Siegel v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 22 December 2021
• Docket Number: 2018–12888, 2019–01026,Index No. 6612/16
• Citation: 202 A.D.3d 125,161 N.Y.S.3d 159
• Parties: Linda SIEGEL, etc., respondent, v. Brian SNYDER, etc., et al., defendants, Radiological Associates of Long Island, P.C., et al., appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

202 A.D.3d 125

161 N.Y.S.3d 159

Linda SIEGEL, etc., respondent,

v. Brian SNYDER, etc., et al., defendants,Radiological Associates of Long Island, P.C., et al., appellants.

2018–12888, 2019–01026

Index No. 6612/16

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—March 15, 2021

December 22, 2021

Bartlett LLP, Mineola, NY (Robert G. Vizza of counsel), for appellants.

Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo P.C., Garden City, NY (Stephen C. Glasser and Christopher J. Dellicarpini of counsel), for respondent.

CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, BETSY BARROS, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

OPINION & ORDER

CHRISTOPHER, J.

Introduction

The question presented herein involves Education Law § 6527(3) and Public Health Law § 2805–m(2), pursuant to which proceedings and records relating to medical or quality-assurance review meetings are protected from disclosure, except for those statements made therein by "any person in attendance at such a meeting who is a party to an action or proceeding the subject matter of which was reviewed at such meeting," known as the party-statement exception ( Education Law § 6527[3] ; see Public Health Law § 2805–m[2] ). The principal issue presented in this appeal is the scope of the quality-assurance privilege and the corresponding party-statement exception to the privilege. More specifically, the issue is whether a party asserting the quality-assurance privilege with regard to peer-review committee meetings has the burden of demonstrating that any statements made at such a meeting, claimed to be privileged, were made by a person who is not a party to an action. The appellants argue that the party-statement exception is automatically inapplicable when the meeting's minutes do not identify the speaker because it cannot be ascertained whether the speaker is a party or nonparty. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the party asserting the quality-assurance privilege must demonstrate that any statements made at such a meeting that are claimed to be privileged were made by a nonparty. Therefore, where the meeting's minutes do not identify the speaker, the party-statement exception to the quality-assurance privilege applies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that statements contained in the defendant South Nassau Communities Hospital's peer-review committee meeting minutes that were attributed to the "committee," or wherein the speaker was not identified, were not entitled to the quality-assurance privilege afforded by Education Law § 6527(3) and Public Health Law § 2805–m(2), as it could not be determined if those statements were in fact made by a nonparty.

Factual and Procedural Background

In November 2015, the decedent, Michael Siegel, was transported to the defendant South Nassau Communities Hospital (hereinafter SNCH) after he was struck by a car and sustained a head injury. At SNCH, the decedent was evaluated and treated for his injuries by, among others, the defendant physicians Kenneth Becker and Matthew Lurin. The decedent suffered from, inter alia, a skull fracture, hemorrhaging and contusions in the frontal and temporal lobes, a subdural hematoma, and eventually herniation of the brain, progressing toward brain death. He died shortly after being removed from life support.

On December 21, 2015, a "Trauma Peer Review Committee" meeting was held, at which the decedent's treatment was reviewed for quality assurance and medical malpractice prevention. Follow-up meetings took place on January 8, 2016, and February 22, 2016. Both Becker, who was the Trauma Medical Director, and Lurin, who was the Assistant Director of the Emergency Department, were in attendance at the meetings. The minutes of the December 21, 2015 meeting contain statements attributed to, inter alia, the "committee," along with one statement attributed to the "Trauma Medical Director."

