People v. Slocum

• Decision Date: 19 November 1984
• Citation: 126 Misc.2d 364,481 N.Y.S.2d 984
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Judson W. SLOCUM, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 984

481 N.Y.S.2d 984

126 Misc.2d 364

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Judson W. SLOCUM, Defendant.

Franklin County Court.

Nov. 19, 1984.

James P. Bessette, Dist. Atty., Malone, for the People of the State of New York.

Robert H. Halliday, Potsdam, for defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

JAN H. PLUMADORE, Judge.

On July 15, 1984 at approximately 2:15 a.m., the body of Jean Cox was discovered lying on the left side of County Route 7, otherwise known as the Gale Road. The autopsy revealed that she died as a result of extensive intracranial hemorrhage caused by a transverse fracture at the base of the skull due to blunt injury to the back of the head. As a result of the state police investigation the Defendant gave a statement which was introduced in evidence before the grand jury, the relevant portions of which are reproduced below:

"While we were in the bar I had one drink with this girl and we stood near the juke box and talked. After about a half hour I decided to go and asked this same girl if she wanted to go with me. She said she did and we both went out in the parking lot where we talked for awhile. We both then got in my truck. I drove. I turned right out of the parking lot onto the Gale Rd. towards route 11B to go parking again. We had only gone a short distance down the road when she opened the passenger door of the truck and jumped out. I wasn't going very fast and I kept going down the Gale Rd. After she jumped out I reached over and pulled the door shut. I did not go back to check on her. I just kept going...."

"I have read this statement and want to add that when we left the Pleasant View Tavern it was my intention to go parking. The girl thought that I was going to take her home. When I turned the opposite way of where her house was, she asked me where we were going because her house was the other way. I told her we were going parking. She protested and said she didn't want to go parking again. I said something to the affect that I would bring her home afterwards. That is when she jumped out of the truck."

The "parking again" refers to the (corroborated) fact that Defendant and decedent had earlier that evening left the bar for a time and then returned. The oral statements made to a B.C.I. investigator track the apparently inculpatory portions of the written, with the addition of a statement that the Defendant thought that he was going about twenty miles per hour when the deceased jumped out and, in one instance, that he "let her out" or that "she got out" of the truck. The grand jury returned I-55-84 charging the Defendant with leaving the scene of an incident without reporting in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600, subd. 2(a).

The thrust of Defendant's motion to dismiss is threefold: 1) that actual knowledge of both the hit (accident or culpability and injury) and run (flight or continuance of trip) is the standard of proof, 2) that the grand jury was entitled, nay, must be instructed as to the law of scienter and its applicability on our facts, and 3) if only minimally, that there was no "accident" (within the meaning of V. & T. § 600).

The People respond in essence 1) that the degree of scienter required is a matter for the trier of fact and any jury charge thereto, 2) that grand jury charges re: scienter may be required, if at all, only on a case-by-case basis (and ours is not one), and 3) that reading § 600 to the grand jury before and after the evidence was presented is sufficient to satisfy People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 426 N.Y.S.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d 1140).

The law regarding scienter in leaving-the-scene prosecutions has been clear in this state for years: the People must prove that the Defendant knewor had reason to know a) that there was an accident/collision and b) that injury/damage resulted (People on Complaint of O'Connor v. Hirsch, 241 A.D. 712, 269 N.Y.S. 830; People v. Hakala, 270 A.D. 612, 61 N.Y.S.2d 718; People v. Spiegelman, 19 A.D.2d 538, 240 N.Y.S.2d 40; People v. Petterson, 103 A.D.2d 811, 477 N.Y.S.2d 691; People v. Dorsey, 102 A.D.2d 123, 477 N.Y.S.2d 747). People v. Hager, 124 Misc.2d 123, 476 N.Y.S.2d 442 extends this concept on its facts to include whether or not a Defendant left the scene knowingly or intentionally.

The Defendant in Hager claimed that a form of amnesia prevented him from forming any sort of mental state vis-a-vis leaving the scene and, as pointed out by the learned court, this was the central factual (and, as it turned out, legal) issue in the case. The court determined that, because the District Attorney had failed to instruct the grand jury as to the definitions and applicability of knowledge, intoxication and voluntariness (emphasis ours) to leaving the scene of the incident, the integrity of the proceeding was impaired (C.P.L. §§ 210.35, subd. 5 and 190.25, subd. 6) and the indictment had to be dismissed.

Our facts, essentially embodied by Defendant's statements, are markedly different. There is no claim of amnesia, shock, intoxication, or failure to perceive either the event that had just taken place or the fact that he left the scene. Rather, it is propounded that because the People merely charged § 600, as did the People in Hager, the indictment must be dismissed. The status of the law in the Third Department, however, is to the contrary.

In another § 600 prosecution (People v. Dorsey, supra) the Appellate Division recently held that People v. Calbud, supra does not require that the definition of knowingly be read to the grand jury. Since nothing in our facts can be said to approach the situation in Hager, i.e. take this case outside the holding in Dorsey, the motion to dismiss on this ground will be denied.

There is, however, a more troublesome issue raised by the state of our facts (and tangentially by Defendant's motion papers). As was touched on supra, the only thing legally sufficient to link Defendant with the death of Jean Cox are his statements, specifically the...