People v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 12 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. E051311.,E051311. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anthony Earl REYNOLDS, Defendant and Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See Annot., Right to credit for time spent in custody prior to trial or sentence (1977) 77 A.L.R.3d 182;3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Punishment, § 390; 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 712; Cal. Jur. 3d, Criminal Law: Trial, § 42.
Alan S. Yockelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Kevin Vienna and Scott C. Taylor Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Anthony Earl Reynolds appeals from a trial court order on July 6, 2010, in which the court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to Patton State Hospital (Patton) pursuant to Penal Code section 1370.2
Defendant contends the trial court violated his equal protection rights under In re Banks (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 864, 152 Cal.Rptr. 111 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] ( Banks ), by ordering him confined at Patton in excess of the three-year maximum commitment term under section 1370, subdivision (c)(1). Specifically, defendant argues the trial court erred in not applying his precommitment custody credits when calculating his three-year commitment term at Patton. Defendant urges this court to reverse the commitment order, with directions that the trial court apply his custody credits against his commitment term at Patton, and find his previous confinement at Patton exceeded the three-year maximum term for the charged offenses. We reject defendant's contentions and affirm the judgment.
On September 30, 2007, defendant set fire to his mother's home, where he had been living in a converted bedroom in the garage. Upon responding to a call reporting the fire, firefighters found a mattress and other items burning inside the converted bedroom. Fire Captain William Schellhous (Schellhous), an arson investigator, attempted to talk to defendant. Defendant scowled, ignored Schellhous, and walked away. Defendant then yelled, “ ‘We had a fire, so now we get a new house.’ ”
While interviewing defendant's sister, Schellhous was suddenly struck in the back with a wheel from a wheel barrow. As Schellhous turned toward defendant, defendant charged toward him. Schellhous stood his ground. Defendant stopped and yelled at the firefighters to get off his property. Schellhous tried to calm down defendant by explaining that the firefighters were only there to put out the fire. Defendant said he knew there was a fire and admitted he had started it.
As the firefighters retreated to their engine for safety, defendant grabbed a pike pole used to prop up the garage door and threw it at the firefighters, fortunately missing them by 10 feet. Schellhous called the police for assistance.
When the police arrived, defendant yelled at the police, refused to comply with orders to get on the ground, and aggressively approached Riverside Police Officer Kean (Kean). Kean subdued defendant with a taser. Defendant was taken into custody. It was determined defendant was a danger to himself and others.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his equal protection rights by not deducting his preconfinement custody credits from his three-year commitment term for competency treatment under section 1370, subdivision (c)(1).
Defendant pled not guilty to charges of arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)) and assault on a firefighter with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (c)).
In February 2008, the trial court granted defense counsel's request that defendant be evaluated to determine whether he should assert a mental defense. (Evid.Code, § 1017.) The court found defendant incompetent to stand trial under section 1370 on the arson and assault charges, and defendant was admitted to Patton on May 30, 2008. He remained at Patton until July 22, 2009, when defendant was found competent to stand trial under section 1368.
In February 2010, the trial court declared doubt as to defendant's mental competence and requested defendant undergo another section 1368 competency evaluation. On April 27, 2010, the court once again found defendant incompetent to stand trial. The court also determined that defendant had been in custody at Patton in excess of the three-year maximum period permitted under Penal Code section 1370. Conservatorship proceedings were initiated.
In June 2010, the trial court determined, contrary to its previous finding, that defendant had not exceeded the three-year maximum confinement period under section 1370 and defendant did not qualify for conservatorship. Over defendant's objection, the court referred the matter back to the County Mental Health Department for a placement recommendation.
At the hearing on placement on July 6, 2010, defense counsel again objected to placing defendant at Patton because the three-year maximum confinement period had already been exceeded. The trial court disagreed and found defendant incompetent to stand trial. The court ordered defendant committed to Patton under section 1370. The court calculated defendant's time served as 1,001 actual days, plus 408 days of custody credit (§ 4019). This court and the California Supreme Court denied defendant's petitions for writ review.
“It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” ( Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353.) “In a competency hearing, the ‘emphasis is on [the defendant's] capacity to consult with counsel and to comprehend the proceedings, ...’ ” ( Id. at p. 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572.)Section 1367 implements this requirement, providing: (§ 1367, subd. (a).)
A defendant who, as a result of a mental disorder, is adjudged not competent to stand trial on a felony charge may be committed to a state hospital for no more than three years. (§§ 1367, subd. (b), 1370, subds. (a), (c); People v. Karriker (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 780, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412.) If, at the end of the three-year period, the medical staff determines there is no substantial likelihood the defendant will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future, the defendant must be returned to the court for further proceedings. (§ 1370, subds.(b), (c); Karriker, at p. 781, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412.) The three-year period under section 1370, subdivisions (a) and (c), applies to the aggregate of all commitments for treatment for incompetency regarding the same charges. (In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1238, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 389.)
Once an incompetent defendant has been committed for the maximum commitment period, if it appears to the court that the defendant is “gravely disabled,” the court shall order the conservatorship investigator to initiate a “Murphy conservatorship.” ( People v. Karriker, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 775–777, 781, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412;§ 1370, subd. (c)(2); Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).) The court may impose a Murphy conservatorship if it finds the defendant, as a result of a mental disorder, “ ‘represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.’ ” ( Karriker, at p. 776, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412;Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 176–177, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) Alternatively, the court can dismiss the charges and order the defendant released, without prejudice to the initiation of alternative commitment proceedings under the Lanterman–Petris–Short Act.4 ( § 1370, subd. (e); In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 806, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018.)
Section 1370 provides a limit on the duration of time a defendant can be committed to a state hospital for incompetency treatment. Under section 1370, subdivision (c)(1),
Relying on Banks, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 864, 152 Cal.Rptr. 111, defendant argues the trial court erred in not taking into account his precommitment custody credits, when determining whether he had exceeded the three-year maximum commitment period under section 1370, subdivision (c)(1). In Banks, the defendant was found guilty of misdemeanor-brandishing a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)). ( Banks, at p. 866, 152 Cal.Rptr. 111.) Before the sanity phase began, the trial court found the defendant incompetent to stand trial (§ 1368) and committed defendant to a state hospital. The defendant had already been in confinement for 60 days during prosecution of the charges, because he was unable to make bail. ( Banks, at p. 866, 152 Cal.Rptr. 111.) The applicable maximum commitment term in Banks was measured by “the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most...
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