People v. Scott

• Citation: 405 N.Y.S.2d 169,93 Misc.2d 1074
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Ralph SCOTT, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 29 March 1978
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New York)

Page 169

405 N.Y.S.2d 169

93 Misc.2d 1074

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Ralph SCOTT, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Bronx County,Part 202.

March 29, 1978.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. of Bronx County (Asst. Dist. Atty. Dennis T. Bernstein), Bronx, for the People.

Frederick H. Block, New York City, for defendant.

DECISION

FRED W. EGGERT, Justice:

BACKGROUND

This motion presents the issue of whether or not a defendant seeking to suppress two items of evidence obtained through the same search and seizure, but relating to two separate and unrelated prosecutions in two different counties, may have two separate identical evidentiary hearings with respect to the common issue of probable cause for the search and seizure. This Court holds that the defendant may not do so because the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a bar to relitigation of the same issue of probable cause which was previously determined adversely to him in New York County.

This case arises out of an arrest on May 11, 1976. On that date, in The Bronx, a milk truck driver was robbed at gunpoint. He immediately gave the police a description of the robber which was broadcast over police radio. Two other police officers received this message, as well as another from two different police officers that two men were under surveillance on a nearby roof. The milk truck driver was brought to the scene and it was learned through further radio communication that one of the men on the roof met the description of the robber. Officers thereupon went to the roof and approached the two men. One of them, the defendant Ralph Scott, turned toward the officers who saw a handgun on his person.

The defendant was arrested for criminal possession of a weapon. The milk truck driver made no identification, but the defendant, while under arrest, made incriminating statements concerning a double murder and robbery in New York County, committed one month before.

The defendant was indicted in Bronx County for Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. That indictment is before this Court. The subject weapon was in no way related to the New York County homicide.

The defendant was also indicted in New York County for Murder in the Second Degree, et al. (1856/76). He moved to suppress the statements concerning the homicide which he made to the police shortly after his weapon arrest in Bronx County. Hearings were conducted thereon before the Honorable Clifford A. Scott, in the Supreme Court, New York County. Defendant argued therein that since there was no probable cause for his arrest in The Bronx, the admissions concerning the New York County homicides resulting from said arrest were the fruit of the poisoned tree and therefore should be suppressed. On June 21, 1977, that court, in an opinion summarized in the fact statement above, denied suppression of the statements, finding that the arrest was based on probable cause and was therefore valid. On June 24, 1977, the defendant was found guilty of Murder in the Second Degree after trial and on July 25, 1977 he was sentenced to twenty-five years to life imprisonment, which sentence he is now serving. Timely notice of appeal was filed. The appeal has not yet been perfected.

Meanwhile, the Bronx indictment for possession of a weapon has been pending. The defendant has now moved to suppress the weapon on the identical ground that the police lacked probable cause to search his person and to seize the subject weapon. Thus since the common issue of probable cause for the rooftop arrest in The Bronx, previously determined by another court in another county, is raised, this Court is squarely presented with the question of whether defendant is estopped from relitigating the identical question.

A hearing on the motion to suppress was briefly commenced before this Court on November 28, 1977. It was continued to give counsel an opportunity to submit briefs on the question of whether collateral estoppel obviated the further taking of evidence. This Court decides that it did.

REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The issue before this Court is whether the motion to suppress evidence should Therefore, we must turn to whether collateral estoppel would apply to this case, where the same arrest produced "fruits" relevant to prosecution in two counties, and the legality of that arrest has been determined in one county. As the Court of Appeals stated in Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969), "New York law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action, and, is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling." (at 71, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960, 246 N.E.2d at 729).

be denied, without an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of the issue of probable cause for arrest. There is no question that collateral estoppel, the rule which denies a party a second chance to litigate an issue which was adversely determined in a prior action or proceeding, is applicable to criminal actions and proceedings (Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Matter of Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41, 333 N.E.2d 350 (1975); Matter of McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 330 N.E.2d 35 (1975); Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919, 308 N.E.2d 439 (1974); S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 298 N.E.2d 105 (1973)).

We must first decide if there is an identity of issues. In Manhattan the issue affecting the Bronx case was whether the defendant's statements were the product of an unlawful detention of the defendant. In The Bronx the issue is whether a handgun was discovered through an unlawful search of the defendant at the time of the same arrest. Normally there would not be an identity of issues here, since the issue of the admissibility of the statements could have involved questions such as whether the statements were in fact "tainted" by the detention (See People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662, 376 N.Y.S.2d 469, 339 N.E.2d 162 (1975)) or whether there was a reasonable investigatory detention on less than probable cause (See People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587, 366 N.E.2d 248 (1977)). In this case however, the New York County Supreme Court specifically found that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant.

This finding of probable cause would render the search and seizure in the Bronx matter lawful as incident to a lawful arrest (See, e. g. People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 277 N.E.2d 396 (1971), cert. den. 405 U.S. 1041, 92 S.Ct. 1315, 31 L.Ed.2d 582 (1972)). The defendant has not advanced any theory under which this arrest could be lawful but the search nevertheless be unlawful, as was the question in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Neither has the defendant offered any newly discovered evidence in support of his motion to suppress. (See C.P.L. § 710.40(4)) Therefore, this Court concludes that the required identity of issues exists here.

It is clear that the second requirement for collateral estoppel, that the party to be bound by the prior adjudication have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, is satisfied here. The same defendant, represented by the same able counsel, tried the suppression issue at length in New York County. The defendant raised the specific issue of the lawfulness of the arrest, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, and called at least one witness of his own. Thus, the second requirement for collateral estoppel was satisfied. (We need not decide whether considerations of "identity of parties" (See People v. Reisman, supra; People v. LoCicero, 17 A.D.2d 31, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dept.1962), mod. 14 N.Y.2d 374, 251 N.Y.S.2d 953, 200 N.E.2d 622 (1964)) are violated by the fact that although both prosecutions are in the name of the People of the State of New York, the two prosecuting authorities are the New York and Bronx District Attorneys, since the Bronx

District Attorney here seeks to use the prior adjudication.)

APPLICABILITY TO SUPPRESSION MOTIONS

Although collateral estoppel in a criminal case usually involves elements of crimes (Ashe v. Swenson, supra ) there is no reason in logic or law to except suppression issues from the doctrine. (See 46 So.Cal.L.Rev. 922, 957-959 (1973)). The unnecessary relitigation of suppression issues, especially where this would involve the repetition of an evidentiary hearing, has long been disfavored (See People v. Bryant, 37 N.Y.2d 208, 371 N.Y.S.2d 881, 333 N.E.2d 161 (1975); People v. Garrow, 52 A.D.2d 982, 383 N.Y.S.2d 428 (3d Dept.1976); People v. Reingold, 44 A.D.2d 191, 353 N.Y.S.2d 978 (4th Dept.1974); People v. Buthy, 38 A.D.2d 10, 326 N.Y.S.2d 512 (4th Dept.1971)).

The fact pattern in the instant case is similar to that in a recent Federal case concerning a habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner. In United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. den. 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172, 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976), the relator was arrested shortly after riding in a car driven by his codefendant. The car was searched in Queens County, and a gun and stolen jewelry were found. Then burglar's tools were found in the trunk of the car. The relator and his codefendant were indicted in Queens County for receiving stolen property and possession of a weapon and the relator was indicted in Nassau County for a burglary in which the burglar's tools were material evidence. The Supreme Court, Queens County found the search of the car to be unlawful, suppressed the gun and jewelry, and dismissed the Queens indictment....