People v. Rivera

• Decision Date: 05 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20.,20.
• Citation: 11 N.Y.S.3d 509,33 N.E.3d 465,25 N.Y.3d 256,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03764
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. David RIVERA, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

25 N.Y.3d 256

33 N.E.3d 465

11 N.Y.S.3d 509

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03764

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant

v.David RIVERA, Respondent.

No. 20.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 5, 2015.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (David P. Stromes and Vincent Rivellese of counsel), for appellant.

Epstein & Weil, LLC, New York City (Lloyd Epstein of counsel), for respondent.

Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP, Garden City (Robert L. Schonfeld and Seth P. Stein of counsel), for New York State Psychiatric Association, Inc. and another, amici curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PIGOTT

, J.

Defendant, while seeking treatment from a psychiatrist, admitted to sexually abusing an 11–year–old relative. The psychiatrist notified the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) of defendant's admission. Subsequently, at defendant's criminal trial, over defendant's objection, the trial court permitted the psychiatrist to testify that defendant had made the admission. The issue on this appeal is whether the trial court's ruling ran afoul of the physician-patient privilege (see CPLR 4504[a]

). We hold that it did.

I

On November 1, 2007, the child revealed to her pediatrician, in her mother's presence, that she had been sexually abused by defendant. The pediatrician reported the abuse to ACS. The

child's mother relayed the accusation to defendant's mother, who told defendant of the child's accusation. Shortly after receiving word of the child's allegation, defendant was taken by ambulance to the psychiatric emergency room at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital (CPH), complaining of depression and suicidal ideation

. While being treated, defendant told his psychiatrist that he had sexually abused the child.

The following day, the child was medically examined at a child advocacy center. While there, she spoke with a detective, who, during a subsequent investigation, learned that defendant had been admitted to CPH. The detective obtained a court order requiring CPH to notify the police upon defendant's release. Four weeks later, following his discharge, defendant was arrested and charged with, among other things, predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law § 130.96

).

Prior to trial, the People moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum seeking defendant's psychological records from CPH for in camera review by the trial court. Specifically, the People sought records that included any admission defendant may have made concerning the crimes charged in the indictment, which, they argued, could be released as either an exception to or waiver of the physician-patient privilege. Defendant countered that the disclosure of the medical records and any testimony by the psychiatrist concerning defendant's treatment was barred by the physician-patient privilege pursuant to CPLR 4504(a)

, and that defendant had not waived that privilege.

Following the in camera review of the records, Supreme Court held that the admissions defendant made to his psychiatrist were privileged because they were made in the course of diagnosis and treatment of his condition. However, the court, while refusing to allow “the full extent of defendant's admissions” to be used, held that, because the psychiatrist had disclosed the reported abuse to ACS, the fact that defendant had admitted to the abuse was admissible at trial.

At trial, the child testified concerning the abuse she sustained at the hands of defendant. The People then called defendant's psychiatrist, who testified that defendant admitted to having sexually abused the child. Defendant, testifying on his own behalf, denied committing any sexual abuse. During summation, the People referred to the psychiatrist's testimony and, during deliberations, the jury requested a read-back of that

testimony. Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to a term of 13 years to life in prison.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the judgment of Supreme Court and remanded for a new trial, holding that Supreme Court erred in permitting the psychiatrist to testify concerning defendant's admissions of sexual abuse and that the error was not harmless (99 A.D.3d 535, 535, 952 N.Y.S.2d 438 [1st Dept.2012]

). A Judge of this Court granted the People leave to appeal (21 N.Y.3d 1008, 971 N.Y.S.2d 260, 993 N.E.2d 1283 [2013] ) and we now affirm.

II

The narrow issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant's psychiatrist to testify concerning defendant's admission that he abused the child.^* We hold that the trial court's ruling violated the physician-patient privilege.

CPLR 4504(a)

provides, as relevant to this appeal, that “[u]nless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine ... shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he [or she] acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him [or her] to act in that capacity.” The People do not argue that defendant waived the privilege, nor do they dispute that there was a “professional relationship” between defendant and his psychiatrist (see e.g.

