People v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 11 December 1986
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 728 P.2d 202 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Juan RODRIGUEZ et al., Defendants and Appellants. Crim. 24124.

Page 132

232 Cal.Rptr. 132

42 Cal.3d 1005, 728 P.2d 202

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Juan RODRIGUEZ et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Crim. 24124.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 11, 1986.

[728 P.2d 203] Tom Takenouchi, Pasadena, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Frank O. Bell, Jr., and Quin Denvir, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Richard Avila, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendants and appellants

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., John R. Gorey and William V. Ballough, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

LUCAS, Justice.

Defendant Juan Rodriguez (hereinafter Juan) appeals after he was charged with and convicted of kidnapping (Pen.Code, § 207; all further statutory references are to this code) and discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246) while personally using a firearm (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to the lower term of three years with the firearm use enhancement stayed. Defendant Barbaro Rodriguez (hereinafter Barbaro) appeals after he was charged with and convicted of kidnapping (§ 207), for which he received probation and county jail time. Defendants raise five issues on appeal: (1) as Spanish-speaking defendants, they were improperly denied full-time assistance of an interpreter; (2) the evidence supported at most the lesser included offense of false imprisonment, but not kidnapping; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Juan's section 246 conviction; (4) the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding Juan's intent; and (5) the trial court had discretion to grant probation to Juan. We will affirm.

Around 2 a.m. on September 10, 1982, Maria de la Luz Michael and her husband returned home after leaving a bar. Defendant Juan followed them and joined them at their home with other guests. At some point, Mrs. Michael's nephew Mario Ruiz admired a chain which Juan was wearing, and Juan removed it and gave it to Mario to use.

About 6 a.m., Raul Huerta arrived, and a few minutes thereafter Mrs. Michael drove to the store with Huerta, her nephew and another friend in Juan's automobile. Upon the group's return, Juan demanded the keys to his car and the return of his chain. The group apparently entered the house without the chain being restored to Juan who then departed.

About 10 minutes later, Juan returned in a car which was driven by defendant Barbaro. Mrs. Michael and Huerta were outside. Juan approached, demanded the return of his chain, and then pointed a gun and fired at the house. Mrs. Michael's son, who was in the house, then called the police.

Juan demanded that Mrs. Michael or Huerta accompany him to find Ruiz. He then pointed the gun at Huerta who entered the car. Huerta appeared frightened and told Mrs. Michael to call the police. Huerta, sitting between Juan and Barbaro, directed the men to the home of Ruiz' mother 10 blocks away. With Juan still The police arrived at the Michael residence and immediately apprehended Barbaro. They found 12 rounds of .32 Colt ammunition in his pocket, the same caliber as that of a bullet found in the door of the Michael home. Juan was found hiding nearby.

pointing the gun at Huerta, they exited the vehicle and Juan proceeded to force his way into the Ruiz home. There, Juan threatened to kill someone if the chain was not returned or he was not given $1,000. Barbaro also demanded that the chain be restored to Juan. After Ruiz' mother convinced defendants that she did not know where her son was, they left and drove Huerta back to the Michael home, Juan continuing to point the gun at Huerta during the drive.

Juan testified that he was angry about Ruiz' failure to return his chain. He asked his cousin Barbaro to assist him and to drive, because he, Juan, was too drunk to drive an automobile. Juan testified he had no gun that day and Huerta voluntarily entered the car to assist in recovering Juan's property. Barbaro similarly testified that Huerta accompanied them under no compulsion and that neither he nor Juan had a gun, nor did he, Barbaro, have any bullets.

At the joint preliminary hearing, two interpreters were sworn. Huerta, testifying for the prosecution, required an interpreter, and one of the two who had been sworn was used for that purpose. The record does not show whose interpreter was so used.

