People v. Seay (In re Seay)

• Decision Date: 04 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 351650,351650
• Parties: IN RE Lawrence Michael SEAY, Minor. People of the State of Michigan, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lawrence Michael Seay, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

335 Mich.App. 715

967 N.W.2d 883

IN RE Lawrence Michael SEAY, Minor.

People of the State of Michigan, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Lawrence Michael Seay, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 351650

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted November 6, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided February 4, 2021, 9:20 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Jessica R. Cooper, Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas R. Grden, Appellate Division Chief, and Joshua J. Miller, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for petitioner.

Hugh R. Marshall, Warren, for respondent.

Before: Stephens, P.J., and Servitto and Letica, JJ.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner appeals as of right the Oakland Circuit Court family division's order declining to authorize its petition, which alleged one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (other person under the age of 13), against respondent and dismissing the case. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of respondent's alleged sexual assault of TS that occurred when TS was eight years old and respondent was 15 or 16 years old. On September 5, 2019, when respondent was 24 years old, a petition was filed in the family division against respondent, alleging he had committed one count of CSC-II. On the same day, petitioner also moved for the family division to waive its jurisdiction to the circuit court for respondent to be tried as an adult. Following a review of the petition, and without a hearing, the referee recommended that the family division not authorize the petition and dismiss the case. The referee concluded that the family division did not have jurisdiction over respondent because, while respondent was 15 or 16 years old when he committed the alleged offense, he was 24 years old when the petition was filed. The referee explained respondent should have been charged in the circuit court initially and that, "[w]hen the adult court determines that the offense occurred prior to [respondent's] 17th birthday, it will transfer the case to the juvenile court to conduct the waiver hearing" under MCL 712A.4. The family division adopted the referee's recommendation and entered an order declining to authorize the petition and dismissing the case.

II. JURISDICTION

On appeal, petitioner argues that the family division erroneously concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over respondent because he was 24 years old when the petition was filed. Petitioner asserts that the family division's rationale for not authorizing the petition and dismissing the case is flawed because the family division had jurisdiction over respondent for the limited purpose of conducting a waiver hearing. We agree.

To preserve an issue for appellate review in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the issue must be raised before, addressed by, and decided by the lower court.

In re Killich , 319 Mich. App. 331, 336, 900 N.W.2d 692 (2017). Petitioner did not raise this argument in the lower court. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate review.

We first note that "[a] circuit court's authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant charged with a felony committed as a minor constitutes a question of personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction." People v. Kiyoshk , 493 Mich. 923, 825 N.W.2d 56 (2013). As stated by our Supreme Court, the circuit court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over a defendant charged with a felony committed as a minor because "Michigan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have subject matter jurisdiction over felony cases." Id. (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). And "a party may stipulate to, waive, or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction." Id. at 924, 825 N.W.2d 56, (quotation marks, alteration, and brackets omitted), quoting People v. Lown , 488 Mich. 242, 268, 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011).

"The legal question of whether a court possesses personal jurisdiction over a party is ... reviewed de novo." Yoost v. Caspari , 295 Mich. App. 209, 219, 813 N.W.2d 783 (2012). This Court also reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. In re Juvenile Commitment Costs , 240 Mich. App. 420, 426, 613 N.W.2d 348 (2000).

Unpreserved issues, however, are reviewed for plain error affecting a party's substantial rights. In re Diehl, Minor , 329 Mich. App. 671, 701, 944 N.W.2d 180 (2019). To avoid forfeiture under the plain-error standard, a petitioner must demonstrate that an error occurred, that the error was plain (i.e., clear or obvious), and that the plain error affected substantial rights. Id . "The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 763, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Even if all three requirements are met, reversal is only warranted when the plain error resulted in an innocent defendant's conviction or it "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." People v. Moorer , 262 Mich. App. 64, 68, 683 N.W.2d 736 (2004).

"Generally, the family division of the circuit court (family court) has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles under seventeen years of age who commit criminal offenses." People v. Conat , 238 Mich. App. 134, 139, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999). Conversely, the family division does not generally have jurisdiction over a juvenile after he or she has reached the age of 18. MCL 712A.5. However, MCL 712A.3 provides:

(1) If during the pendency of a criminal charge against a person in any other court it is ascertained that the person was under the age of 17 at the time of the commission of the offense, the other court shall transfer the case without delay, together with all the papers, documents, and testimony connected with that case, to the family division of the circuit court of the county in which the other court is situated or in which the person resides.^{[1 ]}

In People v. Schneider , 119 Mich. App. 480, 484, 326 N.W.2d 416 (1982) a panel of this Court was called upon to resolve the issue of "whether the court of adult criminal jurisdiction or the juvenile division of the probate court has jurisdiction over a person who allegedly commits a crime prior to his 17th birthday and who obtains the age of 18 prior to the commencement of criminal proceedings against him." The Schneider Court recognized the apparent conflict between MCL 712A.3 and MCL 712A.5, and determined, "Were we to strictly enforce the age limit provided in MCL 712A.5, the provision for transfer of jurisdiction in MCL 712A.3 would be totally negated in cases where the defendant is 18 years of age or older." Id. at 486, 326 N.W.2d 416 (citations omitted). The Court thus held that

where a case is transferred to the probate court pursuant to MCL 712A.3, the probate court shall have jurisdiction without regard to the defendant's age at the time of transfer. However, such jurisdiction shall be for the limited purpose of holding a waiver hearing pursuant to MCL 712A.4. Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the statute, the probate court may waive jurisdiction to the court having general criminal jurisdiction over the charged offense. If the probate court declines to waive jurisdiction, the case shall be dismissed. We believe this procedure effectuates the legislative intent and, to the extent possible, gives effect to both conflicting statutes. [ Id. at 486-487, 326 N.W.2d 416 (citations omitted).]

While the Schneider case is not binding on this Court because of its publication date, MCR 7.215(J)(1), we find the reasoning sound. It is personal jurisdiction over the juvenile that is being transferred from the family division to the criminal division, and, as previously stated, a person may waive, stipulate to, or consent to personal jurisdiction. Kiyoshk , 493 Mich. at 924, 825 N.W.2d 56.

MCL 712A.4 governs the procedure the family division is to follow in holding a waiver hearing:

(1) If a juvenile 14 years of age or older is accused of an act that if committed by an adult would be a felony, the judge of the family division of circuit court in the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed may waive jurisdiction under this section upon motion of the prosecuting attorney. After waiver, the juvenile may be tried in the court having general criminal jurisdiction of the offense.

Before waiving its jurisdiction, the family division must first determine, on the record, whether there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense. MCL 712A.4(3). If the court decides that probable cause has been established, it must then conduct a hearing to determine if the "best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by granting a waiver of jurisdiction to the court of general criminal jurisdiction." MCL 712A.4(4). MCL 712A.4(4) sets forth specific criteria the court is to consider in making this determination:

(a) The seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, including, but not limited to, the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and the impact on any victim.

(b) The culpability of the juvenile in committing the alleged offense, including, but not limited to, the level of the juvenile's participation in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines.

(c) The juvenile's prior record of delinquency including, but not limited to, any record of detention, any police record, any school record, or any other evidence indicating prior delinquent behavior.

(d) The juvenile's programming history, including, but not limited to, the juvenile's past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming.

(e) The adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system.

(f) The dispositional

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