People v. Sliney, 137 N.Y. 570, 580, 33 N.E. 150 [1893] ). Nor do the People contend that the information conveyed by defendant to his psychiatrist was not necessary for his treatment (see

People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 143, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799 [1956] ). Rather, the People claim that, because defendant's admission related to the sexual abuse of a child, it was not privileged since defendant had no reason to believe that it would remain confidential (see generally id. at 145, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799

).

Regardless of whether a physician is required or permitted by law to report instances of abuse or threatened future harm to authorities, which may involve the disclosure of confidential information, it does not follow that such disclosure

necessarily constitutes an abrogation of the evidentiary privilege a criminal defendant enjoys under CPLR 4504(a)

. Whereas confidentiality is an ethical requirement of physicians that “is essential to psychiatric treatment ... [and] is based in part on the special nature of psychiatric therapy as well as on the traditional ethical relationship between physician and patient” (American Psychiatric Association, The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry § 4, annotation 1 at 6 [2013 ed.] ), the physician-patient privilege is a rule of evidence that protects communications and medical records (see

Williams v. Roosevelt Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 391, 396, 497 N.Y.S.2d 348, 488 N.E.2d 94 [1985] ). The privilege serves several objectives: it encourages unrestrained communication between a patient and his or her medical provider so that the patient may obtain diagnosis and treatment without fear of embarrassment over potential disclosure; it encourages physicians to be forthright in recording their patients' confidential information; and it protects “patients' reasonable privacy expectations against disclosure of sensitive personal information” (Matter of Grand Jury Investigation in N.Y. County, 98 N.Y.2d 525, 529–530, 749 N.Y.S.2d 462, 779 N.E.2d 173 [2002] [citations omitted] ).

The People argue that because the legislature has carved out several exceptions to the physician-patient privilege, defendant could not reasonably have expected his statements to remain confidential in the context of a criminal proceeding. Those exceptions, however, underscore that whenever the legislature has decided to limit the privilege's scope, it has done so through the enactment of specific legislation to address the particular subject matter (see Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.2d 130, 136, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758, 450 N.E.2d 678 [1983]

). If the legislature had, in fact, decided to create an additional exception permitting a criminal defendant's mental health professional to testify against the defendant in a criminal proceeding, it would have done so. Indeed, we have noted that, given the number of statutory exceptions to the privilege, “the legislative concept [is clear] that exceptions to the statutorily enacted physician-patient privilege are for the Legislature to declare” (Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.2d at 136, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758, 450 N.E.2d 678 ), and we need look no further than CPLR 4504 itself which contains those exceptions (see CPLR 4504[b] [requiring certain physicians and other health professionals “to disclose information indicating that a patient who is under the age of sixteen years has been the victim of a crime”], [c] [requiring physicians

and nurses “to disclose any information as to the mental or physical condition of a deceased patient privileged under subdivision (a)” in certain designated circumstances] ).

When the legislature has sought to either limit or abrogate the privilege beyond the confines of section 4504

, it has been clear in its intent (see Social Services Law § 384–b [3 ][h] [privilege not available in a proceeding seeking an order committing the guardianship and custody of a destitute or dependent child]; Social Services Law § 413

[identifying class of mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse and maltreatment]; Social Services Law § 415 [providing that reports of suspected child abuse or maltreatment must be made in writing and “shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings relating to child abuse or maltreatment”]; Family Ct Act § 1046[a][vii] [stating that the privilege “shall (not) be a ground for excluding evidence which otherwise would be admissible” in abuse and neglect proceedings]; Mental Hygiene Law § 81.09[d] [permitting a court evaluator in guardianship proceedings to apply for permission to inspect medical and psychiatric records of the alleged incapacitated persons, and allowing the court to order such disclosure notwithstanding the physician-patient privilege]; Public Health Law § 3373 [stating that “(f)or the purposes of duties arising...