People v. Ruff

• Decision Date: 08 June 1993
• Citation: 615 N.E.2d 611,599 N.Y.S.2d 221,81 N.Y.2d 330
• Parties: , 615 N.E.2d 611 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard RUFF, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 221

599 N.Y.S.2d 221

81 N.Y.2d 330, 615 N.E.2d 611

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard RUFF, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 8, 1993.

[615 N.E.2d 612] Thomas Marcelle, Albany, for appellant.

[81 N.Y.2d 331] Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. of Albany County, Albany (Michael J. Connolly, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HANCOCK, Judge.

The issue in this case is whether defendant's statements to police should have been suppressed as violative of his right to counsel under this Court's holding in People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65, 392 N.E.2d 1248. We held in Ermo that a defendant's statement had been taken in violation of his right to counsel because it was elicited while questioning defendant on pending charges on which defendant was represented by counsel. We reasoned that such exploitation of impermissible questioning by the police interfered with the attorney-client relationship and thus violated the right to counsel. The present case calls on the Court to determine whether, in the absence of representation by counsel on the pending charges, questioning on those charges requires suppression of defendant's statement on an unrelated matter. For the following reasons, we conclude that it does not and, accordingly, affirm. 185 A.D.2d 454, 586 N.Y.S.2d 327.

I.

In 1987, a warrant was issued in Rensselaer County for the arrest of defendant charging him with sexual abuse in the first degree. Christopher Ruff, defendant's cousin, was employed as a police dispatcher when he learned of the warrant. He contacted State Police investigators and informed them that he believed that defendant was involved in the 1957 murder of his brother, Billy Ruff, in Albany County. In November of 1988, the investigators located defendant in Florida. They discussed extradition of defendant on the 1987 sexual abuse charges with the Rensselaer County District Attorney, but failed to obtain the necessary authorization to bring defendant back to this State. The investigators were advised that Rensselaer County was withdrawing the warrant and were led to believe that the sexual abuse charges against defendant would be dropped. The Albany County District Attorney, however, was interested in investigating defendant's possible involvement in the 1957 murder and authorized the investigators to travel to Florida to question defendant.

On November 16, 1988, State Police Investigators Brant and Lewis traveled to Florida and, with a Florida law enforcement officer, located defendant at his place of employment. Defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the local police station for questioning. After being read Miranda warnings, defendant was questioned about the sexual abuse allegations. He admitted committing acts constituting several sex crimes, including those involved in the Rensselaer County charges and signed a written statement admitting that conduct.

Defendant was then asked whether he knew anything about the 1957 murder. He denied any knowledge of the circumstances of Billy Ruff's death, but agreed to submit to a polygraph examination. The next day, the investigators took defendant to a civilian polygraph technician who, after defendant received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver, questioned defendant about the murder out of the presence of the investigators. At the conclusion of the questioning, the technician indicated to defendant that he had "a problem". Defendant responded, "Yes, I know. The problem is I killed Billy." Defendant then wrote on a piece of paper "I am an alcoholic. I am cured. In August 1957, I killed Billy, and I need help." Upon further questioning by the investigators, defendant elaborated on the events leading to the death. He was subsequently arrested as a fugitive from New York and transported back to this State. In April of 1989, defendant was indicted in Albany County for the murder. ^*

At a pretrial Huntley hearing, defendant moved to suppress his statements about the murder as violative of his right to counsel which had attached with regard to the pending Rensselaer County sexual abuse charges (see, People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344). The trial court denied the motion and defendant was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree (see, Penal Law of 1957 § 1044). The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed.

II.

In People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247, 420 N.E.2d 45, this Court held that pending criminal charges do not bar the police from questioning a suspect on an unrelated matter, when the suspect is not in fact represented by counsel on the pending charges. In deciding Kazmarick, the Court distinguished its previous decision in People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 397 N.E.2d 709, which held that once an attorney had entered proceedings on prior pending charges, police may not question a suspect in custody on those charges, even on unrelated matters, in the absence of counsel. The Court had reasoned in Rogers that any questioning, even on unrelated matters, presents a potential interference with the critical relationship which exists between attorney and client and thus threatens the suspect's right to counsel (id., at 173, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 397 N.E.2d 709).

But, the Rogers holding had never been applied to bar uncounseled questioning when no attorney-client relationship had been established on the pending charges and when the right to counsel arose solely upon the commencement of formal proceedings (see, Samuels, supra, 49 N.Y.2d at 221, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344). In Kazmarick, the Court simply reaffirmed the narrow application of Rogers as confined to situations where an attorney had entered the pending proceedings. It held that Rogers did not preclude questioning on unrelated charges where defendant's right to counsel had attached in the pending case solely by virtue of commencement of formal proceedings (see, Kazmarick, supra, 52...