People v. Reid

• Decision Date: 06 April 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 51387
• Citation: 113 Mich.App. 262,317 N.W.2d 589
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Allen Ray REID, Defendant-Appellant. 113 Mich.App. 262, 317 N.W.2d 589
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 589

317 N.W.2d 589

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Allen Ray REID, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 51387.

113 Mich.App. 262, 317 N.W.2d 589

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 9, 1981.

Decided Feb. 17, 1982.

Released for Publication April 6, 1982.

[113 MICHAPP 262] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, Asst. Pros. Atty., and James L. McCarthy, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

[113 MICHAPP 263] Vincent D. Giovanni, Birmingham, for defendant-appellant.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and CAVANAGH and FREEMAN, ^* JJ.

DANHOF, Chief Judge.

Defendant Allen Reid was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of one count of kidnapping, M.C.L. Sec. 750.349; M.S.A. Sec. 28.581, two counts of armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, and two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2).

Defendant appeals as of right.

Defendant's conviction arises from an incident in which four high-school-aged girls were abducted from a parking lot. At gunpoint, the victims were robbed and forced to perform various sexual acts on their three abductors.

Because of his age, charges were originally brought against defendant in probate court; however, that court subsequently waived jurisdiction. A preliminary examination was held in district court. At the conclusion of the preliminary examination defendant was bound over on 14 different counts, including four counts of kidnapping, three counts of armed robbery, one count of assault with intent to rob while armed, four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and one count of larceny from a motor vehicle.

Prior to trial defendant moved to quash a search warrant, pursuant to which he was seized for purposes of a lineup. Defendant alleged that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based upon false information in that the informant referred to in the affidavit never gave any information to the police. Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, [113 MICHAPP 264] 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), a hearing was held on defendant's motion. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court rejected defendant's Fourth Amendment claims and held the search warrant valid. Defendant subsequently entered a qualified (or conditional) plea of guilty to one count of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. In return for defendant's guilty plea, all remaining counts against him were dismissed and the prosecutor and the trial court agreed that defendant reserved the right to appeal the search warrant issue.

On appeal, defendant raises two issues concerning whether the trial court erred in not quashing the search warrant and suppressing the subsequent lineup and identification as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. However, before we may address the merits of the issues raised by defendant, we must consider a more basic, threshold question: whether a qualified (or conditional) guilty plea--such as the one entered by defendant whereby he pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the Fourth Amendment issue--violates public or judicial policy.

I

As a general rule an unqualified guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings. People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973). See also, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. [113 MICHAPP 265] 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970). However, even an unqualified guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional defects which preclude a defendant from being convicted even if the government could, in fact, prove its case. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Thus, an unqualified guilty plea does not waive a defendant's right to challenge such jurisdictional defects as the constitutionality of the statute under which he has been charged nor does it foreclose defendant from raising a double jeopardy defense. ¹ People v. Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976).

In the instant case, defendant is challenging the validity of a search warrant and the evidence that flowed from it. His Fourth Amendment, search and seizure, claim represents a nonjurisdictional defect which would be waived by an unqualified guilty plea. See People v. Riley, 88 Mich.App. 727, 279 N.W.2d 303 (1979); People v. Hill, 86 Mich.App. 706, 273 N.W.2d 532 (1978), and People v. White, 411 Mich. 366, 397 fn. 4, 308 N.W.2d 128 (1981) (Justice Moody, concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see, Johnson, supra, 444, 240 N.W.2d 729 (dicta) and Riley, supra, 732, 279 N.W.2d 303 (Judge Riley dissenting in part). Defendant is merely attacking the government's ability to prove its case. He is not raising a defect which would preclude the government from convicting him even if it could prove its case. Thus, we conclude that, had defendant made an unqualified guilty plea, the issues before us would be waived.

[113 MICHAPP 266]

II

The next issue we address is whether the qualified guilty plea agreement involved herein is valid and enforceable and preserves, for appeal, issues which would have been waived had an unqualified plea been entered.

The validity of the qualified plea procedure was addressed in People v. Smith, 85 Mich.App. 32, 270 N.W.2d 697 (1978). In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Cavanagh, joined by Judge Kelly, reached the conclusion that qualified pleas should be enforced. In doing so, Judge Cavanagh rejected arguments put forth by Judge Bronson, who would decline to enforce qualified pleas.

Our review of the opinions in Smith, and those of other jurisdictions addressing the validity of qualified pleas, lead us to conclude that qualified pleas are not valid and enforceable. ² We reach this conclusion for the following reasons.

First, we are in accord with United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (CA 6, 1972), where the Court stated:

"The procedure employed in the case at bar is at variance with the general, well-settled rule that a guilty plea 'normally rests on the defendant's own admission in open court that he has committed the acts with which he is charged'. * * * When made by the accused, knowingly, willingly and with the benefit of competent counsel, a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects.

* * * [113 MICHAPP 267] "To the extent this [qualified plea] procedure allows a defendant to plead guilty, contingent on his right to appeal on nonjurisdictional grounds from his own plea, it is not logically consistent and is against the trend of recent case authority. There is a fundamental and basic inconsistency between knowingly and intelligently entering a voluntary plea of guilty, and then appealing from the judgment entered on the basis of that plea." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 940, 942.

The prosecutor and the criminal defendant may not--even with the trial court's acquiescence--contractually suspend this well-established rule that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects. In this regard it has been stated that "while a plea bargain permits a defendant to waive that to which he does have a right (e.g., a trial), it does not permit him to arrogate that to which he is clearly not entitled". (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508, 511 (CA 9, 1978).

Second, qualified pleas should not be enforced absent an authorizing court rule or statute. Indeed, GCR 1963, 785 provides for three alternative pleas--guilty, not guilty and nolo contendere. By specifically referring to only three types of pleas, GCR 1963, 785 implies that no other plea may be entered.

In the absence of a court rule or statute authorizing them, qualified pleas have the potential of creating numerous appellate problems and endless confusion. State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa, 1971). They could result in the appellate courts being put in the position of having to decide countless procedural and evidentiary questions. Id.

Third, qualified pleas are contingent in nature. As such, they undermine the concept of finality so [113 MICHAPP 268] important to the judicial process and so necessary if punishment is to be effective as a deterrent to crime. As one commentator has noted, qualified pleas make possible "an elaborate procedure of plea, appeal, trial and then reappeal, creating delay before 'final' punishment can be imposed". Comment, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 Harvard L.Rev. 564, 574 (1980).

Fourth, there is a danger that the government will rely to its detriment on a conditional plea and stop preparation of its case. Comment, Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra, 576, fn. 54. See also Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea-a Reply, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 1308 (1978). Should trial become necessary after the appellate court has addressed the issue preserved by the qualified plea, there is the possibility that the government will not be able to present its case because it detrimentally relied on the qualified plea or because of the passage of time involved in the appellate process.

Fifth, the limited record sometimes developed prior to a guilty plea may make review of a complex constitutional or evidentiary question difficult. Smith, supra, 85 Mich.App. at 42, 270 N.W.2d 697 (opinion of Judge Bronson). Furthermore, a limited record might make it impossible to determine whether, for example, use of evidence which should have been suppressed would have been harmless in the...