People v. Ridgeway

• Decision Date: 25 May 1984
• Citation: 101 A.D.2d 555,476 N.Y.S.2d 940
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ethel Mae RIDGEWAY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 940

476 N.Y.S.2d 940

101 A.D.2d 555

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ethel Mae RIDGEWAY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

May 25, 1984.

Rose H. Sconiers, Niagara Falls, for appellant (Richard Weisbeck, Buffalo, of counsel).

Richard J. Arcara, Dist. Atty., Buffalo, for respondent (Barbara Eberl, Buffalo, of counsel).

Before HANCOCK, J.P., and DOERR, DENMAN, GREEN and MOULE, JJ.

HANCOCK, Justice Presiding.

Defendant seeks reversal of her conviction for felony murder upon, among others, the following grounds: (1) that her confession was inadmissible because given after her critical stage right to counsel had attached by virtue of the issuance of a federal arrest warrant; (2) that her confession was involuntary and obtained in violation of her Miranda rights; and (3) that the introduction of a codefendant's confession violated her right to confrontation (see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476). We find no basis for reversal in these or other arguments advanced and accordingly affirm.

I

Defendant, her boyfriend Gregory Cooper, Otis Samuel and Arthur Saddler were tried jointly on charges arising from an attempted holdup of a branch of the M & T Bank in Buffalo, during which a bank guard was killed. Ronald Amerson, also charged with participation in the crime, pleaded guilty and testified for the prosecution against the other four. Videotaped confessions given by Cooper and Samuel and a written confession by defendant were admitted into evidence. All four were convicted of murder, second degree, and, except for defendant, of lesser crimes as well (see People v. Cooper, 101 App.Div.2d 1 475 N.Y.S.2d 660 People v. Amerson, 91 A.D.2d 1204, 459 N.Y.S.2d 198).

The evidence at trial was that on the morning of July 19, 1979, the four defendants and Amerson left defendant's brother's house in a taxicab driven by defendant. At about 10:00 a.m. she parked the cab by a playground near the M & T Bank on Fillmore Street and waited with the engine running while the others entered the bank. Samuel and Saddler were armed. During the attempt to disarm the bank guard, both the guard and Samuel fired their weapons. The guard was killed and Saddler injured so severely that when the others ran out of the bank, he was unable to follow. Amerson, Samuel and Cooper ran to the waiting taxicab and defendant drove them back to her brother's house.

The evidence at the Huntley hearing given by an F.B.I. agent and Buffalo police officers is as follows. F.B.I. Agent Naum arrested defendant at 7:01 p.m. on July 20 pursuant to a federal arrest warrant at her brother's home. After conducting a search of the residence and giving her Miranda warnings, which she said she understood, Naum and other agents took her to F.B.I. headquarters at 7:51 p.m. Shortly thereafter Detective Ludtka of the Buffalo Police Department arrived. He was present as she was again advised of her rights. Although defendant refused to sign the waiver of rights form she said that she understood her rights and was willing to talk. After processing her, the F.B.I. agents conducted defendant to the Buffalo police headquarters shortly after 9:00 p.m. where they turned her over to the Buffalo police.

At police headquarters, Detective Ludtka showed defendant mug shots of Cooper, Samuel, and Amerson. She identified Cooper, saying only that she knew him, and denied any participation in the attempted holdup. At about 10:00 p.m. Detective Gorski arrived. Under continued questioning by Gorski and Ludtka defendant persisted in denying involvement. She was booked and placed in a cell. Ludtka prepared a felony complaint at about 11:00 p.m. accusing her of murder, second degree and criminal possession of a weapon, second degree. To Gorski's and Ludtka's knowledge no one questioned defendant from 11:00 p.m. on July 20 until 2:30 a.m. on July 21 when Gorski told her that Samuel as well as Cooper and Saddler had said she was involved. She then admitted participation in the crime and, at about 4:25 a.m., after further questioning, she initialed a waiver of rights card and gave a signed confession. Later that day, on July 21, she was arraigned.

