People v. Segara

• Decision Date: 06 December 1988
• Docket Number: 66096,No. 65919,65919
• Citation: 127 Ill.Dec. 720,533 N.E.2d 802,126 Ill.2d 70
• Parties: , 127 Ill.Dec. 720 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Reynaldo SEGARA, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 802

533 N.E.2d 802

126 Ill.2d 70, 127 Ill.Dec. 720

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Reynaldo SEGARA, Appellee.

No. 65919, 66096.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 6, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1989.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kenneth T. McCurry, Nancy Black, Inge Fryklund and Al Tomaso, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Karen Daniel, Asst. Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Reynaldo Segara, was found guilty of eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 12-14(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4)), one count of aggravated battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-4(a)) and one count of unlawful restraint (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 10-3(a)). The circuit court subsequently merged the convictions for aggravated battery and unlawful restraint and sentenced defendant to 18 years' imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant appealed. The appellate court vacated six counts of the aggravated criminal sexual assault pursuant to People v. King (1977), 66 Ill.2d 551, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838, and then vacated one of the remaining two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault pursuant to People v. Cox (1972), 53 Ill.2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1. In a Rule 23 order (107 Ill.2d R. 23), the appellate court affirmed the sentence and remanded the cause for the circuit court to "clarify its sentence by indicating the particular aggravated criminal sexual assault count upon which defendant's conviction and sentence are based." (159 Ill.App.3d 1169, 122 Ill.Dec. 73, 526 N.E.2d 213 (unpublished order).) Defendant appealed, and we granted his petition pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (107 Ill.2d R. 315).

The record reveals the following facts. On February 13, 1985, the victim, Anna Marroquin, lived by herself in a studio apartment which did not have a bathroom. The bathroom was located outside of her apartment at the end of the hallway. Defendant and the victim had been friends for four or five years. Their relationship was that of a brother and sister or cousins. The victim did not date or at any time have sexual relations with defendant. Whenever she received her paycheck, she would occasionally treat him to dinner or have him come to dinner at her apartment.

Around 10:30 p.m. on February 13, defendant knocked on the victim's door and stated that he wanted to talk to her. She responded that it was too late and she had to work the next day. At that point, defendant pushed open the door, pushed the victim inside and then chained the door. Defendant began to call the victim all sorts of expletive names and to hit her in the face with his fist. After he struck the victim twice in the face, he threw her to the floor, took off his shoe and hit her on the head with it. From the shoe assault, the victim's head started to bleed. When she began to stand up, defendant pushed her against the wall, then threw her to the bed. During the incident he told her that he was going to "fuck" her and threatened her. As he began to pull off his pants, he threatened her with a pair of scissors. The victim eventually took her own pants off. Defendant then vaginally raped her and then turned her around and performed fellatio, ejaculating in her face. After the incident, the victim, crying and bleeding, was able to put her pants back on, and around 7 a.m. the following day, she convinced defendant that she would not tell anyone; that she had to go to work; that she forgave him; and that she would put on a lot of makeup. Defendant told her she could leave. The victim's eyes were black and she was bleeding from her head.

As she left the apartment building, she found a police squad car with officers inside. They told her that they were too busy and gave her a number to call . She then walked to the train station, called the police station, and within five minutes two officers in a squad car arrived. After she told them that she had been raped, they took her back to her apartment. Just as they arrived, defendant was standing in the hallway wearing the victim's pink robe. The officers placed defendant under arrest, but as they left with defendant, defendant threatened to kill the victim. The victim was subsequently taken to the hospital and treated for her injuries, which included a black eye, a swollen and bleeding nose, and marks on the back of her arms and her back. At the time of the incident, the victim was pregnant but a week later she miscarried the fetus.

Two police officers accompanied the victim back to her apartment after she left the hospital. During the search, they found the victim's blood-saturated blouse in the bathroom sink soaking. They also found blood stains on the wall, floor and on a pillow in her apartment. Blood stains were also found on her pink robe.

Under cross-examination, she stated that she moved into the apartment by herself three months earlier and lived by herself the whole time. She met defendant when she was single and not while she was married. She invited defendant over for dinner at her apartment approximately three to four times and once she spent time with him outside of her apartment. When defendant forced himself into her apartment, she screamed when he put the chain lock on the door, and when he began to hit her, she screamed for help in English and Spanish.

Defendant's only assignment of error concerns whether this court should remand this cause for resentencing since the appellate court vacated all but one conviction. Defendant seeks remandment for resentencing to determine the extent to which the vacated convictions determined his sentence since the appellate court only remanded this cause for clarification regarding which count of aggravated criminal sexual assault exists.

This court finds that it must first determine whether the appellate court properly vacated all but one conviction. In this court's review, it must reevaluate the holdings in its various decisions and determine the direction of the court.

In People v. Cox (1972), 53 Ill.2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1, this court, with six justices taking part in the decision, and with one justice dissenting, held that where two sentences imposed stem from two acts of indecent liberties based upon a single transaction, involving a single victim and occurring simultaneously, only one conviction and sentence can be imposed. The court based its opinion on its reading of the 1965 indecent liberties with a child statute and on the rule of lenity which states:

"When Congress has the will it has no difficulty in expressing it--when it has the will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." Bell v. United States (1955), 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905, 910.

After Cox, this court dealt again with the issue in People v. King (1977), 66 Ill.2d 551, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838, and departed from the strict interpretation announced in Cox and aligned its holdings with the United States Supreme Court's holdings that multiple convictions from a single "transaction" or act are proper. This court rejected the independent motivation test for determining whether any acts committed during a single transaction are separate and distinct offenses authorizing multiple convictions and sentences. This court held that under section 5-8-4(a), a defendant's criminal objective is only relevant in determining whether consecutive sentences can be imposed (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(a)) and subsequently found that there were "no constitutional limitations against multiple convictions and concurrent sentences for different offenses arising from multiple acts which are incidental to or motivated by some greater criminal objective." (Emphasis added.) (66 Ill.2d at 565, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838.) This court concluded that:

"Prejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved...