People v. Shope

• Decision Date: 16 February 1982
• Docket Number: Cr. 38195
• Citation: 128 Cal.App.3d 816,180 Cal.Rptr. 567
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Douglas SHOPE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 567

180 Cal.Rptr. 567

128 Cal.App.3d 816

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Douglas SHOPE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 38195.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Feb. 16, 1982.

Hearing Denied April 15, 1982.

Frederick L. McBride, Santa Ana, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., William R. Pounders and Elizabeth A. Baron, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

HASTINGS, Associate Justice.

Appellant was convicted after a court trial of three counts of receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496). He was sentenced to two years in state prison on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He now appeals from the judgment of conviction.

Three contentions are raised on appeal: (1) There was insufficient evidence to convict appellant of a violation of Penal Code section 496; (2) appellant's statements to police, prior to being arrested, should have been excluded as being a custodial interrogation without benefit of Miranda warnings; and (3) the failure of trial counsel to seek a pretrial suppression of evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) denied appellant the effective assistance of counsel.

FACTS

Appellant is the proprietor of Wagon Wheel Auto Salvage, which he purchased in January of 1978. On November 2, 1978, Deputy Sheriff James A. Raines of the Sheriff's Department Commercial Crimes Unit (Vehicle Theft) went to the Wagon Wheel to inspect the salvage yard. He announced his purpose to the "counter man" and asked to see the owner (appellant), who was not there at the time. Along with Sheriff's Sergeant Donald Bricker, he proceeded to take a tour of the yard. He saw several late-model "expensive-type" cars, a couple of which were "cut up" and the pieces scattered throughout various parts of the yard. His 10 1/2 years' experience investigating auto thefts led him to believe that these cars were stolen, since many showed no sign of collision damage and new car parts are highly valued in the auto salvage business.

Approximately 20 to 30 minutes after Deputy Raines arrived at the yard, he met appellant, who had just returned. He asked appellant to accompany him through the yard. The deputy pointed out parts of about seven different cars and asked appellant if he had any "paperwork" for them (either a "Notice of Acquisition" required by the Department of Motor Vehicles whenever a vehicle is purchased whole and dismantled on the premises, or bills of sale for the various parts). Appellant was unable to produce paperwork for any of the items. Appellant then said he had bought the yard in January of 1978 and everything the deputy pointed out was there at the time of the sale.

Deputy Raines ran a police vehicle check and was informed that certain of the parts found in the yard were from a stolen vehicle. The officers then took appellant to the Lakewood Sheriff's station, where he was arrested and given Miranda warnings.

It was determined that the parts removed from the premises were from three stolen vehicles: a 1972 Ford Ranchero, stolen from Jack Coleman on July 30, 1978; a 1978 Lincoln Continental Mark V, stolen from Barbara Blakely in September, 1978; and a 1976 Chevrolet Camaro, stolen from Garry Richardson in September, 1978. (All three owners testified at the trial. They identified their vehicles, or what was left of them, from police photographs and from inspections at various police impound yards. In addition, they provided keys to the police, which keys fit locks on the stolen vehicles.)

Appellant testified in his own behalf. He said that he bought the Wagon Wheel early in 1978 and had no previous experience in the auto salvage business, although he had owned a body shop for several years. Since he was out of the yard most of the time, much of the purchasing of autos and auto parts was done by two of his employees, a "counter man" and a bookkeeper who also took care of the paperwork required by the Department of Motor Vehicles. All purchases were in cash, and the only records as to how much was paid for each item were "paid out" slips, used to account for the cash taken from the cash drawer. Appellant did not have a cash register. He said it was possible for stolen vehicles and/or parts to get into his yard without him knowing, since his employees bought and sold all day long, with or without him there.

On the day he was arrested, he tried to locate the paperwork required by Deputy Raines, but could not do so. He said when he bought the yard, someone with more experience in the auto salvage business told him that if the police came and he did not have paperwork for a particular item, just to say that the item was there when he bought the yard. He didn't know how pieces of stolen autos got into his yard.

To rebut appellant's testimony that all of the stolen parts were there when he purchased the business in January of 1978, Sgt. Bricker testified that he had inspected the Wagon Wheel in March of 1978, in connection with another vehicle theft, and there were no late-model cars there at that time. Also, as stated above, it was shown that all of the vehicles in question were stolen during the period from July to September of 1978.

I

Sufficiency of Evidence.

In order to sustain a conviction for the crime of receiving stolen property, it must be established by substantial evidence that the particular property was stolen, and that the accused received, concealed or withheld the property from its owner, knowing it was stolen. (In re Richard T., 79 Cal.App.3d 382, 144 Cal.Rptr. 856.) Appellant contends that, aside from statements to the officers, which he feels the trial court should have suppressed, ¹ the evidence in this case was insufficient to find that he had personal knowledge that the property in his possession had been stolen.

Whenever the evidentiary support for a conviction is challenged on appeal, we will review the entire record, in the light most favorable to the judgment below, to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson, 26 Cal.3d 557, 562, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.)

Although knowledge that property has been stolen can seldom be proved by direct evidence (People v. Vann, 12 Cal.3d 220, 224, 115 Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824), "possession of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation or unsatisfactory explanation, will justify an inference that the goods were received with knowledge that they were stolen. Corroboration need only be slight and may be furnished by conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt." (In re Richard T., supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 382, 388, 144 Cal.Rptr. 856, citing People v. Myles, 50 Cal.App.3d 423, 428, 123 Cal.Rptr. 348 [citations omitted].)

Appellant does not dispute the fact that stolen property was found at the business which he owned. Under an administrative action to revoke or suspend his automobile dismantler's license, possession of the property alone would give rise to a prima facie presumption that he knew the property was stolen. (Veh.Code, § 11510.) This is a criminal proceeding, however, and so we give appellant the benefit of the doubt and require corroborating evidence to show that appellant in fact knew the property was stolen.

There was ample corroboration in this case. Appellant did not have the business records which he was required to keep on each vehicle. The paperwork which he introduced at trial was of little help to his case. He produced receipts for a rear body section and doors to a 1976 Camaro, which parts were purchased in July of 1978. However, the Camaro owned by Mr. Richardson was not stolen until September of 1978. Appellant did not offer any records pertaining to the specific vehicles which were the subject of this prosecution. There was also evidence that, despite appellant's testimony to the contrary, the vehicles in question were acquired whole and dismantled on appellant's premises. For instance, parts to Mrs. Blakely's Lincoln were found in various parts of the yard. When all of these were put together, all of the parts matched, down to the trim, and the torch marks fit together like "torn pieces of paper." There was no evidence of any collision damage to the car.

The evidence presented by the People was countered only by appellant's less than satisfactory explanation as to how he acquired the property in question. There was substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion that appellant knew he was dealing in stolen auto parts.

II

Secondly, appellant contends that the officers were required to advise him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, in connection with their inspection of the yard, and therefore all the statements he made to the officers during the inspection should have been suppressed. The trial court ruled that no Miranda warnings were required, since the officer was conducting an inspection authorized by statute and appellant, as a licensee, had a duty to provide the information which the officer requested.

At issue is the applicability to this case of Vehicle Code section 320, ² on which both the officer and the court relied as authority for the inspection of appellant's premises.

Relying on Addison v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 69 Cal.App.3d 486, 138 Cal.Rptr. 185, appellant claims that the last paragraph of section 320 specifically limits inspection of records during business hours to those licensees "conducting more than one type of business from an establishment." That paragraph reads as follows:

"A licensee issued an occupational license by the department and conducting more than one type of business from an...