People v. Rhodus

• Decision Date: 14 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93SC29,93SC29
• Citation: 870 P.2d 470
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Larry RHODUS, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 470

870 P.2d 470

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Larry RHODUS, Respondent.

No. 93SC29.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

March 14, 1994.

Rehearing Denied April 4, 1994.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Patrick E. Meyers, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Frances Smylie Brown, Chief Appellate Deputy Public Defender, Joan E. Mounteer, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.

Justice ERICKSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review People v. Rhodus, 852 P.2d 1280 (Colo.App.1992). In Rhodus, the court of appeals ordered a new trial because of the trial judge's decision to deny defense counsel's challenge of a juror for cause. The question before us is whether a county official whose office, by statutory mandate, is represented by the prosecutor should be excluded from serving on a jury because the county official is implicitlybiased. ¹ We answer the question in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the district court.

I

The defendant, Larry Rhodus (Rhodus), was an inmate in the Fremont Correctional Facility when prison authorities notified him that he was being transferred to another jurisdiction. Rhodus was told to gather his belongings and turn them in to the property custodian of the prison. Rhodus did not comply, and after two hours passed, Rhodus was taken by the authorities to a waiting vehicle for transportation to another jurisdiction. The officers cleaned his cell and turned his personal property over to the custodian. While cleaning the cell, a container of ethyl alcohol was found under his bunk.

As a result of the ethyl alcohol found in his cell, Rhodus was prosecuted for possession of contraband. ² During jury selection, and after Rhodus exercised his final peremptory challenge, Norma Hatfield (Hatfield), the Fremont County Clerk and Recorder, was called to the jury box and voir dired.

By statute, the district attorney's office is the legal advisor to the county clerk and recorder. ³ Thus, the prosecutor's office in this case was also the attorney for Hatfield in her capacity as county clerk and recorder. Hatfield knew the prosecuting attorney and had consulted with him on several occasions in connection with her duties as the Fremont County Clerk and Recorder. The district attorney was not representing Hatfield at the time the defendant was tried. Hatfield stated that although the county clerk and recorder's office is represented by the district attorney, she could be fair and impartial.

Nevertheless, defense counsel challenged Hatfield for cause:

Your Honor, based on the relationship of Ms. Hatfield and her office with the Office of the District Attorney, being the District Attorney is their legal advisor, I would be asking the Court to excuse her for cause. I think there is considerable question here. I understand that Ms. Hatfield would try to be fair, but I think there is an appearance of impropriety having her also sit as a juror where the District Attorney's Office is also prosecuting the case.

The trial judge denied the challenge and stated:

There is no specific Rule 24 challenge for cause. In order to successfully challenge--or to grant the challenge, I would have to presume some sort of bias on the part of Ms. Hatfield. There is nothing in the record from which to base an inference that there would be a bias whatsoever.

After a side-bar conference, the defense renewed the challenge:

Again, I think that because--I would just renew the motion based upon the relationship between the two offices and the statutory relationship with the two offices in that Ms. Hatfield is bound to go to the District Attorney's Office for opinions. They rely on their opinions. They rely on the reliability of information given to them by the District Attorney's Office. There is a clear appearance of impropriety, and I think that the relationship is such that a challenge for cause should be granted.

The trial judge denied the motion. Because the defense had exhausted their peremptory challenges before Hatfield was questioned, the defense requested an additional peremptory challenge. The court denied the request.

The following day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Following his conviction, Rhodus was sentenced to eighteen months confinement to run consecutively with the sentence he was already serving. Rhodus appealed the conviction contending that when the trial court permitted Hatfield to remain on the jury, he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial holding that because the professional relationship between the prosecution and Hatfield was "more than tenuous" and the relationship was mandated by statute, the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause on the basis that Hatfield was implicitly biased.

II

Rhodus contends that the relationship between Hatfield and the district attorney's office created an implied bias and therefore the trial court should have granted Rhodus' challenge for cause. We do not agree.

A

Although challenges for cause are specifically provided for in Crim.P. 24 and section 16-10-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986), they stem from a defendant's right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Due process requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). The right to challenge a potential juror for cause is an integral part of a fair trial. Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337, 339, 565 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1977). However, "[f]airness requires more than the elimination of actual prejudice." People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 238 (Colo.1992). The conduct of justice must not only achieve the reality of fairness, it must also "satisfy the appearance of justice." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. at 625.

The bias of a juror may be actual or implied: "That is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law." United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct. 177, 179, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936). "Actual bias is a state of mind that prevents a juror from deciding the case impartially and without prejudice to a substantial right of one of the parties." Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 162 (6th ed. 1992)). A court must excuse a prospective juror if actual bias is discovered during voir dire. Blasi v. Riveland, 592 F.Supp. 1299, 1301 (D.Colo.1984). If "the court is satisfied that the potential juror will render a fair and impartial verdict according to the law and to the evidence submitted at trial, that person should not be disqualified." People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 320 (Colo.1987).

On the other hand, implied bias is a bias "attributable in law to a prospective juror regardless of actual partiality." Wood, 299 U.S. at 134, 57 S.Ct. at 180. In order to maintain the appearance of impartiality in our justice system, the General Assembly and the courts have delineated circumstances in which bias is implied by law. See § 16-10-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986); Crim.P. 24(b). ⁴ See, e.g., Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 32, 612 P.2d 79, 80 (1980) (stating the test for bias is found in section 16-10-103(1)(j) and Crim.P. 24(b)(1)(X)). Under the Colorado statute and criminal rules, a prospective juror is presumed excused for cause, in most instances, if a relationship exists between the prospective juror and a participant in a criminal trial. The provisions in the statute and Crim.P. 24 are similar to many states' presumptive bias statutes. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 234-35, 102 S.Ct. 940, 955, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (noting that state challenge for cause provisions commonly exclude prospective jurors who are related to the prosecution, defense counsel, a witness, or a defendant). The challenge for cause pursuant to these sections is mandatory. § 16-10-103(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986) (stating that "the court shall sustain a challenge for cause" on certain grounds (emphasis added)).

Section 16-10-103(1)(j), 8A C.R.S. (1986), and Crim.P. 24(b)(1)(X), require a court to sustain a challenge for cause if a juror has a "state of mind evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state...." § 16-10-103(1)(j), 8A C.R.S. (1986). ⁵ However, unlike the other subsections in section 16-10-103(1), which require an automatic grant of a challenge for cause if the statutory criteria are met, subsection 16-10-103(1)(j) leaves the decision to disqualify a juror to the discretion of the court if the court is satisfied that the potential juror will render an impartial verdict. ⁶ Id. The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether or not the juror has bias or enmity under section 16-10-103(1) or Crim.P. 24 because the trial court is in the best position to view the demeanor of the juror when he or she claims impartiality. People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 362 (Colo.1986).

The court of appeals recognized that the defendant did not have grounds to challenge Hatfield for cause based on her position as a county officer represented by the district attorney's office under either section 16-10-103(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), or Crim.P. 24. However, the court of appeals concluded that if a prospective juror has an ongoing professional relationship with the district attorney's office, there is an appearance of impropriety sufficient to constitute grounds for disqualification because that juror has an implied bias. Rhodus, 852 P.2d at 1282.

Thus, implied bias is the keystone for the implication by the court of appeals that all county officers who have been, or may be, represented by the...