People v. Shermaine S. (In re Shermaine S.)

• Decision Date: 09 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–14–2421.,1–14–2421.
• Citation: 25 N.E.3d 723
• Parties: In re SHERMAINE S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Shermaine S., a Minor, Respondent–Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

25 N.E.3d 723

In re SHERMAINE S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee,

v. Shermaine S., a Minor, Respondent–Appellant).

No. 1–14–2421.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Jan. 9, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Jonathon Krieger, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, John E. Nowak, and Katarina Durcova, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Respondent contends the habitual offender provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ( 705 ILCS 405/5–815 (West 2012) ) is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.VIII) and the proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. (Ill. Const.1970, art I., § 11). The gist of his argument is that (i) the mandatory sentencing provision violates the eighth amendment by precluding the sentencing court from taking into consideration individualized factors about the minor, including the offender's youth and attendant characteristics as delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2468, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and (ii) taking away the sentencing court's discretion violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, which mandates a court consider rehabilitation in imposing a sentence. We are compelled to affirm based on existing precedent set forth some 35 years ago in People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d 67, 46 Ill.Dec. 156, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980).

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, respondent, 17–year–old Shermaine S., was convicted of robbery for taking an iPhone. Shermaine was adjudicated a delinquent minor and, because this was his third offense, sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) until his twenty first birthday as required by section 5–815(f) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–815(f) (West 2012)).

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On March 7, 2014, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for Shermaine, who was 16 years old at the time. The petition alleged that Shermaine stole an iPhone from Ashley Bradley and charged him with one count each of robbery, theft from person, and simple battery. The State proceeded on one count of robbery and entered nolle posequi on the other two counts. On March 13, 2014, the State gave notice of its intent to charge Shermaine as a habitual juvenile offender under section 5–815 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5–815 (West 2012) ), based on Shermaine's two prior adjudications for burglary.

¶ 5 At trial, Ashley Bradley testified that on March 6, 2014, she was walking home at about 11:30 a.m. near 46th Street and Lake Park Avenue, Chicago. As Bradley listened to music on her iPhone, a person she identified as Shermaine grabbed her from behind and reached for her phone, which she was carrying in her right hand. Bradley turned around and looked at Shermaine's face for a “good two seconds.” She said Shermaine told her to give him the phone but she resisted and tried to pull away. Shermaine then twisted her right arm, threw her to the ground, took the phone along with a Target bag she was holding in her left hand, and ran off. Bradley and a man standing nearby ran after Shermaine west on 46th Street and saw Shermaine turn right and head north on Woodlawn Avenue when they lost sight of him. Bradley used the man's cell phone to call the police.

¶ 6 A few minutes later, two Chicago police officers, Isaac Lee and Arturo Martinez, arrived in a marked squad car. The bystander who had assisted Bradley left the scene and was not questioned by the police. Bradley described the perpetrator as an 18– to 21–year–old African American male, 5 feet 8 inches to 6 feet tall, with a light to medium build, dreadlocks, dark skin, and wearing a long, black coat. Lee and Martinez drove Bradley around the area, and within about five minutes, Bradley saw Shermaine on the street and when he was about 15 feet away told the officers, “That's him.”

¶ 7 Officer Lee testified that Shermaine was walking briskly, but when he saw the squad car, he turned and started to run away. The officers followed Shermaine to a vacant lot, where Lee got out of the car and chased Shermaine on foot. Lee followed Shermaine to the back of an apartment building at 4335 South Berkeley. Lee said that as Shermaine went up the back steps, he saw Shermaine drop something into the vacant lot next door. Lee continued to pursue Shermaine, who was banging on the apartment door but was unable to gain entry. Lee arrested Shermaine on the apartment's porch landing. Lee later retrieved the object Shermaine dropped, Bradley's cell phone.

¶ 8 Shermaine testified that on March 6, 2014, he was visiting his aunt at her second-floor apartment at 4335 South Berkley. He left the apartment sometime before noon, and as he was walking to meet his mother, a man that Shermaine recognized from the neighborhood approached and offered to sell him a cell phone for $30. Shermaine said he “knew there was something to it, but [he] just bought” it anyway because he needed a phone. Shermaine continued walking. When he got to Drexel Avenue, Shermaine saw a university security police car nearby, got worried because he knew the phone was “not legit,” turned around and started walking back to his aunt's apartment. He said a police squad car then drove up and almost hit him. Shermaine starting running back to his aunt's apartment building, with the police car in pursuit. Shermaine went to the back of the apartment and banged on the door, but no one opened it. Shermaine threw the phone away and was placed under arrest. Shermaine denied having gone to 46th Street and Park Avenue that day, said he had never seen Ashley Bradley before the trial, and denied stealing her cell phone. On cross-examination, Shermaine stated that he could not identify the person from whom he bought the cell phone or remember what the man was wearing but described him as about his own age, with a similar hair style and hair color.

¶ 9 The jury found Shermaine guilty on one count of robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Shermaine should be sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender based on two dispositions for burglary in 2012 and 2013. Certified copies of court date summaries for the two prior adjudications were entered into evidence. Defense counsel acknowledged that the trial judge was “limited in discretion in this matter,” because the prerequisites were met to sentence Shermaine as a habitual juvenile offender.

¶ 10 Before sentencing Shermaine, the trial judge acknowledged he received Shermaine's social investigation report. The report stated, among other things, that in 2007, Shermaine was removed from his mother's custody for about a year in response to a report of child endangerment. Shermaine's father had numerous arrests and served time in the Department of Corrections, and Shermaine's mother was arrested for prostitution in 2012 and received a sentence of three months' supervision. Shermaine also had numerous contacts with law enforcement for various offenses, including battery, burglary, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. In 2011, Shermaine was shot in the leg while standing on a friend's porch. Shermaine was living with his mother in Gary, Indiana, and the whereabouts of his father were unknown. The report indicated that Shermaine loves his parents but that because of frequent fights with his mother, including physical violence against her, he has lived elsewhere for periods of time.

¶ 11 The circuit court found that it was in best interest of Shermaine and the public for Shermaine to be adjudged a ward of the court and that his parents were unfit or unable to care for him. The court also found, based on Shermaine's prior dispositions, that he was a habitual juvenile offender and sentenced him to a mandatory term of commitment to the DJJ until his twenty first birthday.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Shermaine contends the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because it removes the trial court's discretion in sentencing minors who are adjudicated habitual juvenile offenders. Shermaine relies primarily on the Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), to argue that removal of discretion violates the eighth amendment, which requires “a sentencer [to] follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. Shermaine asserts that it also violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, which mandates a court consider rehabilitation in imposing a sentence.

¶ 14 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution do not apply to juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition for adjudication of wardship. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill.2d 510, 520–21, 308 Ill.Dec. 292, 861 N.E.2d 623 (2006). The court explained that both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause apply only to the criminal process, “that is, to direct actions by the government to inflict punishment.” Id. at 518, 308 Ill.Dec. 292, 861 N.E.2d 623. The court concluded that an adjudication of wardship was not criminal in nature and therefore, was not a direct action by the State to inflict punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. Id. at 520–21, 308 Ill.Dec. 292, 861 N.E.2d 623. But,...