People v. Rodriguez

• Citation: 77 A.D.3d 280,907 N.Y.S.2d 294
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., appellant, v. George RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
• Decision Date: 31 August 2010
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

907 N.Y.S.2d 294

77 A.D.3d 280

The PEOPLE, etc., appellant,

v.George RODRIGUEZ, respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Aug. 31, 2010.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Gary Fidel and Donna Aldea of counsel), for appellant.

Quadrino Schwartz, Garden City, N.Y. (Nathaniel E. Burney of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and L. PRISCILLA HALL, JJ.

CHAMBERS, J.

In this case, we conclude that the Supreme Court erred in suppressing physical evidence recovered from the defendant's apartment, as the police were presented with an emergency situation under the standards articulated in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 and People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, cert. denied sub nom. Mitchell v. New York, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3178, 49 L.Ed.2d 1191.

Facts

On August 4, 2006, Police Officer John Bellico and Sergeant Brian Hennessy responded to a radio call informing them of a stabbing in progress on the fifth floor of an apartment complex in Rockaway Beach. Bellico and Hennessy found the defendant, who was bleeding heavily from two large lacerations, on a fifth-floor stairwell of the apartment complex. The defendant provided a description of his assailant and, pursuant to police protocol, Bellico and other officers were dispatched to a nearby train station, where Bellico observed a suspect meeting that description. Hennessy remained at the scene and questioned the defendant about the attack. The defendant stated only that he was walking along the fifth floor when a man stopped him and stabbed him for no reason. Upon further questioning, the defendant saidthat he did not live in the building. The defendant was then taken downstairs by emergency services to a waiting ambulance. Hennessy, continuing his investigation, learned fromthe fifth-floor tenant who called the 911 emergency telephone number that the defendant did in fact live in the building, which raised his suspicion. He knocked on the doors of other fifth-floor apartments, but received no further information. From the fifth-floor stairwell, Hennessy followed a trail of blood leading down to the fourth floor and then to the third floor. On the third floor, Hennessy observed blood on the landing, near the elevator, and in front of apartment 3L, which happened to be where the defendant was living. As he neared apartment 3L, he saw droplets of blood in front of the door, as well as blood on the door.¹ Hennessy knocked on the door, but received no response. Given his small stature, he did not think he would be able to break down the door, and knowing that it would take the emergency services unit approximately 30 minutes to respond, Hennessy asked the superintendent to unlock the door. By the time the superintendent arrived with the key, about 10 minutes later, Hennessy had learned from a radio transmission that a suspect had been apprehended and that the defendant had made a positive identification at a showup. The superintendent unlocked the door, and Hennessy, along with Bellico, who met Hennessy on the third floor, went inside apartment 3L to ascertain whether someone else had been stabbed. Blood was observed in the kitchen and in the living room, but no other victims were found. On the kitchen counter, the officers noticed a digital scale with what appeared to be powdered cocaine on top, and nearby on the floor, the officers found a hydroponic tank with as many as 12 pots containing marijuana plants inside. A few minutes after entering the apartment, both Hennessy and Bellico left. Pursuant to a search warrant later secured by Bellico, police officers made a complete search and seized a significant amount of marijuana and cocaine, along with drug paraphernalia, from apartment 3L.

The defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence obtained from his apartment. The People asserted that the police's initial warrantless entry into apartment 3L was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. The hearing court found that the People failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the police had reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency at hand requiring their immediate assistance for the protection of life or property, the first prong of the Mitchell standard ( see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 177-178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607). The hearing court ruled that because the People failed to satisfy the first prong of Mitchell, it "need not analyze any other element." Moreover, relying on the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638, the hearing court concluded that the Court of Appeals "would probably eliminate the subjective prong" of Mitchell and, therefore, for that reason as well, it need not engage in any further analysis. The People appeal.

Analysis

Analysis begins with the fundamental principle that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution"accord special protection to a person's expectation of privacy in his [or her] own home" ( People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 694, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 422 N.E.2d 531). However, "[c]ourts have long recognized that the Fourth Amendment is not violated every time police enter a private premises without a warrant. Indeed, though warrantless entries into a home are presumptively unreasonable, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness-not the warrant requirement" ( People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 331, 746 N.Y.S.2d 673, 774 N.E.2d 738 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d at 694, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 422 N.E.2d 531). Recognizing these principles, a number of carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement have been crafted ( see People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d at 331, 746 N.Y.S.2d 673, 774 N.E.2d 738; People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d at 694, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 422 N.E.2d 531). One such exception is the emergency doctrine ( see Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943; People v. Guins, 165 A.D.2d 549, 552, 569 N.Y.S.2d 541).

In People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, the Court of Appeals formulated a three-prong test for determining whether the police are presented with an emergency situation that justifies a warrantless intrusion into a protected area:

"(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.

"(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.

"(3) There must some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched."

( id. at 177-178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607).

In 2006 the United States Supreme Court, in order to resolve differences among the state courts and the federal circuit courtsconcerning the appropriate standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation, rejected the second prong of the Mitchell test, stating that an inquiry into "[t]he officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant" ( Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943). Thus, the Court concluded, because the officers' actions in entering the premises were objectively reasonable in that case, it did "not matter ... even if their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled ... whether the officers entered [the house] to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence" ( id. at 405, 126 S.Ct. 1943). As a result of Brigham City, "an inquiry into the subjective motivations of the police is no longer necessary in determining whether the Fourth Amendment ... has been violated" ( People v. Desmarat, 38 A.D.3d 913, 915, 833 N.Y.S.2d 559). Thus, the decision in Brigham City created a conflict between the Fourth Amendment and New York law. However, since we find that the police in this case were presented with an emergency under both the Mitchell test and the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Brigham City, we need not reach the issue of whether the New York Constitution requires retention of the "subjective motivation" prong of the Mitchell test ( see People v. Dallas, 8 N.Y.3d 890, 891, 832 N.Y.S.2d 893, 865 N.E.2d 1; People v. Dillon, 44 A.D.3d 1068, 1070, 844 N.Y.S.2d 402; see also Matter of Clara C. v. William L., 96 N.Y.2d 244, 251, 727 N.Y.S.2d 20, 750 N.E.2d 1068 [Levine, J., concurring] ).

Under the Mitchell test, the first and third prongs make two related objective inquiries. The first prong asks whether the police have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. The third prong asks whether there is some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate that emergency with the area or place to be searched ( see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 177-178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607; People v. Desmarat, 38 A.D.3d at 915, 833 N.Y.S.2d 559).

Initially, "[a]lthough factual findings by a hearing court are not to be lightly disregarded, plainly unjustified or clearly erroneous findings are not to be accepted by an appellate court" ( People v. Battle, 301 A.D.2d 537, 537, 752 N.Y.S.2d 901 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500). In its decision, the hearing court excluded from its factual findings Hennessy's testimony that he observed a blood trail on the fifth floor and blood on the third and fourth floor landings. This testimony was documented in photographs and corroborated inpart by both the defendant and a defense witness.² Where, as here, the trier of fact has incorrectly assessed the evidence, the Appellate...