the People intended to offer. The People made a record with respect to the nature of the evidence and the purposes for which its admission was requested. The trial court reserved ruling pending presentation of other evidence in the People's case. After presenting the other evidence, the People moved to admit the evidence of the two similar transactions for the stated purposes of providing the identity of the perpetrator of the Winegar burglary as well as to show a common scheme, method of operating, and intent.
In her offer of proof, the deputy district attorney described the first incident as having occurred on October 31, 1978, at a residence three to four blocks from the Winegar home. Entry was obtained between 8:30 a. m. and 2:00 p. m. by prying open the back door of the house. Silver and expensive jewelry, including antique items, had been taken, but the stereo, television and cameras were left. A missing pillow slip and a sack, the contents of which had been emptied, may have been used to carry the items. Fingerprints were found on a box in which the silver was kept and, although the offer of proof is not specific, it may be inferred that expert testimony would show the prints to be the defendant's.
The second incident was described in the offer of proof as having taken place on November 3, 1978, at a house within three to four blocks of the other two burglarized residences. There, a woman returned to her home during the day and interrupted a burglary in progress. As she entered her bedroom she saw the defendant leaving through the window. A bag in the kitchen had been emptied and was missing. Jewelry, some of it antique, had been taken, but the stereo and television equipment had not. A broken window in the back bedroom appeared to have been the means of entry. The woman later identified the defendant as the burglar in a photographic lineup.
The trial court concluded that the decision whether to permit the evidence of the other transactions was discretionary and that the question was close. The trial court then stated that it was Thursday afternoon, the second week of the jury panel's service, and that the following Monday would be a holiday; that the second incident was the subject of a charge which had been severed for the charge which the defendant was on trial; that a Wade 3 hearing would be necessary with respect to the identification of the defendant; that the courtroom was hot; 4 and that both other incidents were the subjects of charges pending in other divisions of that court. The court then stated:
"(T)o prolong this trial over a long weekend in the middle of the summer with a jury that, it's the Court's impression, is trying very hard to be attentive and having some difficulty with that in terms of the heat of the courtroom, that to prolong this trial would only confuse the issues for both sides and that neither side would necessarily receive as fair a trial as they could if we tried this incident only and left the similars for another time and another place."
After the People rested, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The motion was denied. The defendant rested without presenting evidence and then renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court reserved ruling on that motion.
The jury deliberations over the course of almost two days, with a three-day weekend interruption, did not produce a verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury reported that it was deadlocked. The trial court then granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on which ruling had previously been reserved.
The People contend that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and in refusing to permit presentation of evidence of the two similar transactions. They ask that the judgment of acquittal be set aside and that a new trial be ordered. Jeopardy has attached, however, and retrial of the defendant is barred. E.g., People v. Waggoner, 196 Colo. 578, 595 P.2d 217 (1979). We treat this matter, therefore, as an appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), in which we may only approve or disapprove the trial court's rulings. The defendant has not participated in the appellate proceedings in this court.
The standard by which a motion for judgment of acquittal is to be tested is well settled. In People v. Downer, 192 Colo. 264, 268, 557 P.2d 835, 838 (1976) we said:
Accord, e.g., People v. Roberts, 197 Colo. 304, 592 P.2d 801 (1979); People v. Martinez, 191 Colo. 428, 553 P.2d 774 (1976); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973).
We have also previously considered the applicability of that general test to situations where a defendant is tied to a crime by fingerprint evidence only. In such a case we have said:
Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 42, 495 P.2d 204, 206 (1972); 5 see also, People v. Gomez, 189 Colo. 91, 537 P.2d 297 (1975); People v. Hannaman, 181 Colo. 82, 507 P.2d 466 (1973).
This test has been elaborated in Edmonds v. State, 5 Md.App. 132, 141, 245 A.2d 618, 623 (1968) as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Czemerynski
...prosecution stated that it was offering Swenson's testimony to prove identity, common scheme, plan, design, and intent. See People v. Ray, 626 P.2d 167, 171 (1981); People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d 741, 744 (Colo.1981) (evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the accused has a propensi......
-
People v. Bartowsheski, 81SA556
...cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1439, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); People v. Elkhatib, 632 P.2d 275 (Colo.1981); People v. Ray, 626 P.2d 167 (Colo.1981); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 Section 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), provides that a person commits the ......
-
People v. Clark
...standards to ensure that fingerprint-based proof of identity is not conflated with proof of culpability. See, e.g., People v. Ray, 626 P.2d 167, 170-71 (Colo. 1981). In Ray, the supreme court articulated the applicable analysis for assessing the sufficiency of evidence where an accused is t......
-
Banks v. People, 82SC375
...rule out the possibility that they may have been impressed at a time other than the time at which the crime was committed. People v. Ray, 626 P.2d 167 (Colo.1981); Silva v. People, 170 Colo. 152, 459 P.2d 285 (1969). There is a substantial difference, however, between the legal sufficiency ......
-
Offers of Proof
...v. Rayco, Inc., 616 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1980). A good example of the benefits of a sound offer of proof may be found in People v. Ray, 626 P.2d 167 (Colo. 1981). On other hand, the failure to make an offer of proof (in accordance with C.R.C.P. 43(c)) can be fatal. See Larsen v. Archdiocese ......