Similarly, at the start of trial, two interpreters, Mona Rich and Enma Helou, were sworn to assist defendants. Enma Helou was thereafter used to interpret for Mrs. Michael, Ruiz' mother, and Huerta. The record specifically indicates Rich remained to interpret for defendants while Helou interpreted for Huerta. Apparently, defendants shared her services during Helou's assistance to two other witnesses as well. The record does not indicate which interpreter was assigned to act for which defendant. After a court trial, defendants were found guilty as charged and sentenced as described above.

I. THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER

We turn first to the appropriate standard of review for violations of the right to an interpreter. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14.) ¹ We considered this right in People v. Aguilar (1984) 35 Cal.3d 785, 200 Cal.Rptr. 908, 677 P.2d 1198, but did not there adopt a particular standard.

In Aguilar, we stressed the importance of the presence of an interpreter throughout the proceedings for those who do not understand English. An interpreter is necessary so that a defendant can understand and fully participate in the proceedings when he is charged with a crime. There are three roles which an interpreter may play: (1) interpreting the questions to and answers of non-English-speaking witnesses; (2) advancing the " 'non-English-speaking defendant's understanding of the colloquy between the attorneys, the witness, and the judge;' " and (3) enabling the non-English-speaking defendant to consult with his English-speaking attorney. (People v. Aguilar, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 790, 200 Cal.Rptr. 908, 677 P.2d 1198, quoting Chang & Araujo, Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-English-Speaking Defendant (1975) 63 Cal.L.Rev. 801, 802.) Deprivation of an interpreter may cause the proceedings in significant part to be incomprehensible to a defendant.

There are three separate possible tests for reversal if an interpreter is improperly denied: (1) per se reversal, (2) the standard enunciated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, and (3) the test applied to violations of state constitutional rights (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243). We will conclude that per se reversal is not appropriate and that a Chapman approach Application of the per se standard requiring automatic reversal for a violation of a constitutional right normally is dependent upon the fundamental character of the right invaded or the impossibility of assessing prejudice. (People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744-745, 209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994.) This test has not been applied to all deprivations of constitutional rights, even federal constitutional rights (see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 21-22, 87 S.Ct. at pp. 826-27; People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 499, 183 Cal.Rptr. 64, 645 P.2d 115), and we believe that it similarly is unnecessary here. In so concluding, we do not intend to diminish the importance of the right to an interpreter where required. However, our consideration of the panoply of constitutional rights implicated in the use of or denial of an interpreter, and the fact that the violation of these rights does not automatically lead to substantial prejudice, leads us to believe that a different standard is appropriate. Moreover, if a defendant can demonstrate, either on the record or through habeas corpus, that a fundamental right has been infringed, the denial of which as a general rule would lead to automatic reversal, then he may still obtain such relief on that basis. However, we agree with the Court of Appeal that "circumstances may exist in which there could be no prejudice" resulting from the absence of an interpreter. (See People v. Nieblas (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 527, 530-531, 207 Cal.Rptr. 695.) ²

best serves the varied constitutional interests at issue.

Courts and commentators have consistently named several constitutional interests which may be implicated in the right to an interpreter. They include the right of a defendant to due process, to confrontation, to effective assistance of counsel, and to be present at trial. Our review demonstrates that violation of these rights which may be affected when an interpreter is wrongfully withheld do not necessarily require automatic reversal.

For example, we recently reviewed claims that a defendant had not been personally present during portions of his trial. We reiterated that " '[W]hen the presence of the defendant will be useful, or of benefit to him and his counsel, the lack of his presence becomes a denial of due process of law.' [Citations.] The burden is upon defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. [Citation.]" (People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309-310, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149; see People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 955, 171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240; People v. Boehm (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 13, 19, 75 Cal.Rptr. 590.) More than a showing of defendant's absence thus is necessary to require reversal. Similarly, the violation of the right to consult counsel may result in reversal only where the breach has had a material affect on the "regularity" of the trial. (See generally People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) ³ So, too, as we recently restated, "It is well settled ... that [even the fundamental] right of confrontation is not absolute." (People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 515, 194 Cal.Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738.) ⁴

The denial of an interpreter in any given case...