People v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 23 May 1995
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Aniel RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Anibal Rodriguez, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 614

627 N.Y.S.2d 614

211 A.D.2d 275

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Aniel RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Anibal Rodriguez, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

May 23, 1995.

Risa Gerson, of counsel (Philip L. Weinstein, Attorney), for defendant-appellant.

Gina D'Angelica, of counsel (Billie Manning, on the brief, Robert T. Johnson, Attorney) for respondent.

Before ELLERIN, J.P., and KUPFERMAN, ASCH and RUBIN, JJ.

ELLERIN, Justice.

At issue in this case is a Batson challenge asserted by defendant and the credibility of the "race-neutral" reasons offered by the prosecution.

While a qualitative analysis of the reasons offered in support of particular peremptory challenges involves a variety of subjective considerations, the validity of which are usually best left for determination by the trial judge who has had the benefit of actually observing the dynamics of the selection process, in this case the uncontroverted facts so strongly predominate against upholding the contested challenges as to require a reversal. We reach this conclusion reluctantly because the evidence here is sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the finding of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and, upon an independent review of the facts, to find that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672.) However, if the principle enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, that peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a racially discriminatory manner, is to have any meaning it cannot be applied in a manner which blindly accepts any articulated reason or excuse, however implausible, that is offered and find it to be an appropriate non-pretextual, race neutral explanation, as was done in this case.

In Batson it was made clear that the racially motivated exercise of peremptory challenges is constitutionally impermissible in denying equal protection to both the defendant and the excluded juror and, additionally, that the harm from discriminatory jury selection touches the entire community by undermining public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1718-1719.) It is in that setting that we must consider defendant's claim that his right to equal protection and due process were denied by the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude three Hispanic prospective jurors.

The Batson issue was initially raised in this case after the first round of jury selection. At that point the prosecutor moved for a hearing on the ground that the two defense counsels had, between them, used peremptory challenges to exclude all white males from the jury. In response, co-defendant's counsel cross-moved on the ground, which was unrefuted by the prosecutor, that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to exclude the only two Hispanics in the pool, i.e., Santos Adorno, a school safety officer who had regular dealings with police officers, and Rafael Alvarez, a college educated computer programmer, who also stated that he had friends and relatives in the police department. A hearing was held at that juncture, with the court finding that race-neutral reasons for all peremptory challenges had been presented by both sides. After the third round of jury selection, the prosecutor renewed his motion and co-defendant's counsel did the same, based on the prosecutor's further use of a peremptory challenge to exclude Nelson Diaz, who was, according to the unrefuted statement of counsel, only the third Hispanic prospective juror who had come before them during jury selection. It was at this point that defendant's counsel joined in the renewed motion made on behalf of the co-defendant and thereby sufficiently preserved defendant's present claim for review as a matter of law by this court.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination arising out of a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, a defendant must show, in the first instance, that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable protected racial group from the panel and that the facts are such as to create an inference that the prosecutor employed the challenges to accomplish a discriminatory purpose (People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 266, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 321, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136; People v. Doran, 195 A.D.2d 364, 600 N.Y.S.2d 222). A discriminatory purpose sufficient to make out a prima facie case may be established by a pattern of strikes or questions and statements made during the voir dire (see, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; People v. Childress, supra, 81 N.Y.2d at 267, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709) or by showing that members of the cognizable group were excluded while others with the same relevant characteristics were not (People v. Childress, supra, 81 N.Y.2d at 267, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; see also, People v. Bolling, supra, 79 N.Y.2d at 324, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136). The court may also take into account whether the prosecution has stricken members of the protected group who, because of their background and experience, might otherwise be expected to be favorably disposed to the prosecution (People v. Childress, supra, at 267, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; see also, People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 516 N.E.2d 1208).

In this case, defendant, who is Hispanic, established that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against three Hispanic prospective jurors of varying ages and educational backgrounds who were, according to the unrefuted statement of defense counsel at voir dire, the only Hispanics in the pool. While this, by itself, would have been sufficient to trigger a Batson hearing (People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 356, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d 621, affd. 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395), it was also demonstrated that at least two of these jurors had disclosed fairly extensive contacts with police officers, a factor which is generally considered desirable for the prosecution. This showing clearly established a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose.

Once a defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide race-neutral explanations for having excused the jurors (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723, People v. Childress, supra, 81 N.Y.2d at 266, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709). The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of purposeful discrimination however, remains with the party alleging the discrimination (Purkett v. Elem, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d, supra at 355, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d 621).

A realistic review of the record in this case demonstrates that defendant satisfied his burden of establishing that adequate, credible explanations were not provided and that the record as a whole demonstrates purposeful discrimination. As to the first excluded prospective juror, Santos Adorno the prosecutor initially alleged that his challenge was based on the fact that Mr. Adorno had regular contact with police officers. Since this background factor is one that would ordinarily be viewed as favorable to the prosecution rather than the defense, it may serve as a basis for an inference that the prosecutor's purpose in challenging such person was discriminatory (see, People v. Childress, supra, 81 N.Y.2d at 267, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; see also, People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d supra, at 425, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 516 N.E.2d 1208), but it can hardly serve as a credible race-neutral explanation. The prosecutor's belated additional explanation that he also took into account the fact that Mr. Adorno's youth might prejudice him toward the defendants (see, e.g., People v. Manigo, 165 A.D.2d 660, 560 N.Y.S.2d 38) is equally difficult to credit. The prosecution, whose burden it was at that stage to come forward with evidence supporting its position, failed to establish Mr. Adorno's age for the record. In any event, neither of the...