Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, Matter of

• Decision Date: 07 June 1983
• Citation: 463 N.Y.S.2d 758,59 N.Y.2d 130,450 N.E.2d 678
• Parties: , 450 N.E.2d 678 In the Matter of a GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF ONONDAGA COUNTY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 758

463 N.Y.S.2d 758

59 N.Y.2d 130, 450 N.E.2d 678

In the Matter of a GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF ONONDAGA COUNTY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 7, 1983.

Richard A. Hennessy, Jr., Dist. Atty. (John A. Cirando and Michael P. Marmor, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel), for appellant.

Raymond R. D'Agostino and Alicia Swiatlowski, Syracuse, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MEYER, Judge.

A subpoena, although limited to "and addresses of those treated for stab wounds or other wounds caused by a knife from June 15, 1982 through June 17, 1982," must be quashed because it may require the hospital to which it is addressed to divulge information protected by the physician-patient privilege (CPLR 4504, subd. ). The order of the Appellate Division, 90 A.D.2d 990, 456 N.Y.S.2d 586, granting the motion of respondent hospital to quash the subpoena served by the District Attorney, as limited by the District Attorney's letter, should, therefore, be affirmed.

On June 16, 1982, a woman was found, stabbed to death, under circumstances which led the Onondaga County District Attorney to believe that she might have stabbed her assailant. On June 17, in an effort to identify the assailant, the District Attorney issued a Grand Jury subpoena commanding the hospital to produce "any and all medical records pertaining to treatment of any person with stab wounds or other wounds caused by a knife, from June 15, 1982 to the present time." The hospital countered by moving to quash on the grounds that the subpoena violated the physician-patient privilege and that the constitutional right to privacy protected the information from disclosure. County Court denied the motion, holding the privilege not so absolute as to proscribe the exercise of discretion and that the public's interest in investigating crime far outweighed its interest in fostering the free flow of information between patient and doctor, but stayed enforcement of its order pending appeal.

Subsequent to the court order, the District Attorney informed the hospital by letter dated July 28, 1982 that the only information he would seek under the subpoena would be the "and addresses of those treated for stab wounds or other wounds caused by a knife from June 15, 1982 through June 17, 1982".

The Appellate Division reversed, granted the motion and quashed the subpoena, holding that a hospital which is not itself the subject of any investigation may properly assert the privilege for the benefit of its patients, including those who are suspected or accused of criminal activity. As for the claimed public interest exception, it found significant the fact that CPLR 4504 (subd. ) enacted a specific exception for child abuse and section 265.25 of the Penal Law required reporting of any injury caused by discharge of a firearm but only of a knife wound likely to result in death and thus not of such a wound not likely to result in death.

The Appellate Division also held that, even as limited by the District Attorney's letter of July 28, 1982, the subpoena violated the statutory proscription because to reveal the names and addresses of all persons treated for stab wounds concerned not only the fact of treatment but also the nature of the treatment.

Before this court, the District Attorney has abandoned the contention that the demand for "all medical records" of persons treated for stab wounds was proper. He now argues only that the demand for names and addresses alone does not violate the privilege, because names and addresses are not privileged and, alternatively, that the County Court had discretion to override the privilege in the public interest because a homicide was under investigation. We disagree.

The physician-patient privilege is statutory and is, therefore, to be construed in accordance with its purpose--"to encourage full disclosure by the patient so that he can secure appropriate treatment from the physician" (Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings 56 N.Y.2d 348, 352, 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 437 N.E.2d 1118)--but is to be given "a broad and liberal construction to carry out its policy" ( Matter of City Council of City of N.Y. v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 300, 31 N.E.2d 31; People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 143, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799). CPLR 4504 (subd. ) proscribes disclosure by a hospital or doctor, among others, of information "acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." ^* It follows from that language that facts which are "plain to the observation of anyone without expert or professional knowledge" are not within the privilege (Klein v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 221 N.Y. 449, 453, 117 N.E. 942; Patten v. United Life & Acc. Ins. Assn., 133 N.Y. 450, 453, 31 N.E. 342; Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 564, 570). Thus, the photographs of all patients meeting a particular description (People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379, 384, 345 N.Y.S.2d 502, 298 N.E.2d 651, cert. den. 414 U.S. 1163, 94 S.Ct. 927, 39 L.Ed.2d 116) or the names and addresses of a particular doctor's patients (Matter of Albert Lindley Lee Mem. Hosp., 115 F.Supp. 643, affd. 209 F.2d 122 cert. den. sub nom. Cincotta v. United States, 347 U.S. 960, 74 S.Ct. 709, 98 L.Ed. 1104) may be subpoenaed without violating the statute (see People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 143, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799, supra).

Although the privilege belongs to the patient and may not be asserted by the physician, hospital or anyone else to protect himself with respect to a crime committed against the patient (Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings 56 N.Y.2d 348, 452 N.Y.S.2d 361, 437 N.E.2d 1118, supra; ...