People v. Seigler, 89CA2030

• Decision Date: 07 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89CA2030,89CA2030
• Citation: 832 P.2d 980
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ron Adam SEIGLER, Defendant-Appellant. . A
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 980

832 P.2d 980

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ron Adam SEIGLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89CA2030.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. A.

Nov. 7, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1991.

Certiorari Granted June 22, 1992.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., A. William Bonner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Robin Desmond, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion by Chief Judge STERNBERG.

The defendant, Ron Adam Seigler, appeals a judgment of conviction of second degree murder and crime of violence. He asserts that the trial court's denial of his motions to recuse, to order a competency evaluation, and to exclude a portion of his videotaped statement constitute reversible error. In what we perceive to be his principal contention, he argues that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on heat of passion as it relates to second degree murder was error. We affirm.

The defendant was charged with one count of first degree murder and one count of crime of violence in the shooting death of his roommate, and a jury trial was set for October 2, 1989. On September 29, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to continue the trial, and on October 2, it denied his motion for a competency evaluation.

It also refused to grant his motions to recuse the court and for mistrial or, alternatively, for leave for counsel to withdraw and for appointment of new counsel. According to the accompanying affidavits, these motions were based upon the trial court's alleged prejudice against the defendant and his counsel as evidenced by its refusal to grant the competency hearing because of the court's belief that the request was a defense "ploy" to delay the trial.

During the trial, the defendant moved to exclude a portion of his videotaped statement on the grounds that it contained irrelevant, but highly prejudicial, information. Specifically, the defendant objected to the portion in which he talked about the deaths of three people with whom he had had relationships and to the portion in which he denied making a statement that he intended to kill his roommate. This motion was denied.

The evidence at trial indicated that the defendant and his roommate had been homosexual lovers and that the roommate had recently become sexually involved with another man. There was also evidence that the defendant and his roommate had engaged in a physical altercation prior to the roommate's death from a rifle shot. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the wound was self-inflicted, whether the defendant admitted to the shooting, and whether he had previously made threats to kill the victim. The jury was instructed on first degree murder and on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder, all degrees of manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide.

The instructions identified, as elements of "provoked passion" manslaughter, that the act causing death must have been performed under a sudden heat of passion that arose from a provocation by the victim which would affect a reasonable person and did affect the defendant and that it occurred where there was no interval between the provocation and the killing "sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard." The jury was also instructed that the burden of proving each element of a lesser offense rests with the prosecution. The court refused the defendant's tendered instruction identifying heat of passion as an affirmative defense to first or second degree murder.

I.

We consider first the defendant's contention that the court committed reversible error in its denial of his various motions.

A.

The defendant argues that when the trial court denied his motion for a competency evaluation, it exhibited a bias against him and his counsel which required recusal. We disagree.

Under § 16-6-201(1)(d), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), a judge must be disqualified if "[h]e is in any way interested or prejudiced with respect to the case, the parties, or counsel." And, when a motion for disqualification is filed, the court must accept the facts alleged in the motion and supporting affidavits as true and must determine, as a matter of law, its adequacy.

To be legally sufficient, the facts alleged in the motion must establish to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the judge has a bias or prejudice that will in all probability prevent him or her from dealing fairly with the defendant. Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952). However, "[p]rejudice must be distinguished from the sort of personal opinions that as a matter of course arise during a judge's hearing of a cause." Smith v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1055 (Colo.1981).

In this case, the defendant filed two motions to recuse. The accompanying affidavits asserted that the judge displayed bias when he stated that the motion for a competency hearing was a "ploy" to delay the trial. Although the trial court improperly denied these motions because it found the affidavits contained false statements, we conclude that its decision that the motion and affidavits were legally insufficient to require recusal was correct for other reasons. See People v. Baca, 193 Colo. 9, 562 P.2d 411 (1977) (a correct result reached upon an erroneous analysis is not grounds for reversal).

Section 16-8-111, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) provides that when the question of a defendant's incompetency to proceed is raised, the court shall make a preliminary finding and shall hold a hearing upon the request of either counsel.

In People v. Morino, 743 P.2d 49 (Colo.App.1987), this court addressed the nature of the showing necessary to raise the issue of a defendant's competency. We observed that § 16-8-110(2)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) requires a suspension of proceedings for a hearing on competency "only in those instances in which the judge 'has reason to believe' that the defendant is incompetent." We also stated that:

[T]here is an initial presumption of competency and no defendant is entitled as of right, to a competency examination or hearing merely by making a demand therefore, particularly if that demand is made only after the trial has commenced. The trial judge who, under such circumstances, has had the opportunity of observing defendant, his actions and general demeanor, has substantial discretion in determining whether an issue respecting his competency has been raised. (emphasis added)

Here, defense counsel refused to give specific reasons to support his opinion that the defendant was incompetent, saying only that he based his opinion on privileged information. He even refused the court's offer of an in camera hearing on the issue. See A v. District Court, 191 Colo. 10, 550 P.2d 315 (1976). Although in Morino the motion for a competency hearing was made after the jury was impaneled, the rationale supporting that decision applies here. The court in both instances had ample opportunity to observe the defendant. In addition, here the trial judge noted that the defendant had ably assisted in his case. Consequently, we hold that the court correctly ruled that the issue of competency had not been properly raised.

"The general rule of law is that what a judge learns in his judicial capacity is a proper basis for judicial observations, and that the use of such information is not the kind of matter that results in disqualification." Smith v. District Court, supra.

Here, the court's statement that the motion for a competency hearing was a "ploy" to delay the trial was adequately supported by what the judge learned in his judicial capacity during argument on pretrial motions concerning the defendant's competency. We agree with the trial court that such a statement does not constitute the kind of prejudice required for recusal.

B.

The defendant also contends that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence portions of his videotaped statement to the police. In this statement, the defendant denied an accusation that he told others that he intended to kill the victim. He also acknowledged that he had had three prior lovers who had died and that the victim was aware of this. The defendant argues that because these statements were irrelevant and highly prejudicial to him, their admission in evidence constitutes reversible error. We disagree.

"A determination that the probative value of evidence outweighs prejudice to the defendant is left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100 (Colo.1990). Such abuse will be found by a reviewing court only if an evidentiary ruling was "manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair." King v. People, 785 P.2d 596 (Colo.1990).

In this case, there was substantial evidence that the defendant had manifested an intent to kill the victim. Additionally, the defendant made no admission of guilt regarding the deaths of his former lovers. Moreover, these comments, while not excised from the tape, were not mentioned or highlighted by either the court or the prosecution. No reference was made to them during the examination of witnesses or during the prosecution's opening or closing arguments. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence these portions of the videotaped statement.

II.

The defendant's principal contention is that Colorado's statutory scheme requires him to assume the burden of proof in violation of his due process rights. He acknowledges our holding in People v. Carrier, 791 P.2d 1204 (Colo.App.1990) that the General Assembly has not chosen to include heat of passion as an affirmative defense to second degree murder. See § 18-1-701, et seq., C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). However, he claims that because the statute identifies heat of passion...