People v. Scott

• Decision Date: 19 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. S211670.,S211670.
• Citation: 58 Cal.4th 1415,171 Cal.Rptr.3d 638,324 P.3d 827
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. James Russell SCOTT, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Supreme Court

58 Cal.4th 1415

324 P.3d 827

171 Cal.Rptr.3d 638

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.James Russell SCOTT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S211670.

Supreme Court of California

May 19, 2014.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Bridget Billeter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Dallas Sacher, Santa Clara, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Laura Burgardt, Berkeley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

CANTIL–SAKAUYE, C.J.

In 2011, the Legislature enacted and amended the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 addressing public safety (Stats.2011, ch. 15, § 1; Stats.2011, 1st Ex.Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, § 1 (the Realignment Act or the Act)). As relevant here, the Realignment Act significantly changes the punishment for some felony convictions. Under the terms of the Act, low-level felony offenders who have neither current nor prior convictions for serious or violent offenses, who are not required to register as sex offenders and who are not subject to an enhancement for multiple felonies involving fraud or embezzlement, no longer serve their sentences in state prison. Instead, such offenders serve their sentences either entirely in county jail or partly in county jail and partly under the mandatory supervision of the county probation officer. ( Pen.Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(2), (3), (5).)¹ Felony offenders who are sentenced to county jail may be eligible for a county home detention program in lieu of confinement (§ 1203.016, subd. (a)) and are not subject to parole, which extends only to persons who have served state prison terms. (§ 3000 et seq.) The Legislature provided that the sentencing changes made by the Realignment Act "shall be applied prospectively to any person sentenced on or after October 1, 2011." ( § 1170, subd. (h)(6) (hereafter section 1170(h)(6) ).)

A conflict in Court of Appeal decisions has developed regarding the applicability of the Realignment Act to the category of defendants who, prior to October 1, 2011, have had a state prison sentence imposed with execution of the sentence suspended pending successful completion of a term of probation, and who, after October 1, 2011, have their probation revoked and are ordered to serve their previously imposed term of incarceration. (Compare People v. Clytus (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006–1009 (Clytus ) [the Realignment Act applies, defendant to serve term in county jail] with People v. Gipson (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1523, 1528–1530, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 (Gipson ) [the Realignment Act does not apply, defendant to serve term in state prison].)² In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the decision in Clytus and held that the trial court had properly directed that defendant's sentence should be served in county jail rather than in state prison. We granted review to resolve the conflict in the Court of Appeal decisions on this issue.

We conclude that the Realignment Act is not applicable to defendants whose state prison sentences were imposed and suspended prior to October 1, 2011. Upon revocation and termination of such a defendant's probation, the trial court ordering execution of the previously imposed sentence must order the sentence to be served in state prison according to the terms of the original sentence, even if the defendant otherwise qualifies for incarceration in county jail under the terms of the Realignment Act. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal's contrary determination.

% I. Background

In May 2009, defendant was charged with transportation or sale of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf.Code, § 11352, subd. (a) ; count 1), possession of cocaine base for sale ( Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5 ; count 2), possession of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a) ; count 3), misdemeanor possession of marijuana while driving (Veh.Code, former § 23222, subd. (b), as amended by Stats.1998, ch. 384, § 2, p. 2897; count 4), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia ( Health & Saf.Code, § 11364, subd. (a) ; count 5). The information alleged that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine base, within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a).

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to count 2 (possession of cocaine base for sale) and admitted the prior conviction on the condition that he be placed on felony probation with a suspended seven-year prison sentence.

In June 2009, the trial court imposed on defendant a seven-year state prison sentence, composed of a four-year middle term for defendant's conviction of possessing cocaine base and a three-year term for the prior conviction enhancement. However, the trial court suspended execution of the seven-year sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for a period of three years. The remaining charges were dismissed pursuant to section 1385.

Defendant's probation was revoked and reinstated on two subsequent occasions. On October 4, 2011, a third petition to revoke probation was filed pursuant to section 1203.2. It alleged defendant had violated his probation by failing to complete a residential drug treatment program. On November 1, 2011, defendant admitted the violation and acknowledged that he faced a seven-year sentence.

On December 13, 2011, the trial court revoked defendant's probation and lifted the suspension of the previously imposed sentence. The court continued the hearing, however, to allow briefing addressing whether defendant should serve the previously imposed but suspended seven-year term of incarceration in state prison or locally in county jail. After briefing and argument, the court ruled that defendant qualified for a local commitment because the court's decision whether to reinstate defendant's probation was "essentially a sentencing proceeding" occurring after October 1, 2011, making the provisions of the Realignment Act applicable under section 1170(h)(6). On December 22, 2011, the trial court ordered defendant to serve his seven-year term in county jail pursuant to section 1170(h).

On the People's appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order sentencing defendant to county jail, agreeing with the reasoning of Clytus, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 1001 and disagreeing with Gipson, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 1523, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 428. We granted review.

II. DISCUSSION

" ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ "When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further." [Citation.] But where a statute's terms are unclear or ambiguous, we may "look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." ’ [Citation.]" ( People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1221–1222, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 167, 312 P.3d 88.)

Section 1170(h)(6) provides that "[t]he sentencing changes made by the [Realignment Act] ... shall be applied prospectively to any person sentenced on or after October 1, 2011. " (Italics added.) The language we have highlighted appears clear on its face for any felony offender whose punishment is imposed and not suspended, but ordered executed at the same time. If such a sentence is pronounced before October 1, 2011, the Act does not apply. However, the meaning of the term "sentenced" in section 1170(h)(6) is potentially ambiguous regarding felony offenders, like defendant in this case, whose state prison terms of incarceration were imposed but execution was suspended pending successful completion of a term of probation prior to October 1, 2011, and who subsequent to October 1, 2011, have their probation revoked and are ordered to serve the previously imposed term of incarceration. Are such defendants "sentenced," within the meaning of section 1170(h)(6), when the sentence is originally imposed and suspended, or are they "sentenced," for purposes of this statute, when the court subsequently orders execution of the sentence? There is no definition of "sentenced" in the Realignment Act itself and nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicates how the Legislature intended the Act to be applied in this situation. As we have noted, the Courts of Appeal are divided on the issue.³

In Clytus, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 1001, the Court of Appeal held that the Realignment Act applied to a defendant whose probation was revoked and whose previously imposed and suspended sentence was ordered to be executed after October 1, 2011. The court acknowledged that a defendant is "sentenced" when his or her sentence is imposed and suspended, but concluded that the defendant is also "sentenced" within the meaning of section 1170(h)(6) when the court orders execution of sentence after October 1, 2011. (Clytus, supra, at p. 1007.) According to the Clytus court, an order of execution of a previously imposed sentence constitutes sentencing because the decision to revoke probation is discretionary and the court must articulate its reasons for revoking probation and executing the sentence. (Ibid. ) The Clytus court distinguished this court's decision in People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 946 P.2d 828 (Howard ), in which we held that a trial court does not have power to modify a previously imposed and suspended sentence when it later revokes probation and orders the sentence executed. (Clytus, at p. 1008.) The Clytus court concluded Howard was inapplicable because Howard could not have anticipated realignment and was...