The testimony of the police was that defendant was not threatened or coerced into confessing, that she never requested an attorney and that she did not appear to be intoxicated. Defendant testified, however, that when she was arrested at 7:00 p.m. on July 20, she was intoxicated and "sluggish" and that at the F.B.I. office in response to the question whether she wanted counsel she gave the name of a lawyer who was never contacted. At Buffalo police headquarters, according to defendant, after she was permitted to telephone her father, the police questioned her for 30 or 40 minutes and then left her in a cell; and a short time later they took her back for prolonged questioning which they interrupted four or five times during the evening by placing her in a cell for brief intervals. Further, she testified that at different points during the questioning they showed her mug shots of the other suspects, told her that Samuel had confessed, that the guard had died, and that Saddler was dying, and threatened that if she "didn't say what wanted to hear, would never see children again." And they brought Amerson to the door of the office where she could see him and showed her the gun they had seized and the pants Samuel had been wearing during the crime. She then admitted that sometime the previous morning she had seen Samuel hand her brother a gun which had blood on the handle. She said someone then typed up a statement and read it to her, telling her that it contained information given by Cooper and Saddler. They then asked her to initial the statement to show that they had read it to her. The only time she was given Miranda warnings was, she stated, at the F.B.I. office.

The hearing court in denying the suppression motion found that defendant's statements "were not involuntarily made made in violation of any constitutional right of defendant". Defendant's motion for a separate trial was denied and during the trial her typewritten statement and Samuels' complete videotaped confession were admitted after the court denied defendant's request that portions of Samuels' statement be redacted. Neither defendant nor Samuels took the stand.

Defendant in her confession admitted to driving Samuel, Saddler, Amerson and Cooper in the cab to a corner near the bank, waiting with the engine running while they entered the bank, and then, when all but Saddler returned, driving them back to her brother's house. On the preceding night, she said, she had driven the four men "to the bank and Satch and Gregory got out he came back he asked me to drive for them tomorrow." She was asked: "Did you know why he wanted you to drive?" and answered: "I assumed already that they were going to hold up the bank." In her statement she also admitted that for her part in driving the car she expected to receive some of the stolen money and that the police showed her a gun which she admitted seeing in Amerson's possession on the morning of the crime.

The portion of Samuel's videotaped confession about which defendant complains is: "Q. Turning your mind over to the bank was it discussed who was going to do what and was this done in front of 'Teen' A. Yes, it was. Q. And she had full knowledge of this robbery that was going to go down of the M & T Bank at Fillmore and Box on the nineteenth? A. Yes." In relating the group's plans for the robbery, Samuel said that he was to disarm the bank guard, but he said nothing concerning whether anyone intended to carry a weapon, loaded or unloaded. When it admitted Samuel's confession into evidence the court cautioned the jury to consider it against him alone, and in its charge, it gave similar limiting instructions. The court also submitted to the jury the questions whether defendant's statement was involuntary and whether it was obtained in violation of her Miranda rights.

Defendant raised the affirmative defense to felony murder that she did not commit or solicit the killing, was not armed, and had no reason to believe that any other participant in the crime was armed with a deadly weapon or intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury (Penal Law, § 125.25, subd. 3). She was convicted of felony murder (Penal Law, § 125.25, subd. 3) and sentenced to 20 years to life.

II

Under New York law, the "critical stage" right to counsel arises upon formal commencement of a criminal proceeding by the filing of the felony complaint or other accusatory instrument (see CPL 1.20, subd. 17; 100.05; People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344; People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 385 N.E.2d 612) or earlier where there has been "significant judicial activity" (see, e.g., People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 371 N.E.2d 819). Here, since no accusatory instrument had been filed in any state court, ¹ the New York criminal proceeding had not been commenced. Nor had there been any judicial activity in New York. ²

Nevertheless, defendant argues that, although at the time she waived her rights and confessed there had been no commencement of any state criminal action against her, the filing of the complaint and issuance of the arrest warrant in federal court should be given effect as though they had occurred in state court for the purpose of generating her New York "critical stage" right to counsel under People v. Samuels (supra) and People v. Settles (supra) and that her subsequent confession should be suppressed. She points out that had these acts occurred in state court, they would under New York law have marked the commencement of the criminal proceeding (see CPL 120.10, subd. 1; People v. Samuels, supra). We reject this argument.

The purpose of the "critical stage" right to counsel rule is...