The plaintiff commenced this action in September 2016, among other things, to recover damages for medical malpractice, and thereafter served combined demands for discovery and inspection dated November 23, 2016. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, hospital records and incident reports, including, among other things, all peer-review reports. The defendants SNCH and Radiological Associates of Long Island, P.C. (hereinafter together the defendants), moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3101(b) and, in effect, CPLR 3103, for a protective order based upon the privileges set forth in Education Law § 6527(3) and Public Health Law § 2805–m. The defendants sought to limit the plaintiff's combined demands, to protect SNCH's peer-review committee meeting minutes from disclosure, and to limit the plaintiff's notice for discovery and inspection to include only those portions of the peer-review committee meeting minutes that constituted statements made by an individually named defendant concerning the care and treatment of the decedent. The defendants also submitted to the Supreme Court a proposed redaction of the peer-review committee meeting minutes, and sought a determination that the party-statement exception applied only to a notation that Becker and Lurin were present at the meetings and a single statement in the December 21, 2015 minutes that was made by Becker. The defendants asserted that the redacted portions of the minutes reflected only discussions of the committee and did not contain any party statements and, therefore, were not discoverable.

In an order entered July 18, 2018, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the unredacted minutes in camera, inter alia, denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3101(b) and, in effect, CPLR 3103, for a protective order based upon the privileges set forth in Education Law § 6527(3) and Public Health Law § 2805–m, and for approval of their proposed redaction of the meeting minutes. The court found that it was unable to determine who provided specific statements and/or information at the peer-review committee meeting when the "statements and/or information contained in the minutes are attributed to the ‘committee.’ " The court opined that it was not satisfied with the representation that the statements in the peer-review committee discussion section of the minutes were made by the "committee," as someone at the meeting, "who may or may not be a party defendant, made a conclusion upon which the committee agreed." The court determined that, without any indication as to who specifically made the statements, it was unable to determine if certain statements were privileged. The defendants thereafter moved for leave to renew and reargue those branches of their motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3101(b) and, in effect, CPLR 3103, for a protective order, and for approval of their proposed redaction of the meeting minutes, contending, among other things, that when peer-review committee minutes are written, they are not intended to identify the individuals who are speaking. In an order entered January 18, 2019, the court, upon renewal, adhered to the prior determination. The court opined that it still could not "determine who provided specific statements and/or information since all of the statements and/or information contained in the subject minutes are attributed to the ‘committee.’ " The court determined that it could not "rule on the admissibility of the information in the hospital peer review committee meeting minutes without knowing if the ‘discussions’ referenced in said minutes involve ‘statements made by any person in attendance at such a meeting who is a party to an action or proceeding the subject matter of which was reviewed at such meeting.’ " The defendants appeal from both orders.

Discussion

1. Liberal Discovery and Privileges

New York's liberal discovery policy, generally governed by CPLR 3101(a), broadly mandates "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" (see Forman v. Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d 656, 661, 70 N.Y.S.3d 157, 93 N.E.3d 882 ; Kavanagh v. Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 952, 954, 683 N.Y.S.2d 156, 705 N.E.2d 1197 ; McAlwee v. Westchester Health Assoc., PLLC, 163 A.D.3d 547, 548, 81 N.Y.S.3d 102 ). "The words, ‘material and necessary’, are ... to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial" ( Allen v. Crowell–Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 235 N.E.2d 430 ; see Forman v. Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d at 661, 70 N.Y.S.3d 157, 93 N.E.3d 882 ). The "statute embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair surprise" ( Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809, 581 N.E.2d 1055 ; see Forman v. Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d at 661, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809, 93 N.E.3d 882). "The purpose of disclosure procedures is to advance the function of a trial to ascertain truth and to accelerate the disposition of suits" ( Rios v. Donovan, 21 A.D.2d 409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; see Swartzenberg v. Trivedi, 189 A.D.2d 151, 153, 594 N.Y.S.2d 927 ).

However, notwithstanding the broad right to disclosure, "the CPLR establishes three categories of protected materials, also supported by policy considerations: privileged matter, absolutely immune from discovery ( CPLR 3101[b] ); attorney's work product, also absolutely immune ( CPLR 3101[c] ); and trial preparation materials, which are subject to disclosure only on a showing of substantial need and undue hardship" ( Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d at 376–377, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809, 581 N.E.2d 1055 ; see Forman v. Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d at 661–662, 70 N.Y.S.3d 157, 93 N.E.3d 882 ). "Obvious tension exists between the policy favoring full disclosure and the policy permitting parties to withhold relevant evidence. Consequently, the burden of establishing any right to protection is on ...