People v. Samuel

• Decision Date: 17 November 1971
• Citation: 277 N.E.2d 381,29 N.Y.2d 252,327 N.Y.S.2d 321
• Parties: , 277 N.E.2d 381 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Abraham SAMUEL, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard BAKER, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John ROLLINS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 321

327 N.Y.S.2d 321

29 N.Y.2d 252, 277 N.E.2d 381

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Abraham SAMUEL, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard BAKER, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John ROLLINS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 17, 1971.

Jesse Berman and Milton Adler, New York City, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. of Kings County (Raymond J. Scanlan, Harry Brodbar, Brooklyn, and Howard R. Schechter, Staten Island, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Jesse Berman, Janice L. Burnett and Robert Kasanof, New York City, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. of New York County (Lewis R. Friedman and Michael R. Juviler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Jesse Berman, Barbara A. Shapiro and Robert Kasanof, New York City, for appellant in the third above-entitled action.

Thomas J. Mackell, Dist. Atty. Of Queens County (Thomas A. Duffy, Jr., Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.

BREITEL, Judge.

Defendant in each of these cases has been convicted of the misdemeanor violation of section 600 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Laws, c. 71, and each attacks the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that the statute invades his privilege against self incrimination. The statute requires a motor vehicle operator involved in an accident, whether culpable or not, to remain at the scene of the accident, identify himself, and report the accident to the police. In each of these cases, the automobile operator, after an accident involving personal injuries to occupants of another vehicle or to pedestrians, left the scene of the accident, in two of them fleeing without removing his vehicle. Two of the cases involve other issues not meriting discussion. ¹

It is concluded that the statute, enacted in its earliest form in 1910 (L.1910, ch. 374), is valid. The duties imposed by it are reasonable exercises of police power by the State to regulate activities directly relevant to public safety. On this view, the incidental and limited risk of inculpation by identification and report of motor vehicle operators whose conduct involves, or is likely to involve, criminal accusations is insufficient to inhibit the regulatory power by the interposition of the privilege against self incrimination (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 6; U.S.Const., 5th Amdt.). ²

The validity of the predecessor statute was declared by this court in 1913, three years after its enactment (People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530). Two developments since require that the issue be revisited. The first is that the rationale in the Rosenheimer case was based on the then current, but now rejected, view that the operation of a motor vehicle was a privilege, and that as such, acceptance of the privilege with its conditions, constituted a waiver of constitutional rights, including that of the privilege against self incrimination (Id., at pp. 120--122, 102 N.E. at pp. 532--533). The court was sage enough to recognize that the privilege-waiver concept could not be applied indiscriminately (Id., at p. 122, 102 N.E. at p. 532). The second development is the holding in recent cases in the United States Supreme Court that the requirement of self-reporting from those engaged in conduct 'inherently suspect of criminal activities' is unconstitutional (Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 52, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906; Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L.Ed.2d 923; Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165; involving severally gambling, firearms, and subversive activities). And, of course, most recent in this development is the case of California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9, in which the court, by a bare majority, sustained the validity of a California motor vehicle self-reporting statute, one rather similar to that of New York. Notably, the court did not reach beyond holding valid the requirement for the operator to remain at the scene of the accident and identify himself. Thus, it did not pass on the further reporting requirements in the California statute, to which New York has a counterpart (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 605).

No elaborate discussion is required to eliminate the privilege-waiver rationale for a self-reporting statute. That rationale is no longer acceptable (Marchetti v. United States, Supra, 390 U.S. at p. 51, 88 S.Ct. 697). Indeed, the very dichotomy between right and privilege in this context has lost whatever intellectual significance it ever had (see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287; Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd., 5 Cir., 294 F.2d 150, 155--156, cert. den. 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct. 368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193). The rejection, however, of an outdated terminology and its connotations does not establish the contrary of the proposition they once supported. The simple fact is that a civilized society cannot exist without power to condition lawful activities by limitations essential to the public welfare, even if they affect other protected freedoms. This condition of society requires, therefore, a balancing of interests, social and individual, to achieve both freedom and survival. The only issue here is whether a reasonable balance has been struck between the dangers posed by the activities allowed as of right and the encroachments imposed as conditions for engaging in those activities.

Section 600 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law requires every motor vehicle operator, whether curpable or not, involved in an accident causing property damage or personal injury, to remain at the scene of the accident, exhibit his license, and identify himself to the party sustaining damage and, in the case of personal injury, to a police officer. Failure to do so is a misdemeanor. ³ There is a furter reporting provision in the statute (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 605) not directly involved but to which parallel reasoning may be applied. The problem is whether motor vehicle operation permits in the social interest a limited obligation of self-reporting in connection with accidents.

Motor vehicle accidents account for almost as many deaths in this country as all other categories of accidents combined (U.S.Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971, p. 58). The toll is enormous. In 1968, traffic accidents caused 54,862 deaths and an estimated 4,400,000 personal injuries, not to mention huge losses in property damage (Id., at pp. 58, 541). The whole system of motor vehicle regulation is built on the identification and qualification of vehicles and operators, by vehicle registration, and operator licensure. The vehicle must always bear its license plates, and the operator must always carry his license on penalty of a presumption that he is unlicensed while the vehicle is operated on a public highway (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 401, subd. 1; § 402, subd. 1; § 501, subd. 1, par. e; § 501, subd. 4). Despite the high number of vehicle accidents, the ratio to vehicle miles traveled is a very small one. ⁴ Many accidents occur without anyone's culpability, let alone criminal culpability, which is not coincident with civil liability in tort. In many accidents only one of the participants is culpable, and others are not.

With the high incidence of automobile use and accidents, it is evident that the close control of vehicles and operators is vital. Involved are safety standards for the vehicles and their equipment, qualification of operators, conditions under which operators operate the vehicles, hazards, both physical and human, to which the operators and vehicles are exposed, ranging from dangerous highways to careless or uncontrolled passage by pedestrians. The significance of having accurate statistics concerning these factors available is evident. At the same time, the preservation of effective civil legal remedies to those sustaining damage as a result of an accident is equally demanding. Finally, and this is the rub, the need exists for effective control over licensed and unlicensed drivers, competent and incompetent drivers, sober and intoxicated drivers, a control enforced by criminal and noncriminal sanctions, and the revocation and suspension of licenses. None of these purposes can be effectively served without a reporting system. A reporting system obviously depends upon operators not absconding. Hence, it is logical to make the operator's failure to remain and identify himself an offense.

To be sure, the culpable driver, especially one unlicensed or underage with limited license, or one under the influence of alcohol or drugs, may be incriminated, but the whole system of regulation fosters the safer operation of safer motor vehicles only if there is an effective way of removing or controlling those who create the greatest and unnecessary hazards. It is interesting that of the three pending cases, two of the hit-and-run drivers were unlicensed, and the other was evidently intoxicated.

The system, like so much other law, depends, and essentially so, upon a high degree of public co-operation. Minimal disclosure is suggested by everyday morality and expectations. The mandate, sanctioned by a penalty for the commission of a separate crime, for operators to remain and identify themselves is an assurance that most will. The statute is addressed to the large class of those involved in accidents. Most of the members of that class will not be culpable of offenses more serious than traffic infractions (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155). Hence, the risk of incrimination, and then only to the...