People v. Sampson, Supreme Court Case No. 17SA49.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2017
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 17SA49.
• Citation: 404 P.3d 273
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Ashley SAMPSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

404 P.3d 273

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.James Ashley SAMPSON, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court Case No. 17SA49.

Supreme Court of Colorado.

October 30, 2017

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, Richard H. Orman, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Jennifer Gilbert, Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Jake C. Taufer, Deputy Public Defender, Centennial, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant James Sampson spoke with a police officer while Sampson was in a hospital for treatment of knife wounds

. Sampson's statements are now at issue in a criminal case pending against him in Arapahoe County. The key question is whether Sampson was in custody when he spoke to the officer. The trial court ruled Sampson was not in custody for Miranda purposes until the officer gave Sampson a Miranda advisement. Finding the People failed to prove Sampson made a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, the trial court suppressed the statements Sampson made after the advisement.

¶2 The People bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2017), and C.A.R. 4.1, challenging the trial court's suppression order. Assuming without deciding that giving Miranda warnings can be considered in determining whether a person is in custody, we conclude Sampson was not in custody at any point during his conversation with the officer at the hospital. Because the defendant was not in custody, Miranda did not apply. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's suppression order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 On January 12, 2016, Aurora Police Department (APD) Officer Darren Martinez spoke with Sampson at the Medical Center of Aurora. Officer Martinez was dispatched to the hospital on a report that a stabbing victim had walked into the emergency room. Sampson told Officer Martinez someone on the street had stabbed him while trying to rob him, and a good Samaritan drove him to the hospital.

¶4 Officer Martinez ran Sampson's name in APD's information database. He learned Sampson was a suspect in a September 2015 domestic violence assault case that allegedly occurred at an address near where Sampson said he was picked up. Officer Martinez then sent officers to the address to make sure it wasn't a crime scene.

¶5 When the officers arrived at the address, they saw what looked like blood outside the apartment door. No one answered the door, so they forced entry. Inside they found Ms. R. with a stab wound

on her thigh. Ms. R. told the officers that Sampson had attacked her with a bat, and she had defended herself with a knife.

¶6 At the hospital, Officer Martinez told Sampson that officers were in contact with Ms. R. and that he knew what had happened at the apartment. At first, Sampson stuck to his original story, but after Officer Martinez said, "[L]ook, we already know what happened," Sampson admitted he had lied.

¶7 After this admission, Officer Martinez read Sampson a Miranda advisement, the sufficiency of which is not in dispute. Sampson acknowledged that he understood his rights, and he agreed to answer Officer Martinez's questions.

¶8 Officer Martinez asked what had happened at the apartment. Sampson said he was there with Ms. R. when they began arguing. Ms. R. told him to leave, so Sampson invited another woman to the address to pick him up. According to Sampson, this upset Ms. R. and caused her to attack him in the kitchen. Sampson told Officer Martinez that Ms. R. stabbed him, but did not provide any details. Officer Martinez told Sampson he would be arrested when he was released from the hospital.

¶9 Sampson now faces charges on the 2015 and 2016 alleged domestic violence incidents, which have been consolidated into the case before us.

¶10 At the suppression hearing, Officer Martinez described the circumstances surrounding his exchange with Sampson. Sampson was sitting on the hospital bed hooked up to medical equipment and Officer Martinez was standing at the sink, about five feet away from him. Sampson was not physically restrained. The room was "very small," about ten feet by ten feet in size. Sampson looked like he was in pain, but seemed coherent and did not appear to be in "agonizing pain." When nurses and doctors came in intermittently to ask questions, Officer Martinez stopped his conversation with Sampson to permit treatment.

¶11 Officer Martinez testified his tone was conversational and that he didn't raise his voice or make any threats, promises, or commands during the conversation. Officer Martinez was in uniform that day, carrying a weapon, and wearing a badge, but he didn't reference, touch, or gesture toward his weapon.

¶12 While considering multiple motions, the trial court made an oral ruling on the suppression issue providing its bottom line: "My ruling on that is the statements are admissible up to the point he was given Miranda. Anything he said after he was given Miranda, because he was in the hospital, because of the cut and all of that, the Court finds was not voluntary."

¶13 The trial court then issued the following written order:

An objective observer would not believe Defendant was in police custody until after Defendant received the Miranda advisement. Defendant claimed he was the victim of a crime-a crime he claimed had nothing to do with the domestic violence incident for which he has been charged. Defendant claimed that he was the victim of robbery and assault by a stranger. Accordingly, the Court concludes that statements Defendant made prior to receiving his Miranda advisement and then waiving his right to remain silent were noncustodial and voluntarily made[.] Therefore, the statements are admissible. Because Defendant was not in custody and his statements were voluntary, the circumstances relating to Defendant's physical and mental condition and any medical treatment he was undergoing go to the weight and not admissibility of these statements.

With respect to statements Defendant made after waiving his right to remain silent, the People bear the burden of proving that Defendant made a voluntary waiver of his rights. The Court finds that People failed to meet their burden. Defendant may have been in a state where he could freely and voluntarily waive his right to remain silent. However, the People failed to produce evidence establishing such. What the Court does know ... is that Defendant had been stabbed and was receiving medical treatment. The Court does not know how serious the injuries were; the Court does not know whether Defendant had been administered any medications that might affect his cognitive abilities; in short, the Court does not know enough to conclude that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion to suppress any statements Defendant made after he waived his right to remain silent.

¶14 The People filed this interlocutory appeal.¹

II. Analysis

¶15 We begin with the applicable standard of review for a Miranda custody determination. Then we address what constitutes custody for Miranda purposes, and we discuss the relevant precedent examining custody determinations in hospital settings. Finally, we apply the custody standard for Miranda purposes to the facts of this case, and conclude there was no custody.

A. Standard of Review

¶16 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 1026, 1029. We defer to a trial court's findings of credibility and historical facts so long as they are supported by the record. People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348, 353 (Colo. 2003). But we review de novo the legal determination of whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes. Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 873 (Colo. 2010). In doing so, we may consider undisputed facts evident in the record, in addition to the trial court's factual findings. People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 16, 298 P.3d 228, 232.

B. "Custody" Under Miranda

¶17 A person subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement must receive an advisement of rights under the Fifth Amendment before questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ; see also People v. Gonzalez-Zamora, 251 P.3d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 2011). A suspect may waive his rights, but must do so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently before the statement may be used against him in a criminal proceeding. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see also Sanchez v. People, 2014 CO 56, ¶ 11, 329 P.3d 253, 257. The voluntariness inquiry turns on the "absence of police overreaching," not on the broader concept of "free choice." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion.") (citation omitted).

¶18 Miranda protections apply only when a suspect has been subjected to both custody and interrogation. Effland, 240 P.3d at 873. To determine if a person is in custody, we ask whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 464 (Colo. 2002). This is an objective legal test and courts must look to the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning occurred. Minjarez, 81 P.3d at 353. Courts should consider the following non-exclusive list of factors to determine if a reasonable person would feel deprived of his freedom to the degree associated with formal arrest:

(1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6)

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