In re People ex rel. L.S.

Decision Date06 March 2023
Docket Number22SA282
Citation2023 CO 3 M
PartiesIn Re The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner In the Interest of Child: L.S., and Concerning G.L.A. and D.S. Respondents
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Rule Made Absolute January 23, 2023

Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21 Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 20JV540 Honorable Don Toussaint Judge

Attorneys for Petitioner: Ronald A. Carl, Arapahoe County Attorney Kristi Erickson, Assistant County Attorney Aurora Colorado

Rebecca M. Taylor, Assistant County Attorney Littleton, Colorado

Attorney for Child: Alison Bettenberg, Guardian ad litem Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent G.L.A.: Kapoor Law + Policy Ruchi Kapoor Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Office of Respondent Parents' Counsel: Melanie Jordan Denver, Colorado

No appearance on behalf of Respondent D.S.

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

OPINION

HOOD, JUSTICE

¶1 In this original proceeding, we consider whether the state satisfies its burden of proving that an appropriate treatment plan can't be devised for a respondent parent in a dependency and neglect case when the state establishes by a preponderance of evidence a single incident resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. We conclude that it does.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 The following factual background is based on the parties' stipulated motion for relief and the district court's findings of fact following the dispositional hearing on that motion.

¶3 G.L.A. ("Mother") brought L.S., who was one year old at the time, to the hospital for medical treatment. Hospital staff conducted a skeletal survey, which revealed that L.S. had a broken tibia; two additional fractures that were healing; severe bruising and swelling to his groin; and significant bruising on his back, face, and genitals. The hospital sent a referral to the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, and the state filed a petition for dependent or neglected children in district court, alleging that Mother had physically abused L.S.

¶4 The district court adjudicated L.S. dependent or neglected. About a month later, the court found that an appropriate treatment plan couldn't be devised for Mother based on L.S.'s serious bodily injury ("SBI"), and Mother appealed.

¶5 Following the appellate court's dismissal of the case for lack of a final order, People in Int. of L.R.S., No. 21CA432, ¶ 1 (Nov. 18, 2021), the parties filed a stipulated motion for relief. In the motion, Mother admitted that L.S. was dependent or neglected because his environment was injurious to his welfare, and she waived holding an adjudicatory hearing to determine a factual basis for her admission. The parties sought a dispositional hearing to determine whether an appropriate treatment plan could be devised.

¶6 At the end of the state's presentation of evidence, Mother moved for directed verdict, asserting that the state had "failed . . . to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a single incident of SBI. There has been no evidence regarding an appropriate treatment plan whatsoever." The parties debated whether proving an SBI alone could support a finding that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised.

¶7 The district court concluded that although the state had presented evidence that L.S. was adjudicated dependent or neglected and that he had suffered an SBI, the state "did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that an appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised to address the unfitness of Mother . . . [and,] [s]tanding alone, proof of serious bodily injury is not evidence that no treatment plan can be devised." The court then granted Mother's request for directed verdict.

¶8 The state petitioned this court for a rule to show cause, which we issued.[1]

II. Discussion

¶9 We first explain this court's original jurisdiction and our decision to exercise it here. We then briefly discuss the standards that guide our review in this case and the framework for dependency and neglect proceedings. Finally, we interpret the statutory provisions at the heart of this dispute and conclude that the district court misinterpreted the law.

A. Jurisdiction

¶10 Whether to exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is a matter wholly within our discretion. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). But C.A.R. 21 provides "an extraordinary remedy that is limited in both purpose and availability." People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d 332, 335 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22, ¶ 19, 459 P.3d 540, 545). "Thus, in the past, we have exercised our original jurisdiction in limited circumstances, such as 'when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, or when a petition raises issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.'" People v. Rainey, 2021 CO 53, ¶ 9, 488 P.3d 1081, 1084 (quoting Lucy, ¶ 11, 467 P.3d at 335).

¶11 This petition presents all three grounds for exercising our jurisdiction. First, there is not a final order that could be appealed. See People in Int. of E.M., L.M. & E.J.M., 2016 COA 38M, ¶¶ 34-35, 417 P.3d 843, 850 (concluding that where the district court found that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised for the parent and didn't otherwise enter a disposition or terminate the parent-child legal relationship, there was no appealable order for the appellate court to review), aff'd sub nom. People in Int. of L.M., 2018 CO 34, 416 P.3d 875. Second, allowing the case to proceed on the district court's order will subject L.S. to an extended period of uncertainty as the court and the parties attempt to devise and implement a treatment plan for Mother. And given the history of abuse presented at the dispositional hearing, as well as the current SBI evidence, L.S. may suffer irreparable harm if we decline to intervene. Finally, this court hasn't previously discussed the evidentiary burden required at a dispositional hearing when the state asserts that an appropriate treatment plan can't be devised for a parent due to the parent's unfitness. See In re Marriage of Wollert, 2020 CO 47, ¶ 19, 464 P.3d 703, 709 (explaining that we may exercise original jurisdiction where "we deem this a rare opportunity to construe" a statute).

¶12 Therefore, we exercise our original jurisdiction and proceed to the merits of the petition.

B. Standard of Review

¶13 We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict. Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C., 292 P.3d 977, 982 (Colo.App. 2011). Even so, directed verdicts are disfavored; we "must consider all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a reasonable jury could have found in favor of the nonmoving party." Scholle v. Ehrichs, 2022 COA 87M, ¶ 21, 519 P.3d 1093, 1101 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Goddard, 2021 COA 15, ¶ 26, 484 P.3d 765, 771).

¶14 Resolution of the motion for directed verdict required the district court to interpret several statutes, a legal question that we also review de novo. See Reigel, 292 P.3d at 982 (explaining that because statutory interpretation presents a question of law, "we 'may make an independent determination of [the] legal question'" (alteration in original) (quoting Omedelena v. Denver Options, Inc., 60 P.3d 717, 722 (Colo.App. 2002))).

¶15 Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People in Int. of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 13, 370 P.3d 1151, 1157. To do so, we begin with the language of the statute, reading the words and phrases in context and according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 690 (Colo. 2007). We construe provisions of the Children's Code liberally, favoring interpretations that produce a harmonious and consistent reading of the scheme as a whole and avoiding technical readings that would disregard the child's best interests or the legislative intent. L.M., ¶ 13, 416 P.3d at 879; Bostelman, 162 P.3d at 690; see also § 19-1-102(2), C.R.S. (2022) ("[T]he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to serve the welfare of children and the best interests of society.").

C. Dependency and Neglect Proceedings Overview

¶16 Dependency and neglect proceedings are governed by article three of the Children's Code. §§ 19-3-100.5 to -905, C.R.S. (2022). These proceedings are "aimed at protecting children from emotional and physical harm while at the same time seeking to repair and maintain family ties." L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Colo. 2000). In striving to balance these objectives, the legislature separated the proceedings into phases. People in Int. of D.R.W., 91 P.3d 453, 456 (Colo.App. 2004).

¶17 The first phase is adjudication. § 19-3-505(7)(a), C.R.S. (2022). "The purpose of adjudication is to determine whether State intervention is necessary to serve the best interests of the children, but to do so in a manner that protects parental rights." J.G., ¶ 24, 370 P.3d at 1159. Until the court has entered an adjudication order, "the state has limited authority to take action to protect a child." L.L., 10 P.3d at 1276. If the state proves the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence, the court "shall make an order of adjudication setting forth whether the child is neglected or dependent." § 19-3-505(7)(a).

¶18 Once the court enters an adjudication order, it must hold a dispositional hearing to determine "the proper disposition [to] best serv[e] the interests of the child and the public." § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. (2022); see also